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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
James R. Lilley
An analytical schism has developed over differing
assessments of China’s military modernization. Underlying
this debate are at least two key questions. First, will the
ongoing China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
modernization provide China with significant offensive
power projection and/or preemptive capability? If so, by
when? Second, does the pace and success of China’s military
modernization constitute a threat to the United States
and/or its friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific region?
At the source of these differing views on the pace and
likely success of the PLA modernization is a lack of hard
evidence, aggravated by a Chinese tendency to conceal both
strengths and weaknesses. There are also analysts who are
locked into positions on the PLA that the evidence seems
unable to alter. Lack of information is often muddied by
anecdotal knowledge, sometimes provided by Chinese
interlocutors, that may be impossible to confirm or refute. In
addition, a large body of conventional wisdom about the
PLA has built up over time, which may inhibit fresh
reassessment. Finally, peer comparisons of the PLA to the
U.S. military, which is without equal in the post-Cold War
period, may shape analysis of the PLA’s capabilities and
shortfalls. As a result, conclusions about China’s military
modernization often leave considerable room for interpretation on any side of an argument.
The policy decisions made today based in part on the
absence of hard analysis will likely haunt U.S. and allied
policy and interests well into the 21st century, as China’s
comprehensive strength and historic aspirations mature. In
order to minimize miscalculations about the PLA
1

modernization, debate is essential, for it can help reduce the
twin analytical evils of overestimation and underestimation. Debate can reduce wishful thinking or
demonization about China’s strategic capability and
intentions. It may also preclude counterproductive
self-imposed constraints on U.S. policy options based on
fear of self-fulfilling prophecies of a China threat. Active
debate, finally, can lead to a reevaluation of old, well-worn
assumptions, and spur greater exploitation of publicly
available information about the PLA and China’s national
security. All of this would potentially help to develop a
clearer picture of China’s People’s Liberation Army After
Next into the 21st century.
The 1999 PLA Conference, which was hosted jointly by
the American Enterprise Institute and the U.S. Army War
College’s Strategic Studies Institute, convened September
10-12, 1999, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The goal of
this conference was to comprehensively examine Chinese
military modernization efforts. The meeting drew together
leading experts on the PLA army, navy, air force, missile
forces, and national defense industries and included PLA
experts with opposing views on the pace and likely success
of Chinese military modernization. Lively debate
continually probed analytical differences and prejudices, as
well as the sources of information upon which conclusions
were based. The conference also included a preliminary yet
timely examination of the PLA’s potential application of
information warfare. An initial discussion of the postKosovo implications for China’s Taiwan strategy and
China’s foreign military relations also took place.
“Going Places or Running in Place? China’s Efforts to
Leverage Advanced Technologies for Military Use,” by
Richard Bitzinger, opened the conference, and is Chapter 2
in this volume. Bitzinger finds that China’s militaryindustrial complex has achieved some success in technology
leveraging over the past 20 years, and as a result, it has
improved its production capabilities to develop and deploy
some relatively modern weapon systems. In particular, it
2

has made real progress in the areas of ballistic and cruise
missiles.
Overall, however, these accomplishments tend to be the
exceptions that prove the rule. Particularly when it comes to
fighter aircraft, surface combatants, and ground
equipment, the Chinese still confront severe problems when
moving from prototypes to production, including drawn-out
development times, program slippage, and small and fitful
production runs. Bitzinger argues that China’s defense
industries fail mainly due to endemic technical, structural,
and cultural problems. A shortage of technical skills,
overcapacity, underfunding, and a bureaucratic, hierarchical and risk-averse work environment have all
impeded technology leveraging. Moreover, he contends that
current defense industry reforms do little to remove or
overcome these impediments. As a result, he concludes the
PLA will find it difficult to rely on its domestic defense
industry to meet many of its more ambitious, near-term
military modernization goals.
Chapter 3, “PLA Logistics and Doctrine Reform,
1999-2009,” by Lonnie Henley, discusses operational
changes, as well as the 10-year effort announced by General
Wang Ke, Chief of the General Logistics Department, in
November 1998, to restructure and reform PLA logistics to
support mobile warfare. Henley argues that logistics
reforms address critical weaknesses in the PLA’s ability to
fight a modern war in or near Chinese territory, while
operational changes seek to combine restructuring of
ground forces with improved doctrine. Together these
changes will help the PLA to “progress toward competent
combined-arms operations” with effective joint operations
as the ultimate goal. Henley assesses that these changes,
even if successful, may not significantly increase China’s
power projection capability. He does argue, however, that
changes in logistics and operations will improve the PLA’s
ability to move and sustain its forces within China and
around its periphery.
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In Chapter 4, “Potential Applications of PLA
Information Warfare Capabilities to Critical Infrastructures,” William C. Triplett II discusses the potential
for the PLA to conduct offensive information warfare
operations against critical civilian infrastructures in the
United States, and how such an operation might unfold.
Triplett’s discussion is particularly timely in the wake of the
May 2000 “I Love You” software virus that crippled
hundreds of thousands of computer systems throughout the
1
world, reportedly penetrating even into classified
2
Pentagon systems. Triplett notes the PLA has shown
intense interest in information warfare with top level
support of PLA leaders, such as General Fu Quanyou, Chief
of the General Staff, PLA, and generous funding. He
observes that PLA Informational Warfare theorists stress
the need for a preemptive strike capability, which Stokes
and others in this volume note has become a fundamental
underpinning of the PLA’s overall military strategy of
“active defense.” Triplett argues that the United States,
Taiwan, and Japan (a key ally in the Asia-Pacific region) are
vulnerable to cyber-attack on critical transportation,
communications, and financial networks. Triplett
concludes with a warning that the “gap between what
information warfare is capable of accomplishing and the
non-action by the defenders” is growing daily, which
demands greater attention and action in the United States,
Japan, and Taiwan.
“China’s Military Space and Conventional Theater
Missile Development: Implications for Security in the
Taiwan Strait,” by Mark A. Stokes is Chapter 5. Stokes
asserts that China is establishing “one of the most daunting
conventional theater missile challenges in the world,” which
the PLA views as an asymmetrical “trump card” against a
superior force. He argues that theater conventional
missiles, supported by spaced-based reconnaissance and
combined with a preemptive strategy, provide Beijing with
a keen psychological tool and possible military advantage,
particularly in the Taiwan Strait. China’s theater
4

conventional missiles and space reconnaissance architecture are emerging as the cornerstone of Chinese
warfighting strategy. They form a relatively cheap and
expeditious compensation for shortcomings in China’s navy
and air force (see Chapters 6 and 8 in this volume), and they
are being developed based on the PLA’s assessment of U.S.
military weaknesses—reliance on space systems, aircraft
carrier battle groups, and expeditionary air forces.
Stokes also asserts that a disturbing convergence has
occurred between Chinese leaders and American political
and sympathetic academic circles who argue that any
missile defense against the PLA’s growing arsenal of
increasingly accurate and lethal missiles would be
destabilizing and lead to an arms race. Stokes counters this
argument by noting that, if the PLA achieves an
overwhelming offensive missile advantage, this would
intensify the already existing arms race and could
destabilize the cross strait balance, causing Taiwan to “shift
toward a tactically offensive doctrine,” including a nuclear
weapon, to deter the PLA’s overwhelming missile threat.
In Chapter 6, “PLA Air Force Operations and Modernization,” Kenneth W. Allen argues that the PLA Air Force
(PLAAF) is undergoing a “crucial transition” from an
obsolete giant with short operational legs and limited
all-weather capability to an “offensive-oriented force with
extended range and greater lethality,” able to fight local,
limited wars under high-tech conditions. To achieve this
transformation, the PLAAF has expanded its defensive
doctrine to include both offensive and defensive operations.
Allen points out that with the modernization of its
equipment, the PLAAF has been able to modernize its
tactics, extend its combat range, and practice providing
support to naval and ground operations. In addition, Allen
describes the transformation of the 15th Airborne Army
into a formidable rapid reaction force with three divisions as
one of the most important changes in recent PLAAF
campaign strategy.
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Despite improvements across the board, however, Allen
argues that the PLAAF still lags far behind its
modernization goals. It retains a mixed fleet of modern
aircraft, such as the J-11 (SU-27), alongside 1950s vintage
aircraft, while its ability to conduct all-weather flying and
extended operations—essential to support an offensive
strategy—are questionable. Further, China’s ability to
exploit foreign advanced technologies and equipment in
production and utilization of advanced aircraft is (as
Bitzinger has also observed) a limitation. Still, Allen
concludes that PLAAF shortfalls will not inhibit its
dedication to completing its assigned missions, nor do its
shortfalls reassure regional powers of China’s long-term
regional capabilities and intentions. As Allen points out,
based on recent research throughout the region, Asian
countries watch the PLA very closely and with growing
concern that it could develop sustained combat capabilities
within the next 10-15 years.
In Chapter 7, “The Kosovo War: Implications for
Taiwan,” Arthur C. Waldron addresses the lessons of
Operation ALLIED FORCE on China’s calculus to use force
against Taiwan, if necessary, to quickly and decisively
impose reunification as a fait accompli before the United
States has time to intervene. Beneath China’s frantic
rhetoric, which was feverishly fanned by the accidental
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, is the
recognition that time is running out for China. The concept
of sovereignty is less sacrosanct now among the international community, which has demonstrated that it will act
to stop genocide and other atrocities within a country’s
borders. Waldron asserts Operation ALLIED FORCE also
demonstrated the limitations of military force to resolve
issues. Its lessons suggest that the application of force is no
longer a viable option for China to resolve the Taiwan
problem. Further, Taiwan’s indigenous democracy
increasingly is recognized by the international community
as legitimate, which makes the possibility of the use of force
even more complicated and risky for China.
6

Chapter 8, “China’s Maritime Strategy,” by Bernard D.
Cole, examines the development of China’s maritime
strategic thinking and its recent attempts to transform the
PLA Navy (PLAN) from a coastal, “brown water” (out to 100
nautical miles) to an open ocean “blue water” force that is
capable of reaching the “second island chain,” defined as a
line from Japan through the Bonin, Marianas, and Caroline
Islands by 2020. The PLAN faces daunting limitations in its
efforts to develop into a power projection force, according to
Cole. The most serious shortfall for the PLAN is a lack of air
power at sea, but it also lacks in virtually all categories
affecting modern naval operations—training and
education; naval systems and platforms; naval warfare
technology and systems; doctrine and tactics; command and
control; intelligence; strategic planning; leadership; and
influence within the national strategy-making structure.
Cole observes that the PLAN’s stated goal to achieve a “blue
water” navy, which presently targets U.S. naval capability,
serves as an impetus to protect and expand the PLAN’s
share of the military budget. Cole notes that, despite recent
purchases from the Russians and overall improvements of
the navy, there is no evidence to support that the PLAN has
initiated the major modernization effort that would be
required to actually transform the largely coastal navy into
a power projection force by 2020.
In summary, Cole and Allen raise important questions
and considerable doubt about the likely success of PLAN
and PLAAF modernization, respectively, over the next
10-20 years. Bitzinger also seriously questions the efficacy
of China’s national defense industries to sustain
modernization, while Henley raises skepticism about
whether China’s military logistics support, an essential
underpinning of power projection, can reach its goals.
Nonetheless, all agree that China actively seeks a
strong, modern military force, with power projection
capability to protect and promote China’s national interests
within the region and beyond, and that it has openly added
“preemptive strike” to its operational strategy. Since China
7

clearly recognizes its own shortcomings, and the gap
between its military capabilities and those of the United
States, as well as against a regional power such as Japan, it
seeks ways to compensate for these deficiencies with
surprise and asymmetrical operations, perhaps including
information warfare and conventional missile strikes. The
PLA’s ongoing military modernization and emphasis on
surprise and preemption combine with China’s refusal to
renounce the use of force against a democratic Taiwan and
its territorial claims over the South China Sea to heighten
concern about China’s intentions and capabilities within
the region.
CHAPTER 1 - ENDNOTES
1. John Markoff, “A Rogue Software Program Attacks Computers
Worldwide,” New York Times, May 5, 2000, p. 1.
2. Associated Press, “Virus Infects Classified Pentagon Systems,”
Colorado Springs Gazette, May 6, 2000, Early Bird, May 8, 2000.
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CHAPTER 2
GOING PLACES OR RUNNING
IN PLACE?
CHINA’S EFFORTS TO LEVERAGE
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES
FOR MILITARY USE
Richard A. Bitzinger
China’s current efforts to modernize its armed forces
have been the subject of considerable foreign inquiry and
1
assessment. As part of this modernization process, Beijing
has gone to considerable lengths to find and acquire
advanced defense and defense-related (i.e., dual-use)
technologies—both through indigenous research and
development (R&D) activities and via foreign inputs.
Beyond the mere acquisition of potentially useful
technologies, however, China must also be able to
effectively leverage—that is, to absorb, assimilate, and
exploit—these technologies for military purposes.
This chapter specifically addresses China’s recent
efforts to leverage advanced technologies for military use.
The conclusion reached here is that the Chinese militaryindustrial complex continues to experience considerable
difficulties in assimilating and exploiting advanced
technologies for military purposes, particularly imported
technologies. Admittedly, China’s military-industrial
complex has experienced some genuine successes in
technology leveraging over the past 20 years, and as a
result, it has made incremental improvements both in its
military products and production capabilities. Beijing is
certainly building some better weapons, and its defense
factories are considerably improved. On the whole,
however, Chinese success with leveraging advanced
9

technologies has been—and will likely remain—narrowly
constrained, fitful, and slow. In some areas, China’s
military-industrial complex has extracted a few tangible
benefits from advanced technologies inputs, while in other
areas developments have been insufficient to close critical
technological gaps with likely military competitors.
Moreover, this chapter finds that these failures are due
mainly to technical, structural, and cultural impediments
inherent in the country’s defense industrial base, and that
current efforts to reform China’s defense industry are doing
little to remove or overcome these impediments. As a result,
Beijing will continue to find it difficult to rely predominantly on its indigenous defense industry in order to acquire
advanced conventional weapons necessary to meet its
military modernization goals.
At the same time, it is acknowledged here that various
gaps and limitations exist in this chapter. By focusing
mainly on the “kinetic” aspects of military power—that is,
lethal items like missiles, combat aircraft, warships, and
ground ordnance, along with their main subsystems and
components (like radar and defense electronics)—one is
obviously omitting much of the field of information-based
systems, an admittedly embryonic area of warfighting
where the Chinese may be making more progress in
technology assimilation and application than is immediately evident. This is an area that demands closer
investigation. In addition, there are limits to empirically
analyzing and assessing Chinese success and failure with
technology absorption and leveraging, at least where the
military-industry complex is concerned. One is bounded by
what evidence one can find in the public record, which is
often less than satisfactory in terms of detail or amounts of
information. In addition, what one sees is open to differing
interpretations. Finally, much of this information is secondhand and filtered through someone else’s perceptions,
creating even more subjectivity. Despite these drawbacks
and limitations, the inductive approach used here can still
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be useful in providing insights into China’s experiences
with leveraging technologies for military purposes.
Chinese Technology Acquisition Activities.
Several Western analysts have meticulously
documented Chinese efforts to develop advanced
technologies for actual or projected military uses. These
writings indicate a particular interest on the part of the
Chinese military in such technology areas as long-range
precision-strike, command, control, communications,
4
computing, and intelligence (C I), information warfare, and
2
area denial. For example, China is working on many of the
requisite technologies necessary to producing an indigenous
land-attack cruise missile (LACM), including airframe
design (perhaps adapting its C-802 antiship cruise missile
to a LACM profile), propulsion systems (such as small
turbojet engines and ramjets/scramjets), and guidance
technologies (such as GPS for in-flight navigation and
terrain contour matching guidance[TERCOM], imaging
infrared, or synthetic aperature radar [SAR] for terminal
3
homing). In addition, it is developing laser-, IR-, or
TV-guided precision-guided munitions, railgun and
microwave weapons, and antisatellite (ASATs) laser
weapons, global positioning system (GPS) guidance for
ballistic missiles, multiple rocket launchers armed with
smart submunitions, sea mines, and a seeker for an
4
active-radar-homing air-to-air missile. China has also
demonstrated at least some low observability (LO)
technological capabilities for reduced radar cross-sections
and heat signatures. At the 1998 China Airshow in Zhuhai,
for example, a Chinese company, Seek Optics, claimed that
it had developed a number of radar-absorbent materials and
coatings, which could be applied to aircraft, cruise missiles,
5
or warships.
Much of China’s recent technology development
activities are civilian in nature and in origin, albeit with
considerable potential for commercial-to-military spin-on.
11

Beijing is conducting a wide variety of basic and applied
R&D, designed to raise the general level of the country’s
science and technology (S&T) base, including solid-state
phased-array radar, ultra-wide band radar technology and
6
photoreconnaissance, and remote sensing. The military
also stands to gain by piggybacking on technology
breakthroughs initiated via the country’s “863” and
“Super-863” programs. The 863 Program was initiated in
March 1986 as an essentially civilian/commercial S&T
development program, but with considerable potential for
military spin-on—signified by the fact that it was
co-managed by the Commission on Science, Technology, and
Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), China’s main
defense R&D oversight organization. The 863 Program
concentrated on seven main areas for long-term S&T
development: astronautics, information technologies,
biotechnology, lasers, automation, energy, and new
materials. The Super-863 Program, which succeeded the
863 Program in 1996, focused subsequent long-term
Chinese S&T development in such key areas as machine
tools and computerized manufacturing systems,
microelectronics and telecommunications, bioengineering,
exotic materials, and nuclear, aviation, space, and marine
7
technologies. For example, China is working on forming a
4
national information infrastructure for improved C I
interconnectivity, including a high-speed fiber-optic
8
computer network and a satellite communications system.
In addition to indigenous S&T developments, China has
greatly increased its imports of military technology and
9
know-how. According to research done by Richard Fisher,
10
Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, and others, China has acquired
a broad array of defense technologies from foreign
sources—primarily Russia, but also Israel and Western
Europe—including:
• Cruise missiles. Several Russian institutes
reportedly have sold cruise missile technology and have
provided Russian advisors and technicians to work on
Chinese cruise missile programs. For example, China may
12

be receiving Russian stealth technology applicable to
fielding a low-observable cruise missile. In addition, Israel
reportedly has supplied China with technology relating to a
jet-powered drone, which could conceivably be adapted to
11
attack.
• Reconnaissance satellites. China and Brazil plan to
orbit a series of earth observation satellites, called CBERS;
the first CBERS satellite will likely be operational by 2000.
At the same time, Canada and Russia reportedly are
providing China with SAR sensor technologies for
earth-observation satellites that could also be applied to
12
military imaging satellites.
• Electronic intelligence (ELINT). Israel and Russia
reportedly have supplied ELINT equipment to the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA), which is being incorporated into
13
special, missionized aircraft.
• Medium-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
China reportedly has received Patriot SAM technology via
Israel, as well as acquiring several hundred SA-10 SAMs
from Russia; according to Fisher and others, technology
from these missiles could be exploited for China’s
14
indigenous HQ-9 medium-range SAM program.
• Fighter aircraft. China is currently producing under
license up to 200 Russian-designed fourth-generation Su-27
fighters. In addition, China’s developmental J-10 (F-10)
fighter reportedly is heavily based on technology derived
15
from Israel’s cancelled Lavi fighter jet program.
• Combat radar and other avionics. Russia, Israel,
and Western Europe are providing radar and avionics to a
number of Chinese development combat aircraft
programs—including the FC-1 and the J-8IIM fighters.
Although most of these programs are for re-export, such
cooperation may provide China with opportunities for
technology exploitation that could advance China’s own
16
indigenous R&D bases.
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• Air-to-air missiles (AAMs) and precision-guided
munitions (PGMs). Israel reportedly has granted China a
license to produce its short-range Python-3 AAM. In
addition, China has reportedly purchased laser-guided
artillery projectiles and bombs, and TV-guided PGMs from
17
Russia.
• Submarines. The Russian submarine-design bureau
Rubin reportedly is assisting China in developing its
next-generation nuclear attack submarine (SSN), which
could also aid Chinese efforts to build a new nuclear18
powered, ballistic-missile-carrying submarine (SSBN).
In addition to providing direct technology assistance to
China’s military-industrial complex, foreign suppliers may
be inadvertently advancing Beijing’s military modernization efforts by selling it equipment that the Chinese could
either reverse-engineer or use for the purposes of
technology exploitation. The Chinese have already
reverse-engineered several pieces of military equipment,
including France’s AS-350 helicopter (produced by China as
19
the Z-11 ), the Italian Aspide AAM/SAM (built by China as
20
the PL-11 AAM and the LY-60 SAM ) and the French
Crotale short-range surface-to-air missile (produced by
China as the FM-80). The Chinese PL-9 short-range
air-to-air missile reportedly is a reverse-engineered version
21
of the Israeli-supplied Python-3 AAM. In addition,
according to the Cox Report, in the early 1980s the Chinese
purchased two CFM-56 turbofan engines (used in
commercial and military transport aircraft) and attempted
to reverse-engineer the engine, ostensibly for military uses.
In particular, foreign commercial technology
transfers—particularly those implemented under the
auspices of defense conversion—have provided Beijing with
opportunities to acquire advanced dual-use technologies
that could be redirected to the arms industry. The West has
been a critical supplier of investments and technologies that
are helping China develop civilian high-tech sectors within
its defense industry, which in turn could help underwrite
14

the design and manufacture of sophisticated weapon
systems. Such dual-use technology transfers include not
only “hardware”—such as technical specifications and
licenses (e.g., for the local production of advanced materials,
metallurgy, propulsion, computers, microelectronics, and
electro-optics) and production and process technology (such
as sophisticated machine tools and workforce training),
and, above all, money (to support the modernization of
Chinese factories and product lines)—but also
“software”—more intangible but nevertheless critical
elements such as quality assurance and Western
management and marketing skills, which could indirectly
22
aid defense production.
For nearly 20 years, Western aerospace companies have
been involved in extensive technology transfers to China’s
commercial aviation industry. For example, the McDonnell
Douglas Corporation (now part of the Boeing Aircraft
Company), as part of its so-called Trunkliner program with
China, established a production and assembly line in
Shanghai to build its series of MD-80 and MD-90 passenger
jets. As part of this arrangement, the Chinese purchased
from McDonnell Douglas a number of large computerized,
numerically controlled machine tools, including multi-axis
milling and profiling machines, that the company had lying
23
unused in a closed aircraft plant.
Boeing and the
European Airbus consortium have also helped establish
production facilities in China for subassemblies and parts
production. In addition, Eurocopter, Sikorsky Helicopter,
Pratt & Whitney jet engines, Bombardier of Canada,
Hexcell, ATR (a Franco-Italian regional aircraft
consortium), and Allied Signal have all established joint
ventures in China for coproducing aerospace systems or
24
components. The Cox Report also asserts that Beijing
attempted to use a joint venture with Pratt & Whitney,
25
Canada, to help it develop a military jet engine.
China’s shipbuilding industry has also benefited greatly
from both commercialization and foreign technology inputs.
According to Evan Medeiros, beginning in the 1980s,
15

Chinese shipyards successfully converted much of their
production to profitable civilian products, such as bulk
carriers and general cargo ships. Moving into commercial
shipbuilding both demanded and permitted the extensive
modernization and expansion of Chinese shipyards; over
the past 15-20 years, these yards have added greatly to their
productive capacity, building huge dry-docks and heavy-lift
cranes. At the same time, they entered into a number of
technical cooperation agreements and joint ventures with
shipbuilding firms in Japan, South Korea, Germany, and
other countries, providing the Chinese with advanced
shipbuilding design and manufacturing technologies—in
particular, computer-assisted design and manufacturing,
hull construction integration systems, propulsion systems,
and numerically controlled processing and testing
equipment—training, capital, and other know-how.
Medeiros adds that commercialization and internationalization has led to important changes in the way Chinese
shipbuilding enterprises are run, resulting in a more
market-oriented and decentralized management. As a
result, military shipbuilding programs collocated at these
yards theoretically should be able to take advantage of these
infrastructure and software improvements to design,
develop, and construct improved warships. Some Chinese
shipbuilding facilities can build ships of 150,000-200,000
tons—large enough to permit construction of an aircraft
26
carrier.
Another critical civil/commercial technology area with
far-reaching implications for spin-on is microelectronics.
The development of a world-class microelectronics sector
has been a government industrial development since the
27
early 1990s. Particular attention has been paid to creating
an indigenous semiconductor manufacturing capability.
The most significant manifestation of this effort has been
the 909 Project, which entailed the establishment of the
$1.2 billion Huahong Company near Shanghai—built with
technology and funding provided by Japan’s NEC
Corporation—which this year began production of
16

64-megabit memory chips with 0.30 micron widths.
Huahong-NEC is currently turning out 5,000 200mm
(8-inch) wafers a month, and production will eventually rise
28
to 20,000 wafers a month.
The United States has also been an important supplier of
dual-use information technologies that could be redirected
towards China’s military-industrial complex, including
computers, encryption technology, and fiber-optic and
29
microprocessor manufacturing equipment.
Thanks to
these and other foreign investments, China is becoming
increasingly proficient in the areas of telecommunications,
semiconductors, software, and information-processing—all
of which provide China with growing opportunities for
spin-on, particularly when it comes to developing tools for
harnessing the information revolution in warfare.
Technology Leveraging: An Empirical Assessment.
China has clearly gained access to considerable amounts
of militarily useful technologies and know-how. The next
step is to assess how well China’s defense industry is doing
in effectively leveraging (i.e., absorbing and exploiting)
these technologies. In this regard, at least two empirical
approaches are possible. First, one can attempt to infer
Chinese progress in technology absorption and leveraging
by examining its success in getting positive results from its
military-industrial complex in the form of new advanced
weapon systems. In particular, such a “results-based”
approach should look not only at what the Chinese are
capable of developing, but also their progress in translating
R&D developments into the timely, serial production of
sophisticated weaponry. Second, at the level of armaments
production, there is a growing body of anecdotal evidence to
permit at least a partial assessment of Chinese capabilities
in leveraging advanced manufacturing technologies,
particularly in the aviation and shipbuilding industries.
Technology Leveraging at the Product Level: A
“Results-Based” Analysis. China, of course, has made its
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most significant production breakthroughs in the area of
missile systems, especially surface-to-surface ballistic
missiles (SSMs) and antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs). In
fact, it has become almost de rigueur to refer to China’s
missile industry as an “island [or pocket] of excellence” in
the country’s military-industrial complex. Beijing has
indigenously developed a full range of surface-to-surface
missiles—from short-range artillery rockets to mediumrange, road-mobile systems to intercontinental and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (ICBMs and
SLBMs). Moreover, China has demonstrated the ability to
produce solid-fueled and/or multistage missile systems,
including space-launch vehicles.
With regard to tactical missile systems, the 600
km-range DF-15 (M-9) and the 300 km-range DF-11 (M-11)
SSMs are perhaps the most well-known. According to
Wendy Frieman, the DF-15 and DF-11 missiles
“represent[s] another class of weapon that China did not
have in the early 1980s—solid-fuel rocket motors— largely
30
based on indigenous R&D.” Moreover, China is
expected to incorporate satellite-assisted navigation
(probably GPS or the Russian GLONASS system) into these
31
missiles to improve their accuracy. Production of these
two missile systems appears to be already well-underway:
Press reports indicate that the number of DF-15 and DF-11
SSMs deployed along Taiwan Strait has grown from 30-50
around the time of the 1995/1996 Straits crisis to 160-200 in
early 1999, and that this figure could rise to 650 by 2005—
indicating the Chinese could be producing around 50-100 of
32
these missiles annually.
Another bright spot in the country’s military-industrial
complex is the antiship cruise missile sector. Again, foreign
technology inputs have been critical to Chinese weapons
development. The Silkworm family of ASCMs, of course, is
based on the Soviet SS-N-2 Styx, while the more modern
C-801 and C-802 ASCMs are reportedly derived from the
33
French Exocet. Moreover, France reportedly supplied a
34
small turbojet engine to power the C-802. More recently,
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China has unveiled an entirely indigenous and all-new
ASCM: the short-range, TV-guided C-701, displayed
publicly for the first time at the 1998 China Airshow in
35
Zhuhai. China’s success with developing and producing
reasonably advanced ASCMs suggests “an ability to
integrate relatively modern Western technology into
36
existing Chinese designs.”
Directly drawing upon its successes in producing
antiship cruise missiles, China is reportedly progressing on
the development of a land-attack cruise missile. A January
2000 article in Jane’s Defense Weekly asserts that China’s
main ASCM academies have been working on a
LACM—known as the X-600 or HN-1—since the late
37
1970s. The missile is similar in appearance to the Russian
Kh-55/AS-15 strategic cruise missile, although with a
shorter range (600 kilometers), fueling speculation that the
X-600 could be a derivative of the Kh-65 missile (itself a
short-range version of the Kh-55), which Russia has
38
reportedly transferred to China. Jane’s states that the
X-600/HN-1 entered service with the PLA in 1992, but this
has not been confirmed officially. At the very least, however,
China could deploy a rudimentary land-attack cruise
39
missile by the middle of the next decade.
Other areas of missile development and production
where China is apparently demonstrating some success in
exploiting imported technologies are air-to-air
missiles—such as the PL-9 (a modified Python-3) and the
PL-7 (believed to be a reverse-engineered version the
40
French-designed R550 Magic AAM )—and surface-to-air
systems—such as the QW-1 shoulder-launched SAM (which
41
reportedly incorporates Stinger technology ), and the
FM-90 SAM (an upgraded version of Crotale-derived
42
FM-80, featuring a faster missile and a longer range ).
A few other sectors outside of the missile industry also
show promise. One of these is the diesel submarine (SSK)
shipbuilding industry: China has developed a modern
indigenous SSK—the Song-class—featuring a more
19

hydrodynamically efficient design and an asymmetrical
43
seven-bladed propeller, for quieter running.
With regard to other programs, however—especially
combat aircraft, surface combatants, and ground
equipment—the Chinese would still appear to confront
severe problems when it comes to moving prototypes into
production. These difficulties, in turn, would suggest
continuing problems with mastering the myriad
technologies that go into such military equipment. One
indicator is the long development times and program
slippage that many weapons experience before finally
entering production—a problem the Chinese readily
44
concede. The JH-7 fighter-bomber, for example, was
initiated over 20 years ago and first flew in the late 1980s;
however, it did not enter even low-rate production until
45
1997 or 1998. The J-10 fighter did not fly until early
46
1998—nearly 15 years after its program start. According
to open sources, the J-10 is unlikely to enter production
before the middle of the next decade—approximately 25
47
years after the program began!
After the Chinese begin building a weapon system,
production runs are often small and fitful. According to
estimates made by PLAAF analyst Ken Allen, the Chinese
are probably manufacturing only around 36 fighter aircraft
48
a year—12 J-8IIs and 24 J-7s. In addition, although
Beijing acquired a license in the early 1980s to produce the
French-designed AS-365N utility helicopter (called the Z-9
in China), the Chinese have reportedly built no more than
50 to 80 Z-9s over the past two decades—and in sporadic
49
batches, at that. With regard to naval shipbuilding, since
1991 China has launched only three destroyers and nine
50
frigates—barely 1.5 major surface combatants per year.
Production of the Song-class submarine has been equally
sporadic, with only one boat commissioned so far (in 1998,
after being launched in 1994). As a result, the Chinese
continue to produce the near-obsolete Ming-class
submarine (a copy of the Soviet Romeo design, dating from
51
the late 1950s).
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These program stretchouts and small production runs
are all the more significant given that much of what the
Chinese are currently building is not particularly
cutting-edge. The J-7 (MiG-21) fighter is essentially late
1960s/early 1970s technology, while the J-8II is roughly
equivalent to a late-generation F-4 fighter (approximately
late 1970s technology). China’s 20-year teething problems
with the JH-7 fighter-bomber involve an aircraft of rather
unremarkable design—i.e., no fly-by-wire flight control
system or exotic materials in its construction. Even the
J-10—admittedly, a full-up fourth-generation fighter—is
basically 1980s technology that will not be deployed until
52
around 2005. For its part, the first Song-class diesel
submarine has been described as a “patchwork of systems
and technologies,” “very noisy with a lot of equipment
53
problems,” and “effectively shown to be a failure.”
Even the defense industry’s “island of excellence” has
shown some less-than-impressive results. Many of China’s
newest missile systems remain at least one or two
generations behind that of the West—basically comparable
to 1960s- or 1970s-era technology—such as the HJ-8
antitank guided weapon (reportedly derived from the
Soviet-designed AT-4 Spigot), the PL-11 semi-active
radar-homing AAM (based on the Italian Aspide), and even
the C-802 ASCM (roughly equivalent to the 1970s-era
54
Exocet). And even if China were to field a fully active
radar-homing (ARH) AAM by 2005, it would still be nearly
25 years after the United States first began production of
the AMRAAM missile; moreover, most Western nations are
already working on the next generation of ARH AAMs,
employing ramjet propulsion and improved seeker
technologies. Finally, it says much about the likely poor
capabilities of two highly touted (and widely marketed)
Chinese ASCMs—the supersonic C-101 and C-301
missiles—that no military—not even the PLA—has
purchased these weapons.
Oft times, too, “progress” turns out to be superficial or
illusory. While China is clearly advancing its space-based
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capabilities for reconnaissance, communication, and
navigation, it is still years away from acquiring even a
rudimentary military capability. The first China-Brazil
Earth Reconnaissance Satellite (CBERS), launched in
October 1999, has only a 20-meter resolution (compared to
one meter or less found on most military reconnaissance
satellites), while it and other planned Chinese earthobservation satellites will continue to lack real-time
surveillance or quick revisit capabilities. Meanwhile,
China’s efforts to expand its microelectronics industry
continue to suffer setbacks. In particular, semiconductors
produced at its showcase Project 909/Huahong-NEC factory
in Shanghai experienced a 50 percent failure rate in its first
55
year of operation, and sales have been poor.
Moreover, despite years of arduous R&D efforts, China’s
defense industry continues to rely heavily—and perhaps
increasingly—upon foreign technologies. These dependencies are especially acute when it comes to jet engines,
marine diesel engines, and fire-control radar and other
avionics. The J-10 fighter, for example, is reportedly
powered by the Russian-built AL-31F engine, which is also
56
used in the Su-27. At the same time, endemic “technical
difficulties” surrounding the JH-7 fighter-bomber’s
indigenous engine have resulted in significant program
delays and ultimately forced the Chinese to approach the
British about buying additional Speys in order to continue
57
aircraft production. The new Song-class submarine uses a
58
German-supplied diesel engine, while both the Ming- and
Han-class submarines reportedly have been upgraded with
59
a French sonar and combat system.
China’s new
Luhai-class destroyer incorporates a number of foreignsupplied systems, including a Ukrainian gas turbine
engine, a German electrical system, Italian torpedoes, and
60
Russian helicopters. Finally, the Chinese have yet to
develop an indigenous turbine engine transmission
(considered only “mid-level” technology) for its armored
vehicles; consequently, they have turned to the Europeans
61
for help.
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To an extent, it makes sense for Beijing to import
advanced technologies, rather than waste time and
resources duplicating the same capabilities indigenously. In
addition, by integrating these technologies into domestic
systems, the Chinese are demonstrating some capability to
leverage foreign technologies. Nevertheless, a growing
dependency on imported systems and technologies is also a
strong indicator of likely deficiencies within the country’s
military-industrial complex. For example, China’s current
export-oriented fighter programs—the FC-1 and the
J-8IIM—respectively incorporate a West European or
Russian radar and avionics suite; in addition, the FC-1 is
powered by a Russian engine. Finally, the PLA’s penchant
for off-the-shelf arms imports could be interpreted as an
indicator of growing frustration on the part of the Chinese
military with the defense industry’s inability or delay in
development and producing advanced weapon systems. The
PLA, for example, has recently concluded a number of
foreign weapons buys, including purchases of Su-30
fighter-bombers, medium-range SA-15 SAMs, Sovremennyyclass destroyers, and Israeli AWACs systems, in addition to
62
the recent startup of Su-27 licensed-production.
Reverse-engineering has its own limitations: While the
Chinese often have been able to “indigenize” several types of
foreign missile systems, they have had much less success
63
with fighter aircraft (such as the MiG-23 ), helicopters
(such as the French SA-321G Super Frelon helicopter
64
[Z-8] ), or jet engines (such as the Spey, which powers the
65
new JH-7 fighter-bomber ). In other cases, the Chinese
must turn to the original manufacturer for critical
components in order to successfully produce the copied
system. Larry Wortzel, for example, points out that Beijing
reverse-engineered the U.S.-designed AN/TPQ-37
artillery-locating radar, which China produces as the
Type-704; at the same time, the Chinese have attempted to
order a large number of spare parts for the AN/TPQ-37,
66
indicating an inability to copy these components. Even
when successful, reverse engineering is often a time- and
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resource-consuming chore—sometimes to the point of
starving other, more cutting-edge R&D. As a result, by the
time the Chinese have perfected a reverse-engineered
system, the “state-of-the-art” has progressed to the next
level, leaving the PLA with to a weapon that, although an
improvement to its current arsenal, does little to narrow the
67
technological gap with its competitors.
Technology Leveraging at the Level of Arms Production:
The Anecdotal Evidence. Besides problems with technology
leveraging at the product level, large parts of China’s arms
industry are experiencing frustrations with leveraging
advanced manufacturing technologies at the level of
armaments production. In the case of the aviation
industry, deficiencies in aircraft design capabilities,
metallurgy, avionics, and engine technology “have been
68
common and have prevented mass production.” According
to a U.S. aviation industry representative, Chinese aircraft
factories were “less than optimum for the task” of
69
cooperative manufacturing. Jonathan Pollack and James
Mulvenon argue that the Chinese aviation industry, while
able to perform most of the tasks necessary to the assembly
of large commercial aircraft, was still deficient in several
areas of aircraft design, development, and production—and
while their assessments were largely directed at China’s
civil aircraft sector, these points appear applicable to
70
China’s advanced military aircraft programs as well.
The Chinese are already experiencing problems and
delays with their Su-27 co-production program—even
though it currently entails the relatively simple task of
assembling knock-down kits imported from Russia. While
the first two locally assembled Su-27 fighters achieved first
flight in December 1998, press reports indicate that the
aircraft immediately had to be taken apart and rebuilt due
to “sub-standard work.” This same report states that, due to
problems with absorbing advanced manufacturing
technologies and processes, it will be at least 2 years before
the Chinese aircraft factory building the Su-27 will reach
full-rate production; as a result, China will be able to
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produce only six or seven Su-27s annually over the next 3
71
years. Consequently, at least 100 Russians will remain
on-site at the Su-27 plant to oversee production and
72
guarantee quality control.
Even China’s shipbuilding industry, after nearly 2
decades of modernization and expansion, is hardly at a
globally competitive level, technologically speaking.
According to a Chinese study of its shipbuilding industry,
while most advanced shipbuilding countries are at a level of
integrated hull construction and outfitting, utilizing
equipment- and information-intensive modular production
techniques (Grade 4 capabilities) and are moving toward
Grade 5 capabilities (“agile shipbuilding”), Chinese
shipyards are largely stuck at Grade 2 (basic hull
construction and pre-outfitting of metal ships), moving
toward Grade 3 capabilities (limited modular construction
73
involving hull block construction and zone outfitting).
Chinese yards still make only limited use of computers in
ship design and for nesting, interference checking, and
outfitting; consequently Chinese shipbuilders spend twice
as long on design efforts as in the West. In general, a
Chinese shipyard takes two to six times longer than
advanced shipbuilding countries to construct a comparable
ship. In addition, Chinese yards are deficient in several
areas of ship construction, including mechanization and
74
advanced welding technologies.
In fact, the acquisition of advanced manufacturing
technologies does not guarantee that they will be exploited
to their full potential. For example, while the Chinese have
invested heavily in acquiring sophisticated, numerically
controlled and multiaxis machine tools, they are often
underutilized. According to Pollack and Mulvenon, some
large pieces of equipment—such as five-axis milling
machines, stretchform presses, and autoclaves—are used so
75
infrequently as to hardly justify their maintenance costs.
An eyewitness account of a visit to a Chinese armored
vehicle factory mentioned an instance of workers milling
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engine parts by hand, even as several multi-axis machine
76
tools lay fallow.
At the same time, much of the Chinese defense industry
continues to labor, with little success, to overcome its
77
long-standing problems with quality control. According to
representatives of Western companies involved in joint
ventures with the Chinese, quality assurance is still pretty
78
much an “alien concept” to the Chinese. Aviation factories
are frequently described as dirty, poorly lit, heated and
79
cooled, and generally disorganized. Documentation and
standardization—critical elements of quality assurance—
80
are often lacking in aircraft production. Within the
shipbuilding industry, Chinese surface combatants sport
“poor welding with signs of premature failure, inoperable
81
equipment, and overall poor hull workmanship.” The
Luhu-class destroyer contains limited damage-control
facilities and basic design flaws in the weapons control
82
room, exacerbated by poor construction. Chinese-built
frigates delivered to Thailand in the early 1990s featured
hulls that buckled after firing trials of their on-board 5-inch
gun, compartments without access, and doors and ladders
83
that led nowhere; in fact, upon arrival these ships had to
be put into dry-dock for repairs and to improve their
84
damage-control capabilities.
It would also appear that commercial-to-military
spin-on is considerably less than meets the eye. According to
Wendy Frieman, despite years of official support of dual-use
technology development, there is still little direct evidence
of strong links between commercial S&T breakthroughs
and the defense industrial base; in addition, it appears that
the best people are not being diverted to military
production, nor are current commercial technology
acquisition efforts being executed so that the defense
85
industry can benefit. Most of the modern shipyards,
aircraft plants, ground vehicle factories, and perhaps even
missile facilities (i.e., those involved in building
space-launch vehicles) appear to do little, if any, military
production.
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In addition, with few exceptions, spin-on is not a simple
matter of “plug and play.” In certain areas—particularly
communications and information networking—the military
can rather easily piggyback off of commercial off-the-shelf
technologies (COTS). However, for most other applications—such as sensors, electronic warfare, and navigation/
guidance—it can require a considerable systems integration
effort to adapt a piece of commercial technology to military
86
use.
With regard to spin-on in the shipbuilding industry,
Evan Medeiros has stated that “the conversion process has
had little impact on improving China’s ability to produce
modern warships equipped with advanced naval
87
technologies.” He adds that the opportunities for direct
spin-on of civilian design and construction are limited: the
shipbuilding industry’s low technology base, while
sufficient for cargo ship construction, offers little
value-added to warship production. In particular, advanced
naval designs require technologies and expertise, such as
damage control and survivability, not accessible through
88
civilian products. These limitations, Medeiros argues,
89
“will persist for years.”
Just as important, while defense conversion may lead to
the acquisition of technologies that could be redirected
toward military uses, the conversion process often acts as a
distraction from defense production. China’s shipyards
have become so successful at commercial production that
warship construction (measured in gross tonnage) is no
more than perhaps 5 percent of all shipbuilding production
sector output. As a result, low-profit naval construction is
likely finding it increasingly difficult to compete with the
more lucrative, export-oriented commercial shipbuilding
90
sector. It is likely that aircraft factories that have
converted to civil aviation or ground ordnance plants that
now build automobiles and motorcycles—especially foreign
joint ventures that earn these enterprises hard currency—
may also oppose efforts to divert assets to military
production.
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Finally, there is no assurance that defense conversion
will even be a successful medium for spinning-on advanced
technologies into China’s commercial industrial base, let
alone the country’s military-industrial complex. In a study
of 1,000 cases of civilian technology transfer to China, for
example, only 200 came to any fruition; and of these, only
91
half (100 cases) were deemed successful.
Impediments to Technology Absorption
and Exploitation.
All in all, China has experienced considerable and
enduring problems “translating theory and design into
92
reliable weapon systems.” Several factors contribute to
the problems that the Chinese defense industry faces when
it comes to expanding its ability to absorb and leverage new
advanced technologies for armaments production. These
barriers can essentially be broken down into three groups:
technical, structural, and cultural.
Technical Deficiencies. China’s defense industrial base
lacks many of the basic technical skills necessary to fully
exploit acquired technologies. One of the most critical of
these is the defense industry’s apparently enduring weak
systems integration capabilities—the ability to
envision, design, and develop a finished weapon system out
of hundreds or even thousands of disparate components and
subsystems and get it to function to its fullest potential as a
single unit. According to a U.S. aviation industry
representative, the Chinese “are especially deficient in
systems integration” when it comes to aircraft
manufacturing; he adds that “Chinese engineers and
technicians are normally grounded in the basic discipline [of
aircraft production], however, practical applications,
manufacturing technologies, and overall experience are in
93
short supply.” Pollack and Mulvenon assert that when it
comes to the systems integration and engineering process,
“the Chinese do not have a master plan that builds aircraft
from the bottom up. Instead, they try to take parts off the
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shelf that were never designed to be part of any particular
94
end product and try to make them fit.” Even the Cox
Report concedes that China “lacks the ability to integrate
the contributions of many disciplines that are required to
utilize the rapidly emerging new technologies. The PRC
system is unable to keep up with these basically new
95
approaches.”
Ironically, some of this deficiency in systems
integration/systems engineering on the part of the Chinese
arms industry appears to be related to its “excessive focus”
on technology acquisition over technology absorption.
According to Mark Stokes, Chinese defense enterprises
have traditionally purchased foreign equipment “without
much thought as to how to integrate various components”
96
into a single, workable system. As such, arms producers
may acquire the “know-how” but not necessarily the
“know-why” of advanced weapons development and
97
manufacturing. As one European aviation industry
representative put it, “Technology transfer is not an event,
98
it is a process.”
Closely linked to the problem of poor systems integration
and systems engineering skills is limited workforce
expertise on the part of industry. According to one Western
analyst, the Chinese traditionally have paid insufficient
99
attention to training and workforce development. Hence,
advanced machine tools often go underused (or even
100
unused), due to a lack of skilled operators.
In addition,
factories often have so little actual contract work that many
skilled workers gain only very limited experience with
advanced manufacturing techniques; at the same time,
many young bright and enthusiastic engineers and
technicians have limited opportunities to apply their
101
knowledge to actual programs.
For their part,
state-owned enterprises (SOE) executives typically lack the
managerial and entrepreneurial skills and experiences
necessary to make market-oriented investment and
102
production decisions.
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Structural Impediments. Another factor impeding the
Chinese defense industry’s ability to absorb and exploit new
technologies is overcapacity. Quite simply, the country
possesses too many workers, too many factories, and too
much productive capacity for what few weapons it produces,
resulting in redundancy and duplication of effort, inefficient
103
production, and wasted resources.
For example, while
Chinese aircraft production is estimated to require only
about 200,000 workers, the aviation industry possesses a
104
workforce nearly three times as large.
Within the
shipbuilding industry, output is only 17 tons per person per
year; in a comparable shipyard in a more advanced country,
105
this figure is 700 tons per person per year. And while this
sector has enjoyed considerable commercial and financial
success, it is beginning to fall victim to the consequences of
rapid and uncoordinated overexpansion: as new ship orders
have dropped and production has stagnated, yards are
106
underbidding each other in an effort to win new contracts.
Nevertheless, China continues to add new dry-docks,
heavy-lift cranes, and even a whole new shipbuilding
facility (the ultra-modern Waigaoqiao yard, near Shanghai,
due to open by 2000), which will nearly double the country’s
current shipbuilding capacity.
This overcapacity is exacerbated by an endemic lack of
sufficient capital. The government often does not have
enough money to put prototype projects into serial
107
production.
In addition, most defense enterprises are
starved of funds to underwrite plant modernization and to
retain skilled workers; a newly hired university graduate
entering the aviation industry, for example, earns less than
500 yuan a month—much less than he or she can make
working in the coastal cities or for a foreign-run joint
108
venture. Low salaries are partly the reason for the exodus
of skilled workers from China’s new semi-conductor plant in
109
Huahong.
Moreover, at least 70 percent of China’s
state-owned enterprises are operating at a loss—and the
arms industries reportedly are among biggest
110
money-losers. As a result, most SOEs are burdened with
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considerable debt, much of which is triangular—that is,
money owed to them by other unprofitable SOEs and
111
therefore nearly uncollectable.
At the same time, most
SOEs are still saddled with their danwei (work unit)
obligations to pay for their workers’ housing, health care,
112
childcare, and retirement.
The highly compartmentalized, vertically
integrated, and secretive nature of the Chinese arms
industry makes it difficult for arms producers to diffuse
advanced technologies, share learning experiences, and
113
collaborate on advanced weapons projects.
According to
Pollack and Mulvenon, Chinese aviation enterprises
typically find it difficult to communicate with each other
horizontally, hampering “effective coordination;” as a
result, firms will often not share information, even on joint
114
programs. This “stovepiping” has exacerbated the excess
competitiveness and redundancy in manufacturing
capability, since each defense enterprise often tries to “do it
all,” resulting in its acquisition of expensive machine tools
that it then hardly uses (instead of subcontracting the work
115
out to another firm).
Compartmentalization, poor
interfirm linkages, and the lack of financial compensation
particularly affects dialogue and exchange between the
R&D institutes which design the weapons and the arms
factories that produce these systems and keep all the
profits. This process often results, according to one Chinese
observer, in poor morale and motivation, the loss of talented
workers, program delays, and poor quality assurance on the
part of the design institutes, who “bear the heavy burden of
continually breaking new ground but have nothing to do
116
with the subsequent harvest.”
Lines of communication
between consumers of armaments (the PLA) and suppliers
117
(the defense industry) are equally poor.
Cultural Impediments . Finally, the h e a v i l y
centralized, hierarchical, bureaucratic, and riskaverse corporate culture typically found within the
defense industry makes it difficult to extract greater
118
benefits from technology acquisitions.
In their recent
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study on Chinese capacities for innovation, Yuko Arayama
and Panos Mourdoukoutas assert that “Chinese managers
do not have either the will, the expertise, or the freedom to
take the risks and make the adjustment associated with
119
innovations.”
Production management is often highly
centralized and “personality-centric,” with most critical
project decisions being made by a single chief engineer. At
the same time, lower-level managers “tend to be conformist,
adhering to standard rules and procedures rather than to
personal judgments based on their professional
120
experiences.” Hence, they are usually reluctant to act on
their own to deal with problems that might arise on the
121
factory floor, inhibiting innovation and experimentation.
For example, Chinese technicians in the aviation industry
lack practical experience in handling modern technology
because of their “hesitancy of making a mistake and
122
failing.”
The “SOE mindset” within the defense industry also
undermines competitiveness and rationalization of arms
production. For example, senior executives in China’s
military-industrial complex will often award contracts in
order to preserve jobs and keep factories open, rather than
123
on the basis of merit and competency.
For its part, the
central government has traditionally been forgiving of bad
124
performance within the SOE sector.
Larry Wortzel, citing a U.S. aerospace industry
representative, perhaps best sums up the impediments to
innovation and technology exploitation arising from the
defense industry’s corporate culture:
Part of the problem with Chinese [aircraft] manufacturing . . . is
that industrial management in China still relies on 1950s
Soviet styles. This involves “batch-building” a full order of
aircraft in advance based on state-planned and dictated order
for parts and materials. As a consequence of this system, there
are no direct lines of accountability for quality control, and no
cost-cutting discussions or steps available to mid-level
management. There is no competitive bidding for contracts,
workers are redundant, and schedules continually slip because
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state planning doesn’t have a fixed required-delivery date for
products . . . Young managers stay risk-averse and are
reluctant to change or improve the system.125

Reforming the Defense Industry: Reorganization,
Restructuring, and Rationalization.
China’s current system, according to Arayama and
Mourdoukoutas, “has yet to develop the entrepreneurial,
managerial, and governmental regimes needed to master
foreign technology and turn it into innovations that lead to
126
sustainable competitive advantages.”
The words,
although aimed at the country’s technological and
industrial base in general, ring particularly true for China’s
defense industry. To be fair, the Chinese are certainly
aware of the deficiencies in their defense industry and are
undertaking efforts to improve their defense R&D and
production processes. The current reform initiatives have
their origins in the Fifteenth Communist Party Congress
held in September 1997 and in legislation approved by the
Ninth National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 1998.
The 1997 Party Congress laid out a radical agenda for
restructuring and downsizing the SOE sector (including, of
course, the defense industries) and for opening up SOEs to
free-market forces—i.e., supply-and-demand dynamics,
competition, and fiscal responsibility. The 1998 NPC
refined this agenda by announcing plans to reorganize the
government’s defense industry oversight and control
apparatus and establish new defense enterprise groups. At
the same time, the NPC established a 3-year timetable for
127
full implementation of these reforms.
Reorganization. One of the most important actions to
come out of the 1998 NPC was the dissolution of the old
COSTIND. COSTIND was created in 1982 to centrally
manage the process of research, development, testing, and
production in the Chinese defense industry. In addition, it
was intended to act as a bridge between the PLA and the
civilian defense industries in order to ensure that the needs
of the “consumer” were being heard and heeded; as such,
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COSTIND was partly staffed by the military and headed by
a PLA general. The self-evident failure of this organization,
however, led to the spin-off of the military half of COSTIND
into a new PLA General Armaments Department (GAD)
and the creation of a “new,” civilian-only COSTIND. The
GAD will act as the purchasing agent for the PLA,
overseeing defense procurement and watchdogging new
weapons programs. Meanwhile, the new COSTIND will
oversee defense-related S&T research, direct military R&D
and production, and formulate and implement defense
128
industry reform plans.
Restructuring. Another key element of current defense
reforms is the creation of ten new defense industry
129
enterprise groups (see Table 1).
These enterprise groups
replace the five old administerial-level pseudocorporations—such as the Aviation Industries of China
(AVIC), the China Aerospace Corporation (CASC), and the
China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO)—that
were essentially ministerial-level bodies directly
answerable to the State Council. These new defense
enterprises will be established as “genuine conglomerates,”
130
integrating research, production, and marketing.
At the
same time, the government role in the daily operations of
131
the defense industry will be greatly reduced,
and these
new enterprise groups will have the authority to manage
their own operations as well as the responsibility for their
132
own profits and losses.
Current reforms include a
significant downsizing of the defense industrial base,
including worker layoffs and factory mergers and
133
closures.
Both AVIC and the China State Shipbuilding
Corporation (CSSC), for example, have announced plans to
eliminate roughly one-third of their workforce by late 2000;
NORINCO and the China National Nuclear Corporation
(CNNC) have detailed lesser (although probably
134
preliminary) layoffs in their industries (see Table 2).
At
the same time, rationalization of the defense industry will
likely include some factory closures as a result of government-encouraged mergers, as part of the policy—
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enunciated at the 15th Party Congress in September
135
1997—of “letting the strong annex the weak.”
Old Corporate Entity

New Enterprise Group

Major Products

Aviation Industries of China
(AVIC)

China Aviation Industry
Corp. I

Fighter aircraft, bombers,
transports, advanced
trainers, commercial
airliners

China Aviation Industry
Corp. II

Helicopters, attack aircraft,
light trainers, UAVs

China Aerospace Science &
Technology Corp.

Space launch vehicles,
satellites, missiles

China Aerospace Machinery
& Electronics Corp.

Missiles, electronics, other
equipment

China North Industries
Group Corp.

Tanks, armored vehicles,
artillery, ordnance

China South Industries
Group Corp.

Miscellaneous ordnance,
automobiles, motorcycles

China State Shipbuilding
Corp. (Southern shipyards,
based in Shanghai)

Frigates, smaller surface
combatants, commercial
ships

China State Shipbuilding
Industry Corp. (Northern
shipyards, based in Dalian)

Destroyers, commercial ships

China National Nuclear
Corp.

Nuclear energy development,
nuclear fuel and equipment

China Nuclear Engineering
& Construction Group Corp.

Construction of nuclear
power plants, other heavy
construction

China Aerospace Corp.
(CASC)

China Ordnance Industry
Corp. (COIC)/NORINCO

China State Shipbuilding
Corp. (CSSC)

China National Nuclear Corp
(CNNC)

Sources: China Daily, January 31, 1999; China Daily, February 5, 1999; Dow Jones
International News Service, March 23, 1999; China Daily Business Weekly
Supplement, May 9, 1999; China Space News, May 26, 1999; AFP, May 27, 1999;
Xinhua, May 28, 1999; China Daily, July 2, 1999; China Aero Information, July 9,
1999; NORINCO website (www.norincogroup.com.cn); private conversations with
Harlan Jencks and Mark Stokes.

Table 1. China Defense Industry Restructuring, 1999.
Defense Industry Reforms: Old Wine in New
Bottles, or Rearranging the Deck Chairs
on the Titanic?
So far, however, these reforms have been largely
disappointing. For one thing, if the intention of creating
these new industrial enterprise groups was to inject greater
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Current Corporate
Entity

Estimated Workforce,
1997

Projected Layoffs,
1998-2000

AVIC

560,000

150,000-200,000

CASC

270,000

None Accounced

NORINCO

800,000

90,000*

CSSC

270,000

60,000-120,000

CNNC

280,000

30,000*

* announced so far; further layoffs aniticpated
Sources: Harlan Jencks, COSTIND is Dead, Long Live COSTIND!; CNNC brochure;
Airshow China ‘96 website; China Daily, October 3, 1997; China Daily Business
Weekly Supplement, December 7, 1997; Sing Tao Jih Pao (Hong Kong), December 23,
1997; Xinhua, January 7, 1998; Journal of Commerce, December 19, 1998.

Table 2. Projected Layoffs in the Chinese Defense Industry.

competition into China’s military-industrial complex—and
therefore spur innovation and greater responsiveness to
customer, i.e., PLA, demands—then these restructuring efforts
have largely been a failure. At one time, it was expected that the
Chinese would create large trans-sectoral, cross-competing
defense conglomerates, similar to the South Korean chaebols
or, more specifically, to horizontally integrated defense
136
companies like Lockheed Martin or British Aerospace.
Such
a strategy would have entailed a much more complicated
restructuring of the defense industry, crafting enterprise
groups that would have competed with each other to produce a
broad array of weaponry. Instead, all Beijing did was break up
137
each of its former defense corporations into two new groups.
Even then, with few exceptions these new enterprise groups
do not compete with each other directly. Of the two new
corporations replacing AVIC, for example, all fighter aircraft
and commercial jetliner production will be concentrated within
one enterprise group, while all helicopter production will be
138
centered in the other. The nuclear industry will be split into
separate enterprises for either construction or nuclear energy
139
development. NORINCO appears to be subdivided into one
enterprise group mostly concerned with building tanks,
armored vehicles, and other ground ordnance, while the
other has been almost entirely civilianized, specializing in
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automobile and motorcycle production.
Even naval
shipbuilding will see little direct competition between the
two new corporations replacing the old CSSC: the new
northern group will build destroyers, while the southern
141
group will concentrate on frigates.
In fact, the Chinese
appear to have intended that the new defense industries not
vie directly with each other. For example, the two enterprise
groups arising out of the CASC breakup “will not compete in
terms of products,” but rather, “in terms of their systems of
142
organization and their operational mechanisms.”
In
addition, the new aviation groups were purposely “divided
143
into conglomerates with different responsibilities.”
Rationalization of the defense industry has also been
much slower than expected. AVIC, for example, was
expected to lay off 60,000 workers in 1998; in reality, only
144
34,000 workers were let go.
At the same time, many of
these layoffs have been illusory—often, displaced workers
are transferred to “alternative” employment within the
same corporation or other SOEs are forced to accept them,
145
or they are simply paid to stay home.
At the same time,
there have been no public announcements of any defense
factories being closed or merged. In fact, it is increasingly
likely—particularly as the Chinese economy continues to
perform poorly—that the 3-year timetable for full
implementation of these reforms will slip by several years
and that many of the more drastic aspects of SOE reform
(i.e., workforce layoffs and enterprise bankruptcies) will be
146
mitigated for the sake of social stability.
It is unclear how independent these new defense
enterprises will be of government control or how responsible
they will ultimately be for their own financial well-being.
According to one Chinese publication, the two new aviation
enterprise groups remain under the “direct leadership of the
central government,” and will be “operated as state holding
147
companies.” Beijing has made it clear from the beginning
of the reform effort that arms production is a strategic
148
industry too critical to national security to be privatized.
The central government will keep the new defense
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enterprises under much stricter supervision than other
types of reformed SOEs; these same rules, however, work in
favor of the arms industries: Beijing will be pressured to
continue subsidizing them in order to preserve key arms
programs.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the reform
initiatives announced so far do not directly address many of
the impediments affecting technology absorption and
leveraging—that is, the defense industry’s weak systems
integration/systems engineering capabilities, the dearth of
workforce expertise, compartmentalization and redundancy, and corporate culture. As a result, it is doubtful that
these reforms as they currently stand will go very far in
injecting market forces that would, in turn, drive innovation
and technology exploitation. Indeed, despite current
defense industry restructuring, Beijing has already called
for additional initiatives to “introduce administrative and
management reforms to meet the demands of the socialist
149
market economy.”
Conclusions.
China’s military-industrial complex arguably has made
some impressive gains when it comes to producing highly
capable weapon systems. Beijing has a proven track record
in the area of reasonably sophisticated tactical missile
systems, particularly with regard to ballistic and antiship
cruise missiles, and, to a lesser extent, surface-to-air
missiles. From this, one could infer that China’s missile
industry does not suffer as much from the kind of
deficiencies—weak systems integration skills, overcapacity, corporate culture, etc.—that retard technology
absorption and exploitation in other defense industrial
sectors. (It is perhaps revealing that, of all the defense
sectors, only the missile industry has not announced any
plans to lay off workers.) The shipbuilding industry has
demonstrated some success in leveraging commercial
technologies, particularly “soft” technologies like Western
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management techniques. The military is almost certainly
benefiting from the acquisition of dual-use technologies in
such areas as telecommunications and informationprocessing, including fiber optics, cellular and wireless
communications, computers, and the Internet. And despite
delays, the country is progressing in the development of a
modern, fourth-generation fighter aircraft.
One also should not rule out the potential long-term
impact of direct foreign assistance on Chinese capabilities
to leverage advanced technologies. In particular, the
presence and involvement of Russian and Israeli advisers
and technicians in Chinese arms factories and on key
weapons programs have considerable potential to aid the
Chinese in overcoming long-standing deficiencies in such
areas as design, engineering, and systems integration. In
addition, the growing use of foreign military technologies,
through licensing and other types of technology transfer,
offers considerable potential for advancing Chinese arms
production. According to Arayama and Mourdoukoutas,
given China’s poor capacities for innovation, “the only
rational choice for Chinese managers is imitation . . . that is,
mass production of products invented and innovated
151
elsewhere around the globe.”
At the same time, this progress must be qualified. For
one thing, much of success within the missile sector is
directly due to the fact that it, along with nuclear weapons
and satellites, has been a national priority since the late
152
1950s.
As a result, the missile industry has been the
beneficiary of considerable high-level support—in terms of
both money and manpower—held constant over several
decades; for example, two recent directors of COSTIND—
Ding Henggao and Cao Gangchuan (who currently heads
the GAD)—are both graduates of Russian missile
153
academies. Given its limited resources, it will be difficult
for Beijing give equal time and attention to many other
weapons programs.
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Secondly, Chinese success in missile development could
be a result of the fact that it is technologically not as
challenging as other types of weapon systems. Missile
production is not exactly rocket science any more—it
requires the mastery of a relative handful of technologies
that, although not easy to master, are nonetheless mature
and increasingly proliferated: aerostructures, propulsion,
guidance, and warhead (witness the fact that at least a
dozen other developing countries have also developed their
154
own ballistic missile systems ). Missile systems do not
require the more complicated technologies typically found
in combat aircraft, armored vehicles, and warships, such as
life-support systems, communications and information
processing, self-defense and damage control, long-life
propulsion, and exotic materials. As a result, missile
systems may be less a pocket of excellence than an “island of
155
adequacy” surrounded by a sea of mediocrity.
With regard to other defense sectors, Chinese progress
in technology leveraging will continue to be less than
optimal, resulting in a haphazard, piecemeal, and
drawn-out military modernization process. At present,
China’s defense industry is still ill- suited to taking full
advantage of many military, dual-use, and productionrelated technologies being made available to it. At the same
time, current efforts to improve the environment for
technology leveraging are inadequate. In short, the defense
industry is broken, and the Chinese are not fixing it.
Barring dramatic reforms, the future of China’s
military-industrial complex will most likely resemble the
present: a handful of promising technology developments,
impeded by delays, small and fitful production runs, and a
steep learning curve. As a result, while China may
experience some modest absolute gains in military
capabilities, it appears to be achieving little by way of
relative gains—that is, closing gaps in its military-technical
position vis-à-vis its likely regional competitors, who are
likewise striving to add new high-tech capabilities to their
156
defense postures.
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Admittedly, adequacy may be sufficient for China to
extract an impressive degree of asymmetric military
capability from its missile industry. Beijing can and
probably will attempt to leverage militarily its strengths in
missile technology and production to compensate for
weaknesses elsewhere. Nevertheless, a reasonably
proficient missile industry is hardly an indicator of an
overall advancing defense industrial base. Missiles can only
add so much to Chinese military capabilities, and in most
other areas—especially aviation, surface ships, and ground
equipment—the PLA is still not getting much bang for its
buck. Even in the missile sector, there remains considerable
uncertainty as to its ability to extract much military
capability from current technical inputs—particularly
when it comes to radar-guided air-to-air missiles,
land-attack cruise missiles, and other air-to-surface
precision-guided missiles (PGMs).
This is not to say that China does not or cannot
constitute a significant military challenge to the region.
Even if perhaps 90 percent of the PLA remains a “junkyard
army,” size still matters, and the sheer mass of brute force is
something Beijing still has in abundance. A large, relatively
backwards armed force, combined with a limited number of
indigenous military-technological breakthroughs and, in
particular, a few well-targeted arms imports, can still have
a significant impact on the balance of power in East Asia.
Nevertheless, if China succeeds in becoming a major
conventional military power, it will more likely be in spite of
its defense industry than because of it.
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CHAPTER 3
PLA LOGISTICS AND DOCTRINE
REFORM, 1999-2009
Lonnie Henley
1

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has
implemented a number of reforms in the past 2 years
intended to improve its ability to conduct mobile warfare.
The main impetus is the realization that the PLA is not agile
enough to cope with a fast-moving, modern opponent even
on its own home turf. In order to address these weaknesses,
the PLA is seeking to improve both its logistics support
structure and its operational doctrine. Even if successful,
these reforms may not significantly increase China’s power
projection capability, but they will improve its ability to
move and sustain forces within China and around its
periphery.
Two recent programs seem particularly important. One
encompasses a group of decisions aimed at standardizing
military operations and training. Chief among these was
the issuance in January 1999 of new “combat regulations” or
“operational ordinance” designed to standardize PLA
doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for combat
2
operations. The second is a 10-year effort to restructure the
logistical system of the entire PLA announced by the
General Logistics Department director, General Wang Ke,
in November 1998. If it is successful, logistics reform will
have a significant impact on China’s military capabilities,
as the inability to sustain large forces in intense,
fast-moving combat operations is among the PLA’s greatest
weaknesses.
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Logistics Reforms.
Wang Ke announced the logistics reform program at a
“Forum on the Features and Rules of Logistics” in
November 1998, and it was officially enacted at the
expanded meeting of the Central Military Commission in
December 1998. It was widely publicized in following
months, including special expanded meetings of the
General Logistics Department (GLD) in Beijing and
logistics departments in the military regions and Service
3
headquarters.
The logistics program was also encompassed in the
major reform document of the late 1990s, PLA Combat
Order No. 13, “PLA Joint Campaign Program,” January 24,
1999, which is discussed in more detail below. The GLD
issued an All-Army Joint Logistics Implementation Plan
shortly thereafter, and the organization and planning phase
4
of the reforms got underway in the spring of 1999. This
phase was to continue into early 2000.
GLD Chief Wang Ke listed the following objectives:

• integrate logistics for the three services;
• supply work for units should be standardized;
• convert officers’ perquisites into cash allowances;
• “socialize” logistics services [in other words,
out-source support functions to civilian contractors
and society at large]; and,

• make management more professional and
“scientific.” 5

Although not included on this list, another central
objective cited elsewhere is to improve mobile logistical
support for units operating away from their home areas.
Trial Programs. As has been PLA practice in the 1990s,
the GLD first set up large-scale trial programs in several
different regions to develop the details and work out
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practical considerations before the final decision was made.
Wang cited experimental programs in Shenyang, Jinan,
and Hainan beginning in 1998, and also pointed to 1998’s
massive flood relief efforts as contributing greatly to the
6
understanding of joint service logistical operations. The
experimental programs did not include reorganization or
restructuring, but focused on single-Service facilities
providing vehicle repair, communications equipment
repair, medical service, and supply to other Services.
Experimentation has continued since the formal
decision in December, as the regions work out how best to
implement the new approach. Beijing Military Region (MR)
instituted a pilot program contracting out support functions
for four hospitals, one group army, and five division-level
7
units. Nanjing MR has begun relying on civilian supply
8
sources for vehicle parts.
Joint Service Logistics. At both the national and the local
level, the separate Services of the PLA—Navy, Air Force,
and Second Artillery (the strategic missile forces)—have
maintained separate logistical infrastructures since they
were created in the 1950s. (There is no separate ground
component headquarters in the PLA. The four General
Departments serve as both army staff and joint staff.) The
military regions’ logistics departments supported the Army
ground forces, as well as the organizations of the
“institutional” PLA—academies and schools, think tanks,
military region, district, and sub-district headquarters, etc.
The MRs exercised nominal control over the other Services’
logistics structures in the region, but actual control
centered in the Service headquarters in Beijing.
This system has become increasingly unsatisfactory, for
both operational and economic reasons. Lieutenant General
Jiang Jiesheng, commander of the GLD’s Wuhan Rear
Base, outlined the operational imperatives in a February
article in Jiefangjun Bao:
Joint operations have become a principal form, and war is
manifested as confrontation between systems. The
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operational system has to be very much complete and in
harmony as a whole, and the logistics support system has to
work as an entity. Hence, implementing a joint logistics support
system among the three armed services has become a historical
necessity.9

Wang Ke characterized the old system as a relic of the
centrally planned economy, now woefully inefficient and out
of step with the rapid transition to market-based structures
in the past 2 decades:
The present logistics and supply system in the army was
established in the early 1950’s, with the Army, Navy, and Air
Force operating their own vertical supply systems under the
leadership of the General Logistics Department. This matched
China’s highly centralized planned economic setup and the
rather low level of army modernization at that time. As China’s
socialist market economy and the army’s modernization have
developed, the defects of this logistics and supply system have
become more and more evident; for instance, for the Army,
Navy, and Air Force to independently organize their own supply
does not match the demand of combined operations using a
variety of weapons in modern war; there is a serious degree of
duplicate construction, and supply efficiency is low and fails to
meet the demand of building the army’s quality; and
decentralization of powers with too many heads facing the
market cannot produce efficiency in scale.10

Under provisions of the reform program, those support
functions that are common to all Services are being merged
into new Joint Logistics [Sub-] Departments (JLD) in each
of the military regions’ logistics departments. The services
will retain separate logistics structures for supplies and
support unique to their own systems. Under the rubric of
“network-style zoned supply work,” the services are
surrendering hospitals, medical supply and maintenance
units, fuel stocks and distribution networks, general supply
warehouses, vehicle supply and maintenance units, and
some general transportation units to the control of the MR
JLD. The reorganization is to be completed by early in
11
2000.
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Role of the Military Regions. Some Western observers
think the demands of modern, high technology warfare
make the MR structure obsolete, and have speculated that
they may be abolished in the near future. The logistics
reform program, however, explicitly calls for strengthening
rather than reducing the role of the MRs and military
districts. With regard to joint logistics structures, Wang Ke
said,
We should build a logistical system based on the military
districts [jun qu] with joint supply for the Army, Navy, and Air
Force. . . . In instituting joint logistics for the three services,
proceeding from the current reality of the armed forces, it is
necessary to establish a new-style logistics system based on
the military district . . . .12

(Jun qu, “military district,” is probably understood to
include da jun qu, which we translate as “military region.")
Wide Angle quoted General Wang, and added,
This means that the country’s military regions will remain
structurally unchanged for a long time to come and the
implementation of a new-type logistic support system capable
of simultaneously catering to the needs of the three services
will raise the position of the country’s military regions.13

Xinhua’s (New China News Agency) report on the
reforms said,
The ongoing reform of linking the logistics work of the three
services is based on major military regions, which coordinate
the reform and take charge of the logistics supply of the
materials commonly used by the three services in the relevant
theater, thereby changing the independent and decentralized
support system in the past.... Some Navy and Air force
hospitals as well as fuel and military supply warehouses were
handed over to major military regions.14

“Socialized Logistics.” In a major departure from the
PLA’s tradition of self-reliance, the reform calls for the
military to turn to the civilian market economy as much as
possible for support functions, in an approach dubbed
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“socialized logistics.” (“Socialized” referring to society, not
socialism.) In part, this is an economic move, seeking to
capitalize on the efficiency of the market and reduce the
overall cost of support functions. But the main thrust is to
relieve military units of unnecessary overhead and allow
them to focus on their operational responsibilities. This is a
major departure from the Maoist tradition of minimizing
the Army’s burden on the civilian society, dating back to the
Eight Points of Attention and the Yan’an Spirit of the
anti-Japanese and Civil War era. Apparently anticipating
resistance to this change, the leadership has devoted some
effort to explaining and popularizing the new approach.
From Xinhua in June 1999:
In the past, the armed forces undertook too heavy a burden by
running their own kindergartens, schools, shops, restaurants,
laundry shops, bathhouses, canteens, heat supply centers, and
cleaning business, taking much of their military and civilian
personnel’s time and effort.15

From Wide Angle in March 1999:
After shaking off a heavy burden of logistic support, the
country’s military regions and the locally stationed ground,
naval, and air units will be able to devote more resources to both
military training and equipment management and this will
definitely help enhance the army’s capability of fighting and
winning a hi-tech war.16

From Jiefangjun Bao in February 1999:
[A]n open equipment and technical support system takes the
military self-support system as the system border, and takes
society’s resources as the system environment. It allows
extensive exchange of information, material, energy and capital
between the system and the environment, making full use of
society’s material, human and technical resources,
strengthening the armed forces equipment and technical
support ability and economically, reliably and efficiently
fulfilling the military’s weapons, equipment, and technical
service requirements. . . . An open equipment technical support
system is the effective measure to “contain the army in the
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people, unite in peace and war.” Once indicators based on
market information of various kinds of essential elements of
support power latent in society are understood, then it is
possible to reduce unnecessary storage and maintenance
ability in the system, and decrease the expenditure of the
system. An open system can raise equipment technical
support “resilience,” which is good for lowering peacetime
expenditures and can satisfy great needs in time of emergency,
adapting better to “both fields.”17

Socialized logistics will contract out most of the
day-to-day service functions that sustain the PLA in
garrison. Besides the items listed by Xinhua, other articles
have mentioned fuel supply, vehicle spare parts, garbage
collection, tree planting, child care, and management of
officers’ housing. Outsourcing of support functions will start
with garrison units and PLA institutes in major cities, and
18
gradually expand to include the entire force.
It appears that this shift does not include agriculture
and light manufacturing, the so-called “sideline production”
which occupies another large part of PLA manpower. There
are frequent references to Jiang Zemin’s 1990 statement
that the PLA must “eat imperial grain” and not follow the
path of feeding itself, but always in a context that is clearly a
metaphorical reference to the divestiture of commercial
activities supplementing the PLA budget, not to actual food
supplies. Similarly, Wang Ke’s December article says in
part,
With regard to the question of army engagement in production
operations, comrade Deng Xiaoping pointed out back in 1978
that units below army level must absolutely not run factories,
and this road must be cut off. Those run for profit must all be
shut down, no matter what reason is given.

Again, however, Wang focuses on for-profit operations,
and not on factories that make uniforms, boots, etc., for the
PLA’s own use.
CMC Vice Chairman General Zhang Wannian clarified
the issue in a speech in April 1999. Although he made no
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reference to the socialized logistics program, which was well
underway by then, he quoted explicit statements by Jiang
Zemin and emphasized that PLA agriculture and light
manufacturing are not affected by the ban on PLA business
enterprises:
Chairman Jiang pointed out: “The agricultural and sideline
production of the armed forces is an old tradition and is the
Nanniwan spirit, which we must carry forward, consolidate,
and improve. . . . It is necessary for the armed forces to run some
agricultural farms, pigsties, and chicken farms to improve the
living standard of the soldiers. We have all along been doing
this. In the future, we shall continue to do so and should do an
even better job in this respect.”19

One might argue that food is the most fungible of goods
which the civilian market in China is well able to supply,
and that agricultural production is one of the activities most
disruptive of military readiness and training. Obviously,
those are secondary considerations against the PLA’s
deep-rooted, almost sacred tradition of self-reliance.
Mobile Logistics. As the PLA has come to grips with the
requirements of Modern Local War under High-Tech
Conditions, it has become clear that the static, fixed-depot
structure of its logistical system is one of its greatest
weaknesses. In order to cope with a fast-moving, modern
military opponent, the PLA needs to be able to rapidly shift
its elite units across China to the site of the conflict, and
sustain them in combat without making them pull back to
the nearest depot for repair or resupply. Throughout the
1990s, the ground forces and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF)
have designated rapid response or “fist” units, and they and
the Second Artillery have practiced rapid deployment some
distance away from their home base for field training
exercises. Only a few units have done such deployments,
and with the possible exception of Second Artillery units,
seldom cross MR boundaries. But this is a major focus of
PLA modernization, and the logistics reform program seeks
to restructure tactical and operational level logistics
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elements to provide better support for out-of-area
deployments. The goal is that “military provisions should
arrive before the combat units arrive, and this is a necessary
20
condition for unfolding a combat operation.” This is
certainly a minimum requirement if the PLA is to develop
any serious mobile warfare capability.
The PLA is not abandoning its fixed-site logistics
structure, but it is seeking to graft on a mobile structure to
provide forward support to the maneuver units.
Components of the mobile logistics effort include repair at
forward positions, without evacuating equipment to the
depot or factory level; more responsive and more mobile
resupply arrangements; new organizations to support
out-of-MR air and ground units; and underway replenishment for naval forces. All these concepts have been themes
of logistics work in the PLA for several years, and the
10-year reform program will build on previous efforts.
The MRs have experimented with a variety of
organizational structures in recent years to provide mobile
21
support, with Beijing MR reportedly in the vanguard. The
current focus is on two types of organizations: emergency
support brigades, consisting of a medical battalion, a supply
battalion, a fuel battalion, and a transportation battalion;
and emergency military depots, encompassing ammunition
depots, fuel depots, general supply warehouses, field clinics,
22
and transportation units.
Experimentation with
emergency support brigades began as early as 1994, when
such a unit was formed by a logistics sub-department in
23
Guangzhou MR. There has been a spate of articles
praising support units that are able to conduct rapid repairs
on the battlefield or during convoy movements, without
24
evacuating systems to depot level. The PLA Navy (PLAN)
has experimented with emergency support detachments
(fendui) to repair warships at sea rather than sending them
25
to factories for repair. The PLAAF has experimented with
composite mobile support detachments, assembled of
elements from several different organizations, to
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accompany fighter units deploying to airfields along the
26
southeast coast.
Standardization of Supply Procedures. The farther a
PLA unit deploys from its home base, the more difficulty it is
likely to have interacting with the support infrastructure at
its deployed location. Stock numbers, requisition
procedures, inventory standards, and other details of
supply operations vary from region to region, creating a
major hindrance to the PLA’s ability to deploy units across
China. This may account in part for the rarity of
cross-region mobility exercises. Although there are few
details on how GLD intends to address the problem, Wang
Ke cited standardization as a major priority of the reform
program:
[W]e must gradually establish a set of supply standard systems
and corresponding rules and regulations that are complete,
dovetail with each other, and are scientific, rational, simple, and
easy to implement, and implement scientific management and
adherence to law in army logistical work.27

Monetization of the Officer Compensation System.
Another theme of logistics reform is the conversion of officer
perquisites into cash allowances, reflecting broader trends
in the economy as a whole. The daily life of ordinary Chinese
has changed dramatically in the past 20 years. In Maoist
China, both rural and urban residents received most of their
daily needs from their work unit, directly in the form of
locally produced products, or indirectly in the form of ration
coupons to exchange at state-owned stores and distribution
points. Housing, education, health care, rail tickets, cooking
fuel, and most other goods and services were either provided
in kind, or heavily subsidized by the state. The transition to
a market economy is converting almost all of those
28
exchanges to cash transactions. Cash in the pocket, and a
choice of things to spend it on, creates a great deal of
personal freedom and encourages more efficient allocation
of goods, but the change also places a major strain on
employers including the PLA. Military personnel costs have
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skyrocketed, as the PLA has to provide its personnel,
especially officers, with ever-increasing volumes of cash to
pay for goods and services. Chinese officers assert, though
detailed figures are hard to obtain, that the PLA’s budget
increases over the past 10 years have been largely
29
consumed by this one requirement. The monetization
process will continue under the logistics reform program,
with particular emphasis on housing and vehicles.
Construction and maintenance of officer housing will
meanwhile be transferred to civilian government programs,
30
as part of the “socialization” of logistics. If successful,
officers will buy or rent their housing on the private real
estate market. Success depends to a great extent on the
broader effort to privatize urban housing throughout China,
however, and that is a huge program with uncertain
31
prospects.
Housing is not the only part of the compensation system
that the PLA is trying to off-load onto civilian government.
Wang Ke cites an August 1998 “insurance decision for
military personnel,” under which responsibility for medical
and pension costs for veterans killed or injured in the line of
duty is being shifted to the state insurance system—in other
words, to local governments. The March 1999 article in
Wide Angle discusses the intent to shift most of the “social
insurance” and “social support” burden for military
personnel to local authorities. The article confidently
predicts that the PLA can “mobilize the enthusiasm of the
local governments” for accepting this burden, because the
divestiture of PLA commercial operations will leave those
now-private enterprises highly “transparent,” and allow
local government enterprises to compete more effectively
against them. One needn’t be a hardened skeptic to question
whether localities will be quite so enthusiastic about this
shift. The author also characterizes the change as an issue
of equity within the PLA; the benefits derived from PLA
enterprises went to the small number of officers involved in
those activities, while this reform will benefit “the broad
masses of officers and men.”
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The primary advantage of providing officer benefits in
cash rather than in kind, besides shifting some of it out of
the military budget, is that the PLA can shed some of the
manpower and overhead associated with housing
construction and maintenance, medical care, and personal
services such as drivers and household servants.
Not directly related to the monetization of officer
perquisites, but in pursuit of similar objectives, is the
establishment of new ranks and pay scales for noncommissioned officers in the July 1999 revision of the
Soldiers’ Service Regulation. The regulation creates six new
grades, NCO 1 through 6, with a pay scale that increases in
32
line with rank and term of service.
Other Logistics Changes. There have been several other
aspects of logistics reform mentioned in the press over
recent months.
• Funding for logistics. One article cites the divestiture of
PLA commercial enterprises as being directly tied to
increased funding for maintenance within the PLA:
In the past, some army units carried out commercial activities
on the pretext of raising maintenance funds for the grassroots
military units. However, only a small part of the funds raised by
the units concerned had actually gone to the grassroots units . . . .
[the CMC] came up with a decision in the second half of 1998 on
banning the army and the armed police from commercial
activities within a short period of time and increasing the
army’s maintenance funds in a timely fashion and adopted
resolute measures to this end . . . .33

• Skip-echelon logistics. Several articles mention
streamlining logistics operations within the MR, allowing
direct links between the MR Joint Logistics Department
and regional level support units, on the one hand, and
34
division, brigade, or regiment level units on the other.
• Food service reforms. These include increasing the
standard dietary allowance for soldiers, with more meat
and greater variety (but no increase in per-soldier
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budgetary allowance for food); improved field kitchens, to
better support mobile operations; issuing combat rations of
toasted rice and hard tack instead of uncooked rice, to
improve survivability on the battlefield by reducing the
need to light fires in order to eat; and developing frozen and
packaged foods for the destroyer Qingdao and training ship
Shichang for their foreign port visits last year, with
increased “freshness” so that sailors would not have to
subsist for weeks on the standard PLAN at-sea rations of
35
instant noodles and canned food.
• Emphasis on faster throughput by the transportation
system. Again, the PLA press cites the 1998 flood relief
operations as having provided valuable real-world
experience in rapid resupply operations. An interesting
application of these efforts is a focus on faster intermodal
transfer of materiel (from land and air, to sea modes) in
support of joint service operations offshore and along the
36
coast near Xiamen.
• Improvement of logistics structures in the reserve
forces. Fujian MD recently created a reserve force logistics
brigade. Hubei MD is restructuring its reserve bridging
units, in part to provide better support in future civil flood
relief operations, while arguing with local governments over
who should pay for such operations. Xinjiang MD is
increasing its investment in dual-use transportation
infrastructure, especially roads and service stations along
37
the Tarim Desert Highway.
The logistics reform program seems to represent a
wide-ranging change in the structure and philosophy of
PLA logistical support, based on 5 years of planning and
experimentation. The official program has just begun, and it
will be several years before we can assess whether it is
achieving much progress.
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Standardization.
Most of the other reforms instituted over the past year or
two can be understood as an effort to create more
standardization within the PLA. Obviously, no large
military can be completely standardized. Units will always
be tailored to their mission and local terrain, or differ just
because that’s how they developed over the years; the
equipment inventory will always vary from unit to unit,
because no large military can modernize all its equipment
at once, and older systems retain some utility for some
missions; commanders and staff will always interpret
training standards and operational doctrine in their own
way.
Within these inevitable limits, however, those units that
deploy and fight away from their home region need to share
key operational approaches and concepts with the units
fighting alongside them. Standardization of supply and
support procedures is important in this regard, as discussed
above. Equally important is some uniformity in how officers
are trained, and the development of the professional
military education system over the past 20 years has
38
contributed significantly to this goal. In a military where
most officers spend their entire career in one division or
even one regiment, it is useful to bring them together on a
regional or national level a few times in their career to study
concepts and techniques of operation. But the most
important consideration is that units from different parts of
China must share the same understanding of how to fight
and how to operate on the battlefield if they are to merge
seamlessly when brought together for combat.
Operational Doctrine. In January 1999, CMC Chairman
Jiang Zemin signed an order implementing the first major
39
revision to PLA operational doctrine since the mid-1980s.
The old regulations, now referred to as the “first-generation” effort to standardize PLA operational procedures, did
not address joint service operations or warfare under
high-technology conditions, did not cover the full range from
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national- and campaign-level down to unit-level operations,
and obviously did not incorporate the lessons of the Gulf
War and other 1990s campaigns or evolving concepts
40
referred to as the “revolution in military affairs.” The 13
new combat regulations, known collectively as the “Chinese
People’s Liberation Army Joint Campaign Program,” are
designed to rectify these omissions.
The new regulations, also called “operational ordinances,” are the embodiment of 7 years of experimentation
and reform in the PLA. From 1992 to 1995, the PLA
conducted a series of what Americans call warfighting
experiments. A number of units throughout the PLA were
assigned to work on different aspects of modern
warfare—night fighting, electronic warfare, battlefield
mobility, strategic mobility, counter-reconnaissance and
counter-surveillance, etc. Since 1995, we have seen several
large-scale field-training exercises and numerous smaller
exercises that attempted to pull together these separate
components into coherent “methods of operations.” The
development of these methods has been a constant theme in
the Chinese military press in the late 1990s.
Now we are told that during this same period, 1995 to
late 1998, a body called the PLA Combat Regulations
Compilation Committee has been coordinating a PLA-wide
effort to codify the doctrinal concepts developed in these two
phases of field experimentation. This committee included
staff officers from all Services and all echelons, as well as
researchers from PLA academies and think tanks. After
extensive coordination and four meetings with the General
Departments, the committee submitted the regulations to
41
the CMC for approval late last year.
There has been no explicit statement yet of the content
or even titles of the 13 regulations, but one report says they
are grouped into two categories: campaign regulations,
further grouped into joint service campaigns and singleService campaigns; and combat regulations, including
“general regulations, the regulations for the combat
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operations conducted jointly by the units of different
services, and the regulations for the combat operations
conducted jointly by the units of different arms and different
specialties.” (The latter seems to refer to what the U.S.
Army calls combined arms operations—infantry, tank,
artillery, etc., working together—rather than joint-service
operations.) The report later lists areas the regulations
focus on, which may correspond to the 13 separate
regulations. These areas are campaign principles; combat
principles; campaign modes; combat modes; basic tactics;
command system; logistics support; equipment support;
political work; information warfare; electronic warfare; air
defense; and countermeasures against the enemy’s hightech arms.
More information and time are required before we can
judge the impact of these new regulations on PLA
operational capabilities. At a minimum the regulations
embody nearly a decade’s worth of PLA thought on how to
implement the general concept of “modern local war under
high-tech conditions.” They will certainly focus on the same
concepts we have seen in PLA exercises over the last 4 years:
progress toward joint operations; the expectation of a
high-tech enemy, a focus on innovative tactics to neutralize
the opponent’s advantage; and efforts to create a more
realistic training environment.
It is also likely, however, that except for those forces
tagged for a potential conflict with Taiwan, the regulations
will display the same muddle concerning strategic
objectives that have characterized PLA modernization
efforts in recent years. China has no major ground threat
since the end of the Soviet Union and the collapse of Russia’s
economy, yet it retains one of the world’s largest armor and
mechanized force structures. Much of the PLA’s experimentation since 1992 has focused on a large ground fight against
a sophisticated opponent. Yet the likelihood of the U.S.
Army invading China, or of anyone else being able to even
contemplate such an attack, must seem vanishingly remote
even to the PLA. China already possesses an enormous
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military advantage over its land neighbors, at least for a
conflict within reach of its MR-based logistical network.
Training to confront a high-tech opponent does make
China’s ground forces better, but without a ground threat to
the homeland, it does not increase China’s useable military
capability, unless the PLA builds a logistics structure to
project and sustain those forces outside China—and there is
no evidence Beijing wants or intends to build such a
structure.
Military Terminology. Standard doctrine requires a
standard vocabulary. A new edition of Chinese PLA Military
Terminology, China’s equivalent of the U.S. Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1-02) , was
issued in 1998, replacing the previous 1982 edition. Most of
the jargon associated with high-tech warfare has come into
use in China since 1982, and the need for standardization is
clear to anyone trying to make sense of exactly what a PLA
publication is talking about. The Jinan MR newspaper cites
the new dictionary, disseminated down to company level, as
laying down standards for PLA units in the same manner as
42
do the Common Regulations.
Training Procedures and Evaluation Standards.
Another effort at standardization focuses on the content of
field and garrison training and on the criteria for evaluating
such training. The PLA General Staff Department (GSD)
Training Department has been issuing army-wide Master
Training Plans for the past several years. New evaluation
standards for both unit and individual training were
promulgated by GSD at an army-wide training reform
meeting in late 1997, under the title of “Provisional
Stipulations for Grading Military Training.” The directive
applied to regimental and lower level unit training that
43
year, and to division level training starting in 1998. There
has been no detailed reporting, however, on the content of
the training program or on the evaluation standards.
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Reorganization.
As of mid-1999, the PLA is engaged in a widespread
restructuring of combat units and noncombat organizations
and institutions. As the PLA leadership warned in early
1998, this phase of reorganization involves the “abolishment, merger, downgrading and reorganization of units and
44
the departure of individuals.” Only the broad outlines of
this reorganization are yet available, but some basic themes
are apparent. One is a straight manpower reduction, with
the focus on reducing the proportion of light infantry among
the regular PLA forces. So far, some 14 light infantry
divisions have been transferred to the People’s Armed
Police, and a number of other units have been reorganized to
concentrate available major systems—tanks, infantry
fighting vehicles, artillery, etc.—into smaller units. Some
maneuver divisions are being reorganized as brigades, and
some artillery regiments have been upgraded to brigades
with the transfer of equipment from other, disbanded
45
units.
Another theme of structural reorganization is the
streamlining of the “institutional” PLA: military region
headquarters, garrison units, academies and schools,
research institutions, etc. The reorganization started with
issuance of revised “Common and Garrison Regulations” in
October 1997. Streamlining of military region-level organs
46
began in August 1998. The U.S. Army in the early 1990s
managed to cut combat units, but had less success in
reducing headquarters staffs and the institutional Army; it
will be interesting to see whether the Chinese are any more
successful than we were.
Assessment of the Effect of These Reforms.
The most important issue raised by the reform programs
is whether they constitute the kernel of a significant power
projection capability for the PLA. The short answer, in this
analyst’s judgement, is no. The logistics reform, if
successful, will improve the PLA’s ability to sustain its
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forces in high-intensity combat in or very near the
homeland, but it strengthens rather than mitigates their
dependence on a geographically fixed logistics infrastructure. Organizations to provide mobile logistics on the
battlefield are one precondition for power projection, but the
other components required to sustain large maneuver
forces in combat outside of China remain absent from
Chinese force structure, support concepts, and reform
plans. These include logistics elements organic to major
maneuver units, making them more self-sufficient in
transportation, first- and second-line maintenance,
evacuating and repairing battlefield equipment casualties,
and maintaining and transporting mobile fuel and supply
stockpiles. They include port-opening and airfield-opening
packages, capable of creating the far end of a logistical flow
structure with minimal reliance on local infrastructure.
They include vastly greater airlift and sealift capabilities
than the PLA has chosen to buy, and the combatant escorts
and refueling units to get the lift to its destination. They
include construction engineers to build the land-based
transportation infrastructure at the far end of the
operation.
The logistics reform program addresses critical
weaknesses in the PLA’s operational capabilities. If
successful, it will improve the PLA’s ability to fight a
modern high-tech conflict on or near Chinese territory. But
it does not contribute significantly to regional, much less
global, power projection.
At the operational level, the restructuring of the ground
forces and the development of improved doctrine continue
the PLA’s progress toward competent combined-arms
operations. The PLA still has a long way to go toward
effective joint service operations, but the new combat
regulations firmly establish joint operations as a goal for
continued doctrinal development.
More broadly, the reforms represent a major step
forward in the regularization of PLA operations. The
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“first-generation” combat regulations of the 1980s were far
too general in their scope to constitute operational doctrine
in the Western sense. If the 1999 ordinances prove to be as
detailed and comprehensive as initial reporting indicates,
they, together with the comprehensive restructuring of the
force and the 10-year logistics reform program, will
represent a major milestone in the professionalization of the
PLA and its slow maturation as a military institution.
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CHAPTER 4
POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS
OF PLA INFORMATION WARFARE
CAPABILITIES
TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES
William C. Triplett II
Introduction.
There is a consensus among specialists that the United
1
States is the world leader in Information Warfare (IW).
Nevertheless, if the United States were to have a significant
offensive IW targeting the critical civilian infrastructure of
foreign countries, details of such a program would not likely
be public information. In fact, the phrase, “computer
network attack” (CNA) was classified until about 2 years
2
ago. The financial resources devoted to such a hypothetical
3
program, as well as some of the locations where the most
sensitive offensive IW Research and Development (R&D) or
operations could be carried out, would similarly be
restricted information. The capabilities of such a
hypothetical program would be closely held to the point of
4
approximating stealth 2 decades ago.
An extensive look at the U.S. official unclassified
publications on IW indicates they are mostly devoted to
military-on-military applications [Command and Control
Warfare], particularly within the Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA) context. There is also a heavy emphasis on
defensive measures and only a rare mention of U.S. offensive
capabilities. Roger Molander of RAND candidly outlines one
aspect of the problem:
The sensitivities of our friends and allies and the
political-military capital that might accrue to possible
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adversaries from increasingly open emphasis on U.S. offensive
SIW [Strategic Information Warfare] initiatives has largely
kept the more definitive information on these capabilities in the
back room. Some SIW offensive capability clearly exists (and
some has been demonstrated) but the full potential is politically
and militarily sensitive.5

Added to the issue of a possible propaganda black eye is
the question of countermeasures. There is no physical
defense against a nuclear-armed missile except a preemp6
tive strike, something of a high-risk operation. As a result,
the declared nuclear powers have adopted a policy of highly
7
publicized and credible deterrent. IW, on the other hand, is
subject to effective countermeasures to the point that
8
Electronic Warfare, for example, is subject to a constant
offense/defense battle of counter-counter-counter, etc.,
measures. If it were known, for example, that the United
States was successfully targeting foreign power grids for
CNA, then a prospective opponent should be able to invest
9
the resources necessary to frustrate that capability.
In short, simply because a certain military capability is
10
not announced does not necessarily mean it does not exist.
Definitions and Scope.
Definitions. IW is in a state of becoming, and definitions
11
are not universally agreed upon. In some cases there is an
aversion to using the word “warfare” so that “Information
Operations” is the politically correct term of art.
Additionally, IW or IO can have an expansive meaning that
even includes Civil Affairs. For the purpose of this exercise,
IW will principally mean CNA with the inclusion of
Precision Strike, Denial and Deception, Special Operations
12
and Psychological Operations, as appropriate.
Scope. The object of warfare is to make an opponent
accept your goals, not his. Your goals may be territorial
conquest, hegemony without territorial absorption, or even
deterrence of offensive operations. For example, one may
wish to exercise deterrence against a third party while
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engaging in operations against a second opponent. Because
IW is relatively cheap, it lends itself to sudden assault.
Because modern societies are increasingly vulnerable, it
13
could be an effective military tool for reaching your goals.
This exercise is designed to look rather narrowly at how
the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) IW capabilities
might be applied against foreign critical infrastructures for
political/military purposes. A broader study would consider
other PRC institutions with IW capability, such as the
14
Ministry of State Security and other IW applications, such
as espionage. Such a study is recommended.
A Summary of PLA IW Capabilities and Doctrine.15
If the Liberation Army Daily (LAD) should announce
that the PLA has the capability to change Japan National
Railways (JNR) switches at will using CNA from outside of
the country, it would cause a sensation. Any responsible
Japanese Government would immediately move to head off
this obvious threat to public safety. There would probably
also be an intense examination in Japan of other parts of the
Japanese critical infrastructure of the potential risk.
Repercussions would spread to other countries as well. In
short order, whatever offensive IW capability the PLA had
would be countered both at the JNR and other infrastructure nodes. The Japanese and others in the region
would have their alert level raised considerably.
The LAD has not, so far, made such a claim and seems
unlikely to do so but arguing from the U.S. analogy, absence
of publicity does not necessarily mean absence of capability.
From the externalities, however, what can we summarize
about the PLA’s IW capabilities or even the PLA’s
opportunity to have an IW capability, if it so chooses?
An IW Program. It is fairly well-established that the
PLA has some kind of IW program. The U.S. Department of
Defense writes, “the PLA has shown an exceptional interest
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16

in information warfare.” Others rank the PLA program
17
right behind the United States and Russia.
Leadership Support. In a 1998 think piece on future
warfare, PLA Chief of Staff General Fu Quanyou added
“information warfare” to a list of new forms of combat that
18
also included air strike, missile and electronic warfare. At
a Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for
National Defense (COSTIND) meeting in 1995 General Liu
Huaqing is alleged to have said:
Information warfare and electronic warfare are of key
importance, while fighting on the ground can only serve to
exploit the victory. Hence, China is more convinced (than ever)
that as far as the PLA is concerned, a military revolution with
information warfare as the core has reached the stage where
efforts must be made to catch up with and overtake rivals.19

There is some indication that IW has the support of
20
rocket scientist-emeritus Qian Xuesen, and, according to
one observer, there is “a push toward establishment of a
21
high level leading group” on IW. One also has to assume
that having repeated access to the pages of the LAD
indicates some measure of political support for IW, since the
LAD is published by the PLA’s General Political
Department.
Financial Resources. There is no unclassified answer to
how much money the PLA is prepared spend on IW.
According to one unconfirmed report, the PRC is intending
to pour “billions” of Australian-dollar equivalents into the
22
PLA’s IW program.
However, it would seem that there is an opportunity to
fund an IW program if they wish. At the end of 1999, the
PRC claimed approximately 155 billion U.S. dollars in
foreign exchange reserves. Billions of U.S. dollars have
already gone into a series of very expensive military
purchases from Russia, Israel, and other sources. In the
spring of 1999, the Republic of China on Taiwan (henceforth
Taiwan) found that the PLA had re-created an exact,
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one-for-one, duplicate of CCK Air Base in central Taiwan.
CCK was designed in the 1950s by the U.S. Strategic Air
Command with very long runways and ultra-wide taxiways
to handle B-52s. Even considering the relatively low cost for
construction labor in China and the location in the desert in
Gansu Province, creating this duplicate must have been
very expensive. It would have required approval at very
high levels, and the leadership must have been convinced of
its importance. Given how inexpensive a reasonable IW
program would look against the re-creation of a SAC base in
Western China, it would seem the funds should be
available.
IW Theorists. We have a list of the names of the major
theorists whose work appears in LAD or similar
23
publications. Whether these are real persons in all cases,
or pen names, or committees are unknown.
IW Research and Development Centers . There is a list of
IW R&D Centers to which we must add the new Science and
Engineering University and the new PLA Information
24
Engineering University at Zhenzhou. However, considering again the American example, some of the more
sensitive centers may well be elsewhere.
Tools: SIGINT. The PLA “maintains by far the most
extensive signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities of all
25
the countries in the Asia/Pacific region.” Just this year,
according to one unconfirmed report, they expanded their
SIGINT facilities to include Cuba, where they may be
intercepting telephone calls along the East Coast of the
26
United States.
Tools: Electronics and Telecommunications
Infrastructure. Without doubt Beijing is developing the
domestic infrastructure that could support a serious IW
program. This includes microelectronics, computers, and
27
fiber-optics-based telecommunications.
Tools: High Performance Computers . The Cox
Committee noted that between January 1996 and the end of
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1998, over 600 American-origin high performance
computers (HPCs) were delivered to China. The number is
undoubtedly higher today. The Committee believes that
such HPCs could prove valuable for offensive IW by giving
the PLA the tools to explore “U.S. information networks and
their vulnerabilities.” Such computers, the Committee says,
are also useful for the development of IW associated
technologies such as jammers, microwave weapons, and
anti-satellite weapons. The Committee notes that the PRC
does not permit end-user checks and therefore it cannot be
determined with precision where the HPCs are or to what
purposes they might be put. There have been a number of
recent cases where HPCs made their way to military
28
end-users, creating a sense of uneasiness, at the least.
Tools: Technical Personnel. The Cox-Dicks Committee
estimated that “at any given time there are over 100,000
PRC nationals who are either attending U.S. universities or
have remained in the United States after graduating from a
U.S. university.” They noted, correctly, that these students
are “a ready target for PRC intelligence officers and PRC
Government-controlled organizations, both while they are
29
in the United States and when they return to the PRC.” A
National Counterintelligence Center report claims the PRC
is recruiting ethnic Chinese students around the world who
have expertise in certain weapons and weapons-related
30
skills including computers.
As early as the fall of 1994 the PLA was telling the
domestic Chinese press that it was recruiting “returned
students” who have experience in “supercomputers” and
31
“artificial intelligence,” both building blocks for IW. In the
summer of 1999, President Jiang announced the
establishment of a cash awards fund designed to lure
Chinese students with science and technology skills back to
32
China.
There is definitely a domestic training program as well.
In July 1999 the LAD discussed the need for “Internet
33
warriors” who could take part in “Internet combat.” The
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PLA is also offering scholarships for Information Warfare
34
students at Beijing and Qinghua Universities.
Tools: High-powered Microwave Weapons . As the
Cox-Dicks Committee noted, high-powered microwave
weapons (HPMs), sometimes known as radio frequency
weapons, have a particularly important role to play in any
serious IW program. The report also accused the PRC of
illegally obtaining U.S. R&D information on
35
“electromagnetic weapons technology.” This apparently
occurred in the late 1990s.
China has a national HPM program as does the United
States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France. China’s
foremost expert on HPMs is Dr. Lin Weigan (University of
California, Berkeley, 1950) and there are institutes devoted
36
to this research.
PLA writings make a clear connection between HPMs
and IW. For example, in 1995, a COSTIND researcher
praised HPMs’ ability to “destroy the opponent’s electronic
equipment and electronic telecommunications systems.
This is a special kind of information-intensified weapon for
37
waging information warfare.”
Russia is considered to be the world’s leader in HPMs,
with research concentrated at the Institute of Applied
38
Physics and Lebedev Physics Institute. Some of the
Russian HPMs are suitcase-size and have been sold on the
39
open market to at least Sweden and Australia. If the size
could be further reduced, they might be deliverable by
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). There are no opensource indications that the PLA has purchased Russian
HPMs of any size or that Russian HPM specialists are
assisting the Chinese program, but under the current
40
circumstances it is certainly worrisome.
Tools: Precision Strike. U.S. doctrine for offensive
Information Operations include “physical attack/
41
destruction,” i.e., long-range precision strike.
PLA
theorists have no difficulty making the link between
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“precision attacks” and “information warfare.” It is
abundantly clear that serious PLA resources are going into
offensive missile strike capability, and that these efforts are
42
seeing some success.
The connection between IW and air power is also not lost
on the PLA, as two authors pointed out in China Military
Science: “Air power’s exclusive strength in information
warfare has made it a key factor for armies of all
43
countries.”
Tools: Special Operations. U.S. doctrine for Information
44
Operations also includes Special Operations. In recent
years there has been considerable public attention paid to
PLA special forces/special operations, including airborne
troops, perhaps indicating that they are receiving more
resources. In the summer of 1999, Wen Wei Pao published a
report on “Special Forces: Emergency Mobilization for
Long-Range Assault.” The report discusses the new
equipment available to Chinese Special Forces, including
motorized hang gliders, and asserts that their mission
45
includes “going deep into the enemy heartland.”
Doctrine: Reading American Literature . PLA theorists
46
are clearly reading the U.S. open-source literature. For
example, U.S. Army Field Manual 100-6, “Information
Operations,” has been translated by the PLA’s Military
47
Science Publishing House.
As another example, in the summer of 1999 there was an
article on a Beijing-based Internet site discussing the June
3, 1995, National Defense University exercise, “The Day
After...in Cyberspace,” which appears as Appendix C in the
RAND publication Strategic Information Warfare published
48
in 1996. PLA writers tend to use virtually the same
definitions of IW that the United States does: “electronic
warfare, tactical deception, strategic deterrence,
propaganda warfare, psychological warfare, computer
49
warfare, and command and control warfare.” From time to
time, there is talk of an IW with Chinese characteristics, but
there is no evidence that such a creature exists as yet. PLA
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theorists speak of IW as a new form of “People’s War,”
meaning civilian technicians in uniform at the keyboard,
but that would be the case under any Western program as
well.
Doctrine: Writing Their Own Literature . The theorists
are certainly talking about it. Articles have appeared in
LAD on the subject since 1987, and in the first 9 months of
1999 the words “information warfare” appeared in LAD at
50
least 10 times. They began publishing books on the subject
as early 1985, and there are important symposia covering
51
IW sponsored by COSTIND.
Arguably the most significant article appeared in LAD
on November 11, 1999. The three authors argued that the
PLA should create a “net force” equal to the PLA Army,
Navy, and Air Force. They also argued for an “offensive
technology” capability.
Doctrine: Preemptive Strike. One might argue that the
PLA has a long association with surprise attack, i.e.,
preemptive strike. Certainly the Vietnamese would agree.
It is, therefore, not surprising that PLA IW theorists have
been quick to see IW as a preemptive strike weapon. In an
often-quoted 1996 LAD article, Lu Linzhi pointed out that,
“In military affairs, launching a preemptive strike has
always been an effective way in which the party at a
disadvantage may overpower its stronger opponent.” Lu
calls for zeroing in on “enemy troops as well as the
52
war-making machine.”
Training and Exercises . There has been a lot of
discussion going back several years about training for IW.
For example, in February 1999 the LAD ran a story titled,
“Train Talented People at Different Levels for Information
53
Warfare.”
According to a COSTIND-controlled
publication, the PLA’s Communications Command
Academy is offering a cross-disciplinary course on IW based
on textbooks prepared by experts from the PLA Engineering
Institute, the General Staff Department, the Academy of
Military Sciences and the National Defense University. The
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Annual Harvard Senior Military Officers program for PLA
54
officers includes IW training.
By one account, IW was included in the spring 1996
55
exercises in the Taiwan Strait. Two years later Shenyang
Military Region was boasting of its IW exercises in LAD,
“Accept a New Challenge, Exercise in New Topics—More
than 20 Achievements Tested by Shenyang Military Region
Live Information Warfare Exercise.” Just recently Lanzhou
Military Region was conducting “Red Team-Blue Team”
Information Warfare exercises that opened with a surprise
56
network attack by the “Blue Team.”
In summary, the Chinese have an IW program, they
have a reasonable level of leadership support, sufficient
available resources, the necessary tools (or are acquiring
them), and they are working on doctrine in the right
direction and conducting military exercises that feature IW
prominently. Their level of competence is as yet unknown,
perhaps to themselves as well.
The next question is “What’s the most likely application?”
Potential Applications I—The United States.
Today there exists a level of concern bordering on alarm
in official Washington over U.S. vulnerability to CNA
against critical infrastructures. A former Director of NSA
called the United States the most vulnerable country in the
world to CNA and in 1996 then-CIA Director John Deutch
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expressed similar concerns to the Senate. The issue is
being studied in the public policy institutes. Some two major
commissions have convened on the matter, and the Defense
Science Board has reported on it. Even the Senate Y2K
Committee drew attention to it. A series of useful U.S.
General Accounting Office reports on the threats to critical
58
infrastructures have been written.
The Public Policy Institutes. The Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) recently completed a
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major IW study subtitled Averting an Electronic Waterloo.
The opening paragraph reads:
The United States is now exposed to a host of new threats to
the economy, indeed to the whole of society. It has erected
immensely complex information systems on insecure
foundations. The ability to network has far outpaced the
ability to protect networks. The economy is totally dependent
on these systems. America’s adversaries and enemies
recognize this dependency and are developing weapons of
mass disruption and destruction.59[Emphasis added]

Nor is CSIS alone. RAND’s Strategic Information
WarfareA New Face of War contains the following
assessment:
U.S. homeland is vulnerable
• Cyberspace efficiencies-use-dependence-vulnerability
cycle especially acute in U.S.
• U.S. info-based infrastructures present lucrative
strategic targets.
• IW weapons less physically destructive than
Russian ICBMs, but much cheaper to field, and
probability of use in conflict is much higher.
You lose U.S. as sanctuary.
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The Commissions. In 1997, the President’s Commission
on Critical Infrastructure Protection released its report,
“Critical Foundations—Protecting America’s Infrastructures.” The Commission was created in response to the
Oklahoma City bombing of 1995. It began looking at
physical threats but moved fairly quickly into cyber threats.
It examined five sectors—information and
communications; banking and finance; energy, including
electrical power, oil and gas; physical distribution; and vital
human services. The Commission was very alarmed at what
it found.
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1. There is an increasing dependence on critical
infrastructures.
2. There is an increasing vulnerability to those
infrastructures from a wide range of threats, particularly
IW.
3. There is a lack of public awareness to the threats.
4. There is no national focus for protection of critical
infrastructures.
As the Commission findings noted,
Potentially serious cyber attacks can be conceived and planned
without detectable logistic preparation. They can be invisibly
reconnoitered, clandestinely rehearsed, and then mounted in a
matter of minutes or even seconds without revealing the
identity and location of the attacker.61

In the fall of 1999, the United States Commission on
National Security/21st Century released its report, “New
World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century.” The
Commission, chaired by former Senators Gary Hart (D-CO)
and Warren Rudman (R-NH), notes that “the United States
and its allies are particularly vulnerable” to IW attacks on
the critical infrastructure because “the health, welfare and
prosperity of the citizens of the developed world depend on
this infrastructure.” The Commission asked its readers to
“Imagine, for example, a well-planned attack against the air
traffic control network on the east coast of the United States
as more than 200 commercial aircraft are trying to land in
62
rain and fog on any given weekday morning.”
The Defense Science Board Report . In the fall of 1996, the
Defense Science Board presented its report on threats to
DOD systems. The Board concluded,
Because of its ever-increasing dependence on information and
information technology, the United States is one of the most
vulnerable nations to information warfare attacks.

Further,
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We conclude that there is a need for extraordinary action to
deal with the present and emerging challenges of defending
against possible information warfare attacks on facilities,
information systems, and networks of the United States which
would seriously affect the ability of the Department of Defense
to carry about its assigned missions and functions.

Finally, the Board warned that,
increasing reliance on information systems to operate,
maintain and monitor infrastructures . . . creates a tunnel of
vulnerability previously unrealized in the history of conflict.63

Vulnerabilities. To what extent are the concerns
expressed above valid? Consider the following:
On June 16, 1999, the sanitation department of Van
Nuys, California ran a Y2K compliance check. At midnight
they were testing a backup electrical system when they
received a frantic call from a park ranger. Raw, untreated
sewage was pouring out of a manhole cover and spilling into
a park. Later it was estimated that four million gallons of
sewage had been released. A computer had mistakenly
closed a gate that should have remained open to control
transfer of the sewage. A programmer’s error in 1985 seems
to have been the culprit. It cost the taxpayers about
64
$100,000 to clean up the mess.
That was one line of code, sending one message to one
computer-controlled gate. And it was an accident. A
competent, motivated, hostile force might be able to do the
following:

• Change the dose levels in prescription medicines at
pharmaceutical plants so that thousands of people
would be poisoned. 65

• Infiltrate the manufacturing process for baby food so

that the standard components would be increased by
400 percent (to toxic levels). 66
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• In a similar manner, taint the processed food industry

for adults: restaurants, hotels, hospitals, and
retirement homes.

• Subtly change the radar signals picked up at airports

so that air traffic controllers would unknowingly put
passenger planes on the same flight path.

• Stage a surprise attack on many of the automated
gasoline refineries in the nation, causing enormous,
out-of-control fires that would inundate emergency
officials and lead to immediate gasoline rationing. 67

• Contaminate the city water systems, turn the valves

backwards at the sewer systems, shut down the
electric power grid, overload the natural gas pipeline
system.

• Loot the bank accounts of selected persons,
transferring all their funds overseas and wiping out
records of their existence. 68

• Attack the identities of selected persons, eliminating

their social security records, Veterans Department
records, driver’s license numbers, bank and credit
card numbers and accounts and so on. 69

All of these examples have either been tried or are of
concern to competent officials.
Example: SCADAs and Related Systems . “SCADA” is the
acronym for “Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition,"
the computer-controlled gates which control an increasing
percentage of American infrastructures. The SCADA
systems are composed of three parts—a master station, one
or more remotes, and the custom software that controls
them. In a public water system, for example, they would
control when the pumps start and stop, how much chlorine
is injected into the system, which valves are open and which
are shut, and so forth. According to the President’s
Commission, “Cyber vulnerabilities include the increasing
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reliance on SCADA systems for the flow and pressure of
water supplies.”
Related systems called “Distributed Control Systems”
are routinely used in food processing, pharmaceutical, and
chemical facilities. Other SCADA-related systems control
railways and trucking operations.
Consider the electrical grid. It might have thousands of
SCADAs or SCADA related computer-controlled switches
that are hundreds of miles apart all tied to the central
computer. Communications from the center to the remotes
is by radio, and typically the radio communications links are
not encrypted. The SCADAs may also be maintained by
outside contractors whose personnel may or may not have
received background checks. According to the President’s
Commission, the systems rely on “dial-back modems that
can be bypassed,” which means that an outside team could
gain access to them either by capturing and overriding the
radio signals to the remotes, or by using the telephone
system and the dial-back modems to gain control over the
entire network. Once inside, a hostile force could wreck
havoc on the system.
Pharmaceutical plants, processed-food factories,
wastewater treatment plants, refineries, chemical plants,
electrical grids, oil and gas pipeline systems—all are
70
susceptible to manipulation and destruction.
Further Example: The Refineries. The refineries are
probably the most vulnerable. As of this writing, the United
States has 160 active refineries. Some are singles, but
others are clustered, often with associated chemical plants.
As the President’s Commission noted, “Large refineries
(greater than 250,000 barrel capacity) in California, Texas,
and Louisiana would be attractive targets for physical or
71
cyber attack.”
An attack might look like this: The CNA team operating
either abroad or from a clandestine U.S. location would
access the system through the dial-back modems. The
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system would be mapped thoroughly and a “backdoor”
would be left in place so it could be monitored easily for any
changes in the system. CNAs would be rehearsed until the
leadership had a high level of confidence. Using some cover
story such as seeking employment or maintenance, a special
operations individual or team would gain physical access to
the command building. It, too, would be mapped looking for
doors, windows, or other entranceways that give a direct
line-of-sight from the outside into the area where the
central computer and backups are located.
The attack would be in two phases. First, the CNA team
would deliver false messages to the SCADAs, setting off
cascading fires and explosions. Next, at the proper moment
72
the special operations team would set off an HPM,
disintegrating the electronics. This would make it
impossible for the refinery’s Information Technology team
to recover, isolate the fires, or regain control over the
system. If a number of refineries and chemical plants in the
same area were attacked simultaneously, the effects would
be catastrophic—the emergency response teams would be
overwhelmed, thousands of people would be killed or
injured, and gasoline rationing would be at World War II
levels for months.
Potential Applications II.
Taiwan. In 1995, a decade after the PLA started on IW,
Taiwan’s military establishment was complacent: “As far as
our side is concerned, the defense of the Taiwan Strait area
73
is mainly a matter of resisting landing operations.” As late
as the fall of 1998, two well-respected researchers from
Taiwan would write that Taiwan’s military restructuring
program is “not designed to counter possible electronic and
74
information warfare waged by the PLA.”
All that is different now. At a March 1999 conference,
Defense Minister Tang Fei surprised his audience by
claiming that Taiwan may be powerless against an IW
attack from the mainland. Chief of the General Staff Tang
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Yaoming told a seminar, “A massive information attack
may lead to chaos here.” Dr. Lin Chong-pin of the Mainland
Affairs Council has gone out with a public warning of
Taiwan’s increasing vulnerability to an IW attack. From
ignoring the issue, Taipei’s newspapers have been full of
articles about IW, particularly as political figures have
75
begun to take notice.
The response is a bit late, but it is on the mark. Taiwan,
like the United States, is an industrial society tied more and
more to computer systems. Whatever applies to American
infrastructure vulnerabilities applies to Taiwan as well.
The five sectors examined by the American President’s
Commission—finance, telecommunications, energy,
physical distribution, and public services—have the same
risk in Taipei as they do in Washington.
Taipei may have some additional exposure that
Washington has escaped. PLA theorist Wang Baocun talks
about the idea of “virtual warfare” where:
One is using virtual reality and computer imaging technology
during the course of war to construct images of the enemy’s
supreme commander and have him issue statements that are
not conducive to the conduct of the war, such as having him
declare though his homeland’s television system that, for
various reasons, hostilities with the enemy have ceased and
all military forces are being withdrawn.76

Considering how often President Lee has appeared on
television, and how relatively easy it would be to capture his
likeness and manipulate it, Taipei should take warning.
Taipei has other concerns as well. In the event of war, the
early warning network would be the first to be attacked. It is
unlikely that every radar on Taiwan would be taken out in
the first wave. If the surviving radar shows an attack
coming from the south, is this a true image, or a “virtual
fleet” created by Colonel Wang and his comrades? Could the
real attack be coming from the north? If your troops know
that the Other Side has been inside your system, even once,
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how much trust will they place in orders coming from
Central Command, particularly maneuver orders that
would require them to leave a prepared and presumably
secure position?
Taipei’s vulnerabilities to IW are only limited by human
imagination. Clean out the bank accounts of the political
and economic elite and transfer the proceeds overseas? Why
not let them have their money and then publicize the fact
that they are running for cover? Close down all the civilian
airports? Why not let people think one is open in order to
increase the panic and chaos as the elite tries to reach
presumed safety? As Dr. Lin pointed out this year, “Our
77
psychological defense is almost nil.”
Japan. Raisuke Miyawaki, senior advisor to the
Japanese Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection, told a CSIS conference in June 1999, “Key
elements of Japan’s information infrastructure remain
fragile and open to cyberattack.” He claims there is a
“leadership void” in Japan because of “a lack of technology
understanding” at the top. Japan is only going through the
motions of infrastructure protection, he says, because the
United States is pressuring it to do something about the
78
problem.
Whereas the refineries are probably the most lucrative
U.S. target, the railways and subways are probably the
79
most problematic in Japan. Japanese hackers have
already successfully attacked the computer control systems
80
of commuter trains, paralyzing major cities for hours. The
1995 NDU exercise considered a “new high-speed
Metro-Superliner traveling at 300 km/hr” slams into a
81
misrouted freight train somewhere in Maryland. The
team estimated 60 deaths, but in the Japanese context, it
would be much higher. A surprise attack on the Japanese
national railways would aim at multiple accidents during
the height of the rush hour, followed by a total shutdown of
the emergency response team. Those who did not perish
immediately from the shock of the collisions would die
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lingering, painful deaths because no one could care for
them.
Instrument of Choice.
If there is to be armed conflict in the Strait, the PLA’s
instrument of choice could be IW applied to Taiwan, the
United States, and Japan. Taiwan would receive the full
brunt of the campaign: preemptive precision strikes,
massive CNAs, aggressive deception, and psychological
warfare on a grand and imaginative scale. If a well-known
political figure could be coopted, one option might be to use
Special Forces to take over a military facility, install him or
her there, and rescind any calls for outside assistance.
Since the aim would be to keep the United States and
Japan out of the fray, CNA could be applied here at a
reduced level as part of a diplomatic campaign. However,
the threat of major destruction to critical infrastructures
would always hover in the background.
The primary attractiveness of such a program would be
power projection. As the RAND report demonstrates, there
is no other way to reach the U.S. homeland short of nuclear
Armageddon. The U.S. mainland has not seen war on the
home turf since Appomattox, and no one could determine
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the psychological effects a serious attack would produce.
On Taiwan and Japan, probably no one under 60 has any
real memory of World War II.
At the same time, it is the perfect match of vulnerability
against capability. Responsible officials in the United
States, Taiwan, and Japan are practically announcing to
the world how at-risk their most critical infrastructures are.
At the same time, as industrial societies become every day
more and more interconnected, they become even more
vulnerable.
Used cleverly, IW can be a very useful diplomatic tool
because it is the consummate political/military rheostat. In
the U.S. context, an opponent could go from causing minor
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inconvenience by turning all the stop-signals of a major city
to blinking red, or creating massive civilian casualties, and
every gradation in between.
There can be no question that PLA theorists are aware of
the opportunity IW presents to the Taiwan context. The
very RAND publication that includes the information above
on the vulnerability of the U.S. homeland was discussed in
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an LAD article in 1998 and an Internet article in June
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1999. The RAND publications are all available online, as is
the CSIS report. “Critical Foundations” also can be
downloaded from the Internet. From a straight military
point of view, the PLA is unlikely, it seems, to make the
mistakes Britain and France did in allowing military
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innovation to pass them by during the interwar period.
Responses.
The Administration. While the GAO, RAND, and others
have been pointing to U.S. vulnerabilities to IW for years,
the U.S. Government has been slow off the mark. In May
1998 President Clinton issued Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD) 63 “Critical Infrastructure Protection,”
which set goals and established administrative mechanisms. In keeping with many government projects, the
program is over budget and behind schedule as of this
writing.
Congress. Congress has been equally slow in responding,
but it has a very large trump card. Saying that IW is the
PLA’s best option in the Taiwan context does not mean it is
without risk. The real danger to the PRC would be
escalation led by Congress. Since 1985, Congress has
imposed economic sanctions on South Africa, Iraq, Iran,
Libya, Cuba, and Burma. It threw Toshiba Machine out of
the United States for 3 years and ultimately cost the parent
corporation half a billion dollars in lost business. Congress
also passed sanctions on foreign corporations who export
nuclear technology, chemical or biological weapons
technology, missiles, or advanced conventional weapons to
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certain countries. With the exception of sanctions on Iraq
and Cuba, all of these actions were taken over the strenuous
objections of the Executive Branch.
Given congressional hostility to Beijing now, any war
move toward Taiwan is very likely to trigger a serious
response. Congress, if it so chooses, has great leverage up to
and including a full economic embargo against the PRC, and
confiscation of all property held in the United States by PRC
citizens. As it demonstrated in the South Africa case,
Congress is not afraid of engaging in a secondary boycott
and, given the size of the U.S. economy, can throw
considerable weight around. It is worth pointing out that a
Democrat-controlled Congress with a veto-proof margin
passed the Taiwan Relations Act while a Democrat was in
the White House. By the same token, the South Africa
sanctions legislation was drafted by a Republican Senate
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and passed over a Republican President’s veto.
If
democratic Taiwan passes to a communist regime by force
and violence (with substantial civilian casualties), Congress
can turn the lights out, and there will be little the White
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House can do about it.
Beijing is clearly aware of this. In a recent interview
Senior Colonel Wang Baoqing of the Academy of Military
Sciences listed “economic sanctions against the mainland”
as his first estimate of U.S. response in the event of an
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attempt by the PRC to take over Taiwan.
In conclusion, the United States, the PRC, Taiwan, and
even Japan are entering a dangerous period. The gap
between what offensive IW is capable of accomplishing and
the nonaction by the defenders grows every day. In fact, the
defenders are advertising their vulnerability in hope of
generating public support to do something about it. As the
RAND study notes, “the probability of use [of IW] in conflict
is much higher” than the nuclear exchange which formerly
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dominated official concerns. For those with the capability
to use IW against critical infrastructures, the temptation is
to apply it.
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CHAPTER 5
CHINA’S MILITARY SPACE AND
CONVENTIONAL THEATER MISSILE
DEVELOPMENT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY
IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
Mark A. Stokes
INTRODUCTION
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is developing one
of the most daunting conventional theater missile
challenges in the world. Theater missiles and supporting
space assets are emerging as one of the most important
political and operational tools of the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA). A large arsenal of highly accurate and lethal
theater missiles serves as a “trump card” ( shashoujian), a
revolutionary departure from the PLA of the past. The
PLA’s theater missiles and a supporting space-based
surveillance network are emerging not only as a tool of
psychological warfare but as a potentially devastating
1
weapon of military utility.
Theater ballistic and land attack cruise missiles,
supported by space-based reconnaissance, appear likely to
emerge as a cornerstone of PLA warfighting early in the
21st century. A growing sector of the PLA believes strategic
attack through theater missile strikes is the best way to
even out the playing field when fighting against a
technologically superior force. The concept of strategic
attack involves pitting one’s strengths against an enemy’s
weakness, waging an asymmetrical strategy using
overwhelming offensive capabilities. Theater missiles offer
a lethal means of striking targets that most directly relate to
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the opponent’s ability to sustain operations. According to
PLA National Defense University officials, “the guiding
strategic principle of China’s new era military is active
defense (jiji fangyu), of which the required essence is
2
offensive operations against theater targets.”
Beijing’s move toward a force dominated by offensive
theater missiles could have significant implications for
regional stability, creating the first theater in which highly
accurate conventional ballistic missiles dominate the
strategic landscape. Oddly enough, PRC officials, echoed by
many within U.S. Government and academic circles, argue
that defenses against the growing PLA conventional
theater missile threat would be destabilizing since they
would spark an arms race. The misplaced focus on missile
defenses within academic and policy communities in the
United States has resulted in neglect of the dangers
presented by Beijing’s growing arsenal of increasingly
accurate and lethal theater missiles. This arsenal, together
with a preemptive doctrine, could give Beijing a decisive
edge in any future conflict with Taiwan. An overwhelming
offensive advantage could intensify the existing cross-Strait
arms race, reduce Beijing’s willingness to compromise on
cross-Strait issues, increase the chances that force could be
used short of an outright Taiwan declaration of de jure
independence, and naturally prompt Taiwan to shift toward
a tactically offensive doctrine. At the extreme, an overwhelming PLA offensive advantage could force Taiwan to
pursue a punitive deterrent option.
In this chapter, the author will first address drivers that
are influencing the PLA force planners who view space
assets and theater missiles as integral to 21st century
operations. He next outlines Chinese efforts to field a
space-based reconnaissance architecture that would
support theater missile targeting; then he reviews research
and development aimed at fielding a large arsenal of
ballistic and land attack cruise missiles. Next, the author
details operational concepts associated with a PLA theater
missile campaign, to include organizational issues,
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information denial, and the Second Artillery’s phased
approach to theater warfighting. He concludes with a
discussion of the operational and political implications of an
offense-dominated force structure, as well as potential
countermeasures.
DRIVERS
A number of drivers are propelling Beijing toward
reliance on theater missiles and supporting space assets.
These include: (1) lessons from the Gulf War and
subsequent U.S. and Russian literature on the revolution in
military affairs (RMA); (2) a doctrinal shift toward offensive
preemption, surprise, and deep strikes against strategic
and operational targets; (3) use of Taiwan as a preeminent
force planning scenario; and (4) prevention of foreign
intervention in a Taiwan scenario through an area denial
strategy.
Lessons from the Gulf War. China’s interest in deep
attack was sparked in large part by lessons from the Gulf
War and subsequent U.S. and Russian literature on the
revolution in military affairs (RMA). The U.S. performance
in the Gulf War demonstrated to the Central Military
Commission (CMC) the preeminence of the offensive,
especially airpower and long-range precision strike. In a
December 1995 meeting, the CMC concluded that “ground
fighting can only enhance the results of battle.” Lessons
from the Gulf War have been reinforced by calls to meet its
challenges of 21st century warfare through selected
3
exploitation of the RMA. Chinese commentators note areas for
exploitation include precision strike, strategic maneuver, and space
4
combat.
Emerging Operational Concepts. The Gulf War and the
RMA have sparked a fundamental reassessment of the
PLA’s approach to warfare. Operational concepts
articulated in a wide range of PLA publications serve as an
important driver propelling the PLA toward theater
missiles and supporting space assets. Key to future
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conflicts around the PRC’s periphery will be achieving a
political resolution through rapid establishment of
information dominance ( zhixinxiquan) and air superiority
5
(zhikongquan) in the opening phases of a conflict. The
concept of “rapid war, rapid resolution” ( suzhan, sujue)
requires a series of crippling strikes directed against vital
points (dianxue) of the enemy’s defense infrastructure.
These critical nodes include civilian and military command
and control facilities; intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance nodes; and important airfields and air
defense sites. This does not require annihilation of the
enemy or occupation of his territory, only a paralyzing
“mortal blow” (zhiming daji), “winning victory with one
6
strike” (yizhan, ersheng). From the Chinese perspective,
“gaining the initiative by striking first” ( xianfa zhiren), is
one of most effective means of offsetting the technological
and logistical advantages that a more advanced military
power would bring to the fight. The emerging doctrine
requires a high degree of secrecy, mobility, an accurate
7
concentration of firepower, and surprise.
Use of Taiwan as a Primary Force Planning Scenario.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Taiwan appears to
have become a primary testing grounds for the PLA’s
emerging operational concepts. Military force planners
around the world generally rely on illustrative planning
scenarios to guide the development of doctrine, research
and development (R&D), and acquisition. Until the early- to
mid-1990s, China did not appear to be fostering an ability to
take Taiwan by force. Nor did the PRC deploy more than a
symbolic land, sea, or air force presence within 300 miles of
Taiwan. Now, however, PLA modernization—and theater
missile development in particular—is motivated in large
part by the desire to use decisive military force as a means to
deter Taiwan independence sentiment and strengthen the
PRC’s hand in a reestablished cross-Strait dialogue. The
focus on Taiwan may reflect a view within the PLA that
force may eventually have to be used.
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With Taiwan as the primary driver, the PLA has three
general operational requirements. First is the capacity to
bring Taiwan to its knees quickly through paralysis of
Taipei’s ability to conduct military operations. Critical to
this effort is establishment of information dominance by
neutralizing Taiwan’s intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets and paralyzing its command and
control network. Information dominance enhances the
conditions necessary to control the airspace over Taiwan.
Theater ballistic and land attack cruise missiles, used in
parallel with electronic warfare, special operations, and
offensive counterair operations, can play a crucial role in the
rapid establishment of information and air superiority.
Control of the information environment and the skies above
the Taiwan Strait—if not enough to force a resolution in
itself—could create the conditions necessary for dominance
8
of seas and facilitate an amphibious invasion, if necessary.
The PLA must also hedge against strikes against its own
critical assets and facilities.
Prevention of Foreign Intervention. At the same time, the
PLA must deny foreign forces the ability to intervene either
through a quick resolution of the conflict or through
complicating their ability to enter the area of operations.
Since the U.S. deployment of two aircraft carrier battle
groups off the coast of Taiwan in March 1996, PLA planners
probably assume the United States would intervene in a
future Taiwan scenario. PLA writings indicate Beijing is
pursuing the kinds of capabilities intended to deter or
prevent intervention by outside powers such as the United
States. The PLA has carefully studied U.S. military
weaknesses and has identified vulnerabilities in U.S. force
projection, including reliance on space systems, weaknesses
in aircraft carrier battle groups, and expeditionary air
9
forces.
The most fundamental requirement for denying the
United States the ability to intervene in a Taiwan conflict
would be an expanded capacity for intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance. Monitoring U.S.
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deployments could enable PLA targeting of critical nodes in
the Western Pacific in order to complicate or delay U.S.
intervention in a Taiwan scenario. Successful use of
overwhelming force through preemptive strikes to quickly
resolve the Taiwan issue could preclude U.S. intervention
by presenting Washington and the international community with a fait accompli.
SPACE SUPPORT FOR THEATER MISSILE
OPERATIONS
Under CMC guidance, China’s space and missile
industry intends to field a constellation of reconnaissance
systems that could support the PLA with near-real-time
intelligence early in the 21st century. PLA observers view
exploitation of space assets as crucial for 21st century
warfare. Theater operations must be supported by
surveillance architecture for strategic intelligence,
targeting, and battle damage assessment (BDA). Effective
theater missile operations need to see deep. Before any
targets can be struck, they must be identified as targets,
precisely located, and defenses accurately assessed so that
they can be hit without prohibitive losses. This requires
information from a variety of space-based, airborne, and
ground-based sensors. Through its existing air- and
ground-based reconnaissance network, the PLA currently
has the ability to monitor activities within line of sight of its
10
borders—approximately 200 nautical miles. However, to
expand its battlespace awareness, the PLA must develop
the means to monitor activities in the Western Pacific,
South China Sea, and Indian Ocean. Space assets could
enable the monitoring of naval activities in the Pacific and
Indian Oceans and the South China Sea and track U.S. Air
Force expeditionary air force deployments into the region.
Space-based reconnaissance systems also provide the
images necessary for mission planning functions, such as
navigation and terminal guidance for land attack cruise
missiles.
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China Aerospace S&T Corporation (CASC) is developing
at least four space-based systems that would expand PLA
battlespace awareness and support strike operations
11
further from Chinese shores.
Space operations are the
responsibility of the PLA General Armaments Department
(GAD) China Launch and Tracking Control General
12
(CLTC). While only a small percentage of space-derived
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets
will be near real time, the number and diversity of sensors
could provide frequent revisit times and complementary
data on significant military targets on Taiwan and in the
13
Western Pacific.
By the 2005-2010 timeframe, China’s space-based
surveillance architecture could have at least four
components: 1) synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites for
all weather, day/night monitoring of military activities; 2)
electronic reconnaissance satellites to detect electronic
emissions in the Western Pacific; 3) mid-high resolution
electro-optical satellites for early warning, targeting, and
mission planning; and 4) a new generation of high
resolution recoverable satellites for intelligence and
analysis. According to Chinese sources, SAR and electronic
reconnaissance satellites would serve as important
components of an ocean monitoring ( haiyang jianshi)
network for detecting and tracking naval activities, to
include carrier battle groups and submarines.
Development of space-based surveillance architecture has
in large part been funded under the special 863-program
14
budget.
Radar Imaging Satellites. Work on an indigenous
synthetic radar (SAR) satellite ( hecheng kongjing leida
weixing) began in the 1980s. Under the 863 Program,
China’s space industry and oceanographic research
organizations began preliminary research on a SAR
satellite in 1987. The program moved into the applied R&D
phase in 1991. After successful fielding of an airborne SAR
15
system,
China’s State Science and Technology
Commission (SSTC) and the PLA’s Commission on Science,
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Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND)
approved the finalized design and associated high speed
data transmission system in May 1995.
Production of the first generation SAR satellite is
included in the 9th Five-Year Plan (1996-2000). China’s
first radar imaging satellite, designated the Haiyang-1
(HY-1), is slated for launch in 2001. The HY-1 will be based
on a small satellite bus that will serve as a common bus for a
range of future satellite constellations, to include an
integrated SAR/Electro-optical (EO) small satellite
constellation. The HY-1 and major subsystems passed a
design finalization review recently and a test model is
supposed to be delivered by end of this year. Preliminary
research has already begun on a more sophisticated
16
second-generation SAR satellite system.
While SAR satellites have civilian applications, Chinese
journals note their principal purpose is to support national
defense. The PLA and other parts of the state apparatus
view radar satellite imagery as a critical modernization
program. Unlike electro-optical systems, GSD Second
Department advocates note that space-based SAR systems
can see through clouds, rain, and fog in order to detect and
17
track ships and submarines in shallow waters.
China has arranged to receive downlinked radar
satellite imagery to help establish a foundation for radar
satellite imagery exploitation.
The PRC has entered
contractual agreements to obtain commercial radar
satellite data from a number of foreign vendors. China
began receiving SAR data from ERS-1 and JERS-1
satellites in 1994 and from Canada’s RADARSAT in 1997.
Included in the arrangement was training of imagery
18
analysts.
Electronic Reconnaissance Satellites. Electronic
reconnaissance satellites ( dianzi zhencha weixing) appear
to be the second component of an ocean-monitoring
network. Strong indications exist that China has
resurrected an electronic reconnaissance satellite program
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that has been dormant for over 20 years. The PLA
experimented with electronic reconnaissance satellites,
euphemistically called “technical experimental satellites”
(jishu shiyan weixing ), in the mid-1970s under the
Shanghai Bureau of Astronautics’ 701 Program. Technical
writings indicate the Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight
Technology (SAST), the successor of the Shanghai Bureau
of Astronautics, has resurrected the program and intends to
field a space-based electronic reconnaissance system. At
least one SAST design under evaluation is a constellation of
small electronic reconnaissance satellites that can ensure
19
precise location data and survivability.
Electro-optical Reconnaissance Systems. In addition to
its ocean reconnaissance systems, China’s remote sensing
community is working feverishly to deploy space-based
electro-optical (EO) remote sensing platforms. CASC and
China’s electronics industries have made notable progress
in charged couple devices (CCDs), a technology which is
essential to the development of real-time EO imaging
20
systems. Fielding of EO satellites would enable Beijing to
beam images back to ground stations directly from space.
The Ziyuan-1 (ZY-1), a joint venture between the PRC
and Brazil, will serve as China’s first EO reconnaissance
satellite. Launched in October 1999, the ZY-1 has a 2-year
lifespan and incorporates a data transmission system to
beam images back to earth. The ZY-1, operating at an
altitude of 778 kilometers, is expected to have only a
20-meter resolution but will add to China’s experience base
21
in EO imaging systems.
Building on the experience gained from the HY-1 and
ZY-1 programs, CASC spokesmen have announced their
intention to field a tactical small satellite imaging
constellation and associated mobile ground receiving
stations. The tactical imaging system, slated for launch in
next two years, will consist of four EO and two SAR
satellites. The EO component likely will use the same bus
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as the HY-1 and is designed to have a five-meter resolution
22
when operating in a 700-kilometer orbit.
Small satellite constellations are an important aspect of
China’s operational concept for space warfare. Clearly
recognizing their military implications, Chinese defense
officials advocate small satellite development in order to
reduce vulnerability of fixed launch sites. Chinese
engineers are examining the utility of using mobile, solid
23
fueled launch vehicles, such as a modified DF-21 or DF-31.
Reduced size and complexity allows for faster R&D and
manufacturing time, and production in significant
numbers. In a contingency situation, tactical imagery
satellites can be launched on demand, with mobile launch
platforms increasing survivability. Multiple small satellites
can be stacked on a single launch vehicle. Furthermore,
enemy attacks on small satellite constellations will
encounter greater targeting difficulties and be costly.
Destruction of one satellite will have minimal effect on the
24
overall functioning of the architecture.
The FSW-3. China has launched more than a dozen
film-based recoverable satellites ( fanhuishi weixing, or
FSW) since 1975. These systems stayed in orbit for up to 16
days and were used to obtain imagery of Taiwan and nations
around China’s periphery, determine coordinates of
facilities that were potential targets of Chinese missiles,
and map Chinese territory. China’s most recent generation
of reconnaissance satellite, the Fanhuishi-2 (FSW-2),
displayed an ability to maneuver in orbit. Reconnaissance
satellites generally have been launched from Gansu’s
25
Jiuquan Space Launch Center. China’s next generation
recoverable satellite—the FSW-3—is expected to have a
resolution of one meter. This satellite could be launched as
26
early as later this year.
Ground Processing. China’s ground processing capacity
is rapidly progressing. Chinese engineers are working to
improve ultra high-speed data processing, storage, and
transmission systems, as well as computer, data compres116

sion, and networking technology to be able to handle real
time, high-resolution imagery from multiple satellites.
Essential for the efficient transmission and processing of
satellite-derived imagery is data compression technology,
27
which CAST is attempting to master. The PLA has fielded
a real time image storage system as well as an imagery
dissemination system that is linked to China’s national
integrated telecommunications network. The system will
28
allow subscribers to search and rapidly download images.
In 1996, the PLA installed a digitized high-resolution
29
imagery processing system, the BGC-161.
China is receiving foreign assistance. In 1992, Italy’s
Telespazio signed an agreement worth U.S. $8 million to
provide Olivetti image processing computers and software.
Telespazio assigned technicians to train Chinese photo
interpreters for up to three years. China’s procurement of
foreign sources of imagery also includes options for
30
training.
Despite significant investment in reconnaissance
systems, China may still have a limited near-real-time
targeting capability. Reconnaissance satellites must be
within line of sight of a ground station to download their
imagery data. Targets on Taiwan could be imaged and
immediately beamed back to a ground station on the
mainland. However, satellites imaging targets further out
from China’s borders in the Western Pacific likely would
need to store their images and wait until they return to
within line of sight of the Chinese mainland.
Future deployments of a sea-based imagery receiving
station, a data relay satellite (DRS), or establishment of
ground stations abroad would enhance China’s extended
31
range near-real-time targeting capability. A Chinese DRS
architecture under development is expected to include at
least two geostationary satellites that could provide 85
percent coverage of the earth and support 5-10 satellites at
32
the same time.
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R&D, production, and deployment of satellite systems
are expensive. However, much of the R&D budget for
China’s space program comes from the State Council
33
science and technology budget, not from PLA coffers. With
a price tag of between 5-12 million U.S. dollars per satellite,
the cost of satellite development in China is significantly
34
less than in the United States or Western Europe.
In
addition to funding from the 863 Program, R&D of space
systems is subsidized by revenues from commercial space
launches and the sale of satellite systems abroad.
International cooperative efforts with Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus, France, Germany, Italy, and Brazil cut costs even
35
more.
THEATER MISSILE DEVELOPMENTS
A space-based reconnaissance system will be a key
element of the PLA’s emerging theater missile strike force.
In March 1996, the Central Military Commission reportedly
convened an enlarged meeting and developed a plan to
develop seven weapons on a priority basis. Four of those
weapons are directly related to building a deep strike
capability. At least one of the objectives was fielding
China’s first generation land attack cruise missile by
36
2000.
Dependence on theater missiles reflects a failure of
China’s aviation industry to provide the types of aircraft
37
that normally would carry out this mission. Although they
can carry only one-sixth the payload of an air-to-ground
strike fighter, ballistic missiles have a strong psychological
deterrent effect, and are increasingly accurate, mobile, and
stealthy. Advocates argue that ballistic and land attack
cruise missiles are relatively cheap while aviation
technology is increasingly sophisticated and expensive. Air
mobilization is time consuming and relatively easy to
detect. Air strikes against targets in denied areas require a
measure of air superiority. Theater ballistic missiles,
however, can be rapidly mobilized with a high degree of
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secrecy. They are much harder to counter due to their fast
38
reentry speeds and short flight times.
Theater Ballistic Missiles.
Ballistic missiles are emerging as the backbone of
conventional PLA theater operations. Drawing profound
lessons from the Gulf War, the PLA views conventional
ballistic missiles as a crucial aspect of China’s emerging
39
deep attack (zongshen daji) strategy.
The China Aerospace S&T Corporation (CASC) appears to be producing a
substantial number of conventional theater ballistic
missiles with ranges stretching from 300 to 2000
kilometers. In fact, a 1998 Department of Defense report
asserted that China’s space and missile industry probably
will have the capacity to produce as many as 1000 ballistic
40
missiles in the next decade. At an estimated cost of U.S.
$500,000 or less per missile, CASC would be able to produce
41
up to 1000 ballistic missiles at a total cost of $500 million.
CASC’s key producers of ballistic missiles—China Academy
of Launch Technology and the 066 Base in Hubei
province—are leveraging foreign technology in order to
achieve tremendous advances in accuracy. At the same
time, they are diversifying the payloads of their ballistic
missile to increase their lethality. CASC and the PLA are
also examining a wide range of countermeasures to ensure
their theater ballistic missile force remains viable as active
theater missile defenses are introduced into the Asia-Pacific
region. The PRC is concentrating on three conventional
theater ballistic missile systems: 1) the DF-15 short-range
ballistic missile (SRBM); 2) the DF-11 SRBM; and 3) the
42
DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM).
DF-15 Short-Range Ballistic Missile System. The DF-15
(CSS-6) is a solid-fueled, 600 kilometer SRBM
manufactured by the China Academy of Launch Technology
(CALT). The DF-15’s payload reportedly has an attitude
control mechanism that permits steering corrections from
43
separation to impact.
The detachable warhead offers a
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much smaller target than a SCUD, and its potential
maneuverability would complicate missile defense radar
tracking, computations, and interception. With a unitary,
high explosive warhead, the DF-15 could create a crater as
44
large as 30-50 meters in diameter. Assuming a nominal
trajectory at a range of 500 kilometers, the DF-15 would
reach an altitude of about 120 kilometers, achieve a reentry
speed of about two kilometers per second, and have a flight
45
time of only six or seven minutes.
Some reporting
indicates the DF-15 currently has a 100-meter circular error
46
of probability (CEP).
To diversify its theater ballistic
missile inventory, a 1200-kilometer range version of the
47
DF-15 is reportedly under development.
DF-11 Short Range Ballistic Missile System. The
DF-11—better known by its export designator, the M-11
(CSS-7) — also is a solid propellant, road-mobile SRBM
with an estimated range of 300 km. This missile, however,
has not yet entered the PLA’s inventory. An improved,
longer-range version of the DF-11 may be under
48
development. The main advantage of the DF-11 over the
DF-15 is its ability to carry a larger payload. Some sources
credit the 300-kilometer version with an 800-kilogram
49
warhead and a 150-meter CEP.
The DF-11 is manufactured by the CASC’s 066 Base, also known as the
Sanjiang Space Corporation, based in Hubei province. The
DF-11’s 300-kilometer range presents challenges for active
missile defenses due to its brief flight time of three minutes.
Because its flight would remain within the atmosphere,
upper tier systems would be unable to engage the
50
300-kilometer DF-11. Details on the longer-range version
are unavailable.
DF-21 Medium Range Ballistic Missile System. One
other missile system which could be brought to bear against
Taiwan is the solid-fueled 2000 kilometer DF-21 (CSS-5),
equipped with a 600 kilogram warhead. Research and
development on the DF-21 began in 1967, had its first
successful test in 1985, and deployed into an experimental
regiment as early as 1991. With a circular error probable
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(CEP) of 700 meters, the DF-21 is currently equipped for
nuclear missions only. However, there are indications that
since 1995 a terminal guidance system has been under
development for the DF-21 that could permit highly
51
accurate conventional strikes. The DF-21 reentry speed is
fast enough to preclude successful intercepts by lower-tier
missile defense systems. Because of its warhead size and
the inability of lower tier missile defense systems to engage
longer range MRBMs, incorporation of a terminal guidance
system could have significant military implications.
Technical Trends.
Several efforts are underway to increase the accuracy
and lethality of China’s theater ballistic missiles. These
include: 1) terminal guidance; 2) a diverse mix of conventional payloads; and 3) missile defense countermeasures.
Terminal Guidance. The most significant development
in China’s theater ballistic missile program is the
development of terminal guidance systems that, according
to Chinese writings, meet a CEP requirement of 25-40
52
meters. CASC engineers point to three options in ballistic
missile terminal guidance. First, terrain matching
terminal guidance (dixing pipei mozhidao) makes use of
digitized stored images (electro-optical or radar) and
matches them against the images acquired in the seeker.
CALT began preliminary research on terrain matching
53
terminal guidance as early as 1977. Radar matching was
used on the U.S. Pershing-II and optical matching is
currently used on a Russian variant of the SCUD-B.
Chinese engineers note that critical technologies for terrain
matching terminal guidance include large scale and very
54
large-scale integrated circuits (LSIC/VLSIC).
A second means for terminal guidance is a millimeter
wave seeker (maomibo xun). CALT engineers have carried
out a number of feasibility studies on terminal guidance
55
technologies, to include millimeter wave and infrared.
Millimeter wave seekers are compact, lightweight, have
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high spatial resolution, a robust antijamming capability,
and are all weather. Critical technologies include LSICs,
microcomputers, and digital information management
systems for target discrimination and tracking. Chinese
engineers, however, note that millimeter wave (MMW)
56
seekers are relatively expensive.
A final option for terminal guidance is exploitation of the
global positional system (GPS). GPS-assisted guidance
systems usually include a GPS receiver, a ring laser gyro
(huanxing jiguang tuoluo), and microcomputer. There are
indications China has already mastered use of GPS for
mid-course corrections. At least two tests of an on-board
GPS trajectory reference system had been conducted as of
57
1995. Use of GPS for terminal guidance requires frequent
and highly precise updates from navigation satellites.
Potentially in support of this effort, China is installing a
differential GPS network (chafen quanqiu dingwei xitong)
along its eastern seaboard that could enhance the accuracy
58
of the PLA’s SRBM force.
As a final note, CASC institutes have close
relations—some officially sanctioned and some not—with
counterparts in the former Soviet Union. Chinese engineers
have approached Russian institutes for ballistic missile
guidance and control technology and have hired a number of
59
Russian scientists as technical advisors.
Conventional Payloads. There is evidence that China
intends to design up to six different payloads for its theater
ballistic missiles. Today, the PLA’s conventional theater
ballistic missiles are armed only with unitary blast
fragmentation warheads. To diversify its missile payloads,
CASC writings indicate prioritization of three categories of
specialized warheads for use against air defense sites,
radar, airfields, semi-hardened C4I centers, and ports: 1)
submunition (zimudan) payloads; 2) electromagnetic pulse
warheads (dianci chongzhong dantou); 3) penetrating
warheads (zuandi dantou); and 4) fuel-air explosive
60
warheads (youqi or leibao dantou).
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Submunitions. A submunition warhead contains a
number of small devices or “bomblets” designed for
specialized roles. These warheads usually detonate at a
preset altitude of several hundred meters so as to spread the
munitions out to an optimal pattern size. Submunition
warheads are far more efficient against targets susceptible
to blast and fragmentation than unitary warheads of the
same weight. As of 1996, CALT was testing a guided
submunition (jiandan zimudan) package for blast and
fragmentation effects; and penetrating submunitions
(qinche zimudan) for cratering runways. More advanced
packages under development include terminally guided
61
sensor fused submunition warheads. There are also
indications of CBU-78 GATOR-like mine laying
62
submunition development.
Electromagnetic Pulse Warhead (EMP). PLA writings
indicate that fielding of an anti-radiation EMP warhead is a
high priority. An anti-radiation warhead, specifically a
high-powered microwave (HPM) device, is viewed as a
“natural enemy” (tiandi) of more technologically advanced
militaries and an “electronic trump card” ( dianzi
63
shashou).
Due to challenges related to weaponizing a
device with enough power, HPM warheads would initially
only be effective against radiating targets within the
immediate area of impact—radar and communications
centers would be the prime candidates. As the technology
64
progresses, HPM warheads could achieve wider effects.
The developers of the DF-11—known as the 066 Base—have
65
demonstrated the most interest in HPM warheads.
Penetration Warheads. Chinese engineers note that an
increase in CEP to better than 50 meters would permit the
use of penetration warheads (zuandi dantou) that would dig
deep into semi-hardened facilities such as command and
control centers, intelligence collection facilities, and
weapons storage facilities which are housed in concrete
bunkers. CALT warhead engineers have tested a range of
high strength steels and other material and structural
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technologies that would dig into critical hardened
66
facilities.
Fuel-Air Explosive Warhead. There are also indications
that the DF-15 may carry a fuel-air explosive (FAE)
warhead. FAE warheads offer greater explosive power at a
weight approximately 50 percent less than conventional
explosives. Pound for pound, FAE weapons are three to five
times as destructive as high explosive warheads. For
example, a 500kg FAE warhead would destroy most aircraft
and injure all personnel within 250 meters of the impact
point. Chinese designers have studied the use of FAE
warheads since the 1970s and tested the effectiveness of an
FAE as early as 1976 by detonating an U.S. device that had
been captured by the Vietnamese and transferred to
67
Beijing.
Missile Defense Countermeasures.
The PLA places a premium on ensuring its ballistic
missile force would be able to penetrate future active
theater missile defenses. PLA and defense industry
analysts are examining a range of more sophisticated TMD
countermeasures that could reduce the effectiveness of
active missile defense systems.
Saturation. The simplest means of overcoming missile
defense architecture is through saturating it with a large
number of missiles. Given enough ballistic and land attack
cruise missiles, any system can be saturated by
overwhelming a missile defense systems’ area of coverage.
Saturation generally requires a large number of missiles,
timed to arrive together in order to bunch effectively for
ground defense saturation. PLA General Armament
Department engineers have evaluated PATRIOT
saturation rates and are confident that their theater
68
ballistic missiles can reach their targets.
Maneuvering Re-Entry Vehicles. More sophisticated
countermeasures could reduce the effectiveness of active
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missile defenses short of the brute force saturation
approach. For example, the CASC is developing the
capabilities that would permit conventional ballistic missile
re-entry vehicles to maneuver in their terminal phase.
Missile designers believe maneuvering not only is essential
for terminal guidance packages but is also a means to
complicate ballistic missile defenses. Through modeling
and simulation, CASC has determined that maneuvering is
a viable means to reduce land-based lower tier TBMD
69
probability of kill rates. In support of this research effort,
China allegedly acquired PATRIOT technology to calibrate
an auxiliary propulsion system on the DF-15 re-entry
vehicle to enable the payload to outmaneuver a PATRIOT
70
system as it re-enters the atmosphere. Missile designers
have also demonstrated a special interest in the speed
control maneuver (sudu kongzhi jidong) used in the
71
1800-kilometer Pershing-II.
Shaping, Stealth, Decoys, and On-Board Jammers.
CALT warhead designers have already lowered the DF-15
and DF-11 signature through shaping of the warhead. A
warhead designer can lower the signature of a reentry
vehicle further by reducing the infrared signal or by
incorporating stealth design technologies to reduce the
radar cross-section. Use of balloons can also mask the shape
of reentry vehicles and chaff ( jinshu botiao) can be released
with the reentry vehicle in an attempt to hide the target
behind a cloud of radar reflecting metal strips. Chinese
engineers have tested chaff packages. Other measures
under investigation include electronic and infrared
countermeasures on board reentry vehicles, as well as
carrying out hard kills against enemy TMD radar through
72
the use of anti-radiation missiles. CASC missile engineers
have tested active jammers that can broadcast a signal
designed to interfere with a radar’s ability to detect the
target object or corrupt the signal in such a way as to cause
73
the radar to receive a false echo.
National University of
Defense Technology analysts have examined electronic
countermeasure packages on board theater ballistic
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missiles as a means to counter millimeter wave and infrared
74
seekers on missile defense interceptors. In 1995 and 1996,
the Chinese allegedly tested DF-21 endo-atmospheric
75
decoys.
Laser Cladding. Looking ahead to the potential
deployment of boost phase intercept systems such as the
airborne laser (ABL), Chinese engineers are developing a
coating for ballistic missiles that could complicate use of
missile defense high power lasers. Using their own
indigenously developed high powered lasers, Chinese
institutes have tested various coating materials to protect
the outer shell of ballistic missiles, a process known as laser
76
cladding (jiguang rongfu). Laser cladding, together with
the spinning of theater ballistic missiles, may not make
ballistic missiles immune to boost phase missile defense
systems but could increase required lasing time, thus
reducing the number of laser shots available per ABL
mission.
Multi-Axis Attacks. The Second Artillery and CASC
have conducted modeling exercises and simulations to test
China’s ability to break though the wide range of projected
TMD deployments. Modeling has focused on large raid
sizes, using combinations of surface-to-surface, air-tosurface, and sea-to-surface theater missile systems. After
computer simulations and modeling exercises, CASC is
confident that its theater ballistic missiles can neutralize
77
opposing land based lower tier systems.
Depressed Trajectories. Chinese missile analysts view
depressed trajectories (yadi guidao) as another option to
counter space-based and exo-atmospheric upper tier missile
defense systems. A 1200-kilometer range ballistic missile
on a nominal trajectory will normally reach an altitude of
400 kilometers, rendering the missile vulnerable to upper
tier missile defenses for a substantial portion of the flight.
However, launching a missile at a depressed trajectory
could allow the missile to achieve only a 100-kilometer
altitude that limits the ability of exo-atmospheric upper
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systems to engage the missile. Testing and modeling has
been done on the DF-3 (CSS-2), which normally has a range
of 2780 kilometers, with a maximum altitude of 550km.
With depressed trajectory, the DF-3 travels 1550 kilometers
78
at 100 kilometers altitude.
Land Attack Cruise Missiles.
To augment its theater ballistic missile arsenal, China is
creating a new generation of cruise missiles able to
penetrate defenses and strike critical targets with precision
and increased firepower. Fielding of land attack cruise
missiles (LACMs) may prompt expansion of missions of the
PLA’s Second Artillery and Navy. Increasing availability of
cheap navigation and guidance systems and digital
mapping technology have increased the incentives and
reduced the time required to field a LACM.
Cheaper and more accurate than ballistic missiles,
LACMs appear to have a relatively high development
priority. The size and flight profile of ground-, air-, and
sea-launched cruise missiles can stress the capabilities of
even the most modern air defense systems. Chinese
research and development of LACMs is being aided by an
aggressive effort to acquire foreign cruise missile
technology and subsystems, particularly from Russia. The
first LACM to enter production probably would be
air-launched and could be operational early in the 21st
79
century.
The heart of China’s LACM missile development lies
within CASC’s Third Academy, headquartered just
southwest of Beijing. Over 14,500 technicians and workers
ply their trade in ten research institutes and two major
factories. The following discussion of China LACM
development focuses on: 1) the underlying rationale for
LACM development; 2) specific LACM systems that may
come on line within the next 5 years; 3) the mission planning
process; and 4) general technical trends influencing China’s
80
LACM development.
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Why Land Attack Cruise Missiles? Land attack cruise
missiles have a number of advantages over ballistic missiles
or manned aircraft. China’s first generation LACM is likely
to be up to twice as accurate as their theater ballistic
missiles. Successful exploitation of GPS, indigenous and/or
foreign procured remote sensing data, and digital mapping
technology could permit the fielding of an LACM with a CEP
of 16 meters or better. LACMs are cheaper to produce—
generally thought to be one-third the cost of ballistic
missiles. For example, if one assumes an SRBM unit cost of
$500,000, then the unit cost of an LACM could be as little as
$175,000. Chinese defense industrial observers note that
developing an arsenal of cruise missiles could have a 9:1
ratio over the cost of defending against them. As the
president of the Third Academy has pointed out, the cost of
producing cruise missiles is 20-30 percent less in China
81
than it is in other countries.
Cruise missiles offer other appealing features as well.
Use of GPS allows launchers to forego pre-surveyed launch
sites, permitting the missile to disperse to a greater range of
launch sites. Ground-launched LACMs can be quite
survivable. With a low take-off weight, they tend to be more
easily transportable than theater ballistic missiles. The
infrared launch signature would be less than that of a
ballistic missile, decreasing warning time and increasing
survivability. Unlike ballistic missiles, land attack cruise
missiles could be loaded onto ships and fired at land targets
82
that may have not been anticipated.
Land attack cruise missiles pose serious challenges for
air defenses. Due to the earth’s curvature, ground-based
radar can detect a low flying cruise missile only about 32
kilometers away. In comparison, an aircraft flying at 10,000
feet can be detected when it is about 240 kilometers away.
Newer missiles are incorporating stealth features that
would make them even less visible to radar and infrared
detectors.
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PLA LACM Programs. In accordance with standard
Third Academy R&D practices, China’s future family of
land attack cruise missiles likely will be based on airframes
83
which have already been fielded.
Chinese and Western
sources indicate at least three families of cruise missiles
may be under evaluation for a land attack mission: 1) the
Silkworm; 2) the multipurpose Yingji-8 missile; and 3) an
anti-radiation missile that Western sources have
84
designated as the YJ-9.
The Land Attack Silkworm. China’s first LACM is
expected to be a Silkworm derivative. This system,
designated the XY-41 as early as 1989, will be smaller, more
mobile, and more accurate than ballistic missiles such as
the DF-15, but carry the same size warhead (500kg). The
85
XY-41 is a variant of the HY-4 anti-ship cruise missile.
The Silkworm-derivative could be air- or ground-launched
and reportedly will have a range of 300-400 kilometers,
86
indicating an upgrade to the HY-4’s turbojet engine. Some
Western reporting asserts that CASC is getting foreign
assistance in development of an integrated INS/GPS system
87
and in warhead technology.
Ground-launched LACMs would be subordinated to the
Second Artillery. Based on existing organizational
structures within the Second Artillery and in coastal
Silkworm units, a ground launched LACM brigade likely
would be divided in four battalions, with each battalion
having four company-sized fire units with one launcher per
fire unit. A first generation LACM brigade could adopt an
organization structure similar to today’s typical HY-4 fire
unit—four towed launchers, a firing command vehicle, a
truck mounted microwave relay, and auxiliary power truck.
The HY-4 is launched via a solid rocket booster before a
turbojet engine takes over for the duration of the flight. The
missile cruises at about Mach 0.8 and maintains an altitude
88
between 70-200 meters.
The YJ-8. A second system reported by Western sources
as being adapted for land attack use is the smaller Yingji-8
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(YJ-8). The Exocet-like YJ-8 series adopts a solid propellant
that decreases the size and weight of the system to enable
more diverse set of launching modes. With the solid motor,
however, the YJ-8’s range is limited to 42 kilometers or less.
A YJ-8 follow-on, designated the YJ-82, utilizes the same
basic airframe but uses a small turbojet engine instead of a
solid motor that extends the airframe’s range to 120
kilometers. The alleged land attack version of the
YJ-8—reportedly the turbojet variant—would incorporate
integrated GPS and TERCOM guidance. Western sources
indicate the Third Academy may be extending its range to at
least 300 kilometers and claim that GPS-aided navigation—augmented by terrain contour matching—could
result in cruise missiles like the YJ-8 to achieve an accuracy
of up to 10 meters. The YJ-8’s smaller warhead (165kg),
89
however, would limit the missile’s utility.
A Chinese Anti-Radiation Missile. The PLA and China’s
space and missile community have also devoted a
significant degree of attention to development of cruise
missiles with passive seekers to counter enemy radar
systems. Like ballistic and other cruise missiles,
anti-radiation missiles are considered as a shashoujian for
priority development. Western sources have designated
China’s new family of anti-radiation missiles as the Yingji-9
(YJ-9), a system influenced by Russia’s Kh-31P and/or
Israel’s STAR-1 ARM systems. There are persistent rumors
of PLA procurement or joint production arrangement on the
Kh-31P, which Chinese engineers note was specifically
developed to counter the U.S. AWACS, PATRIOT MPQ-53
radar, and AEGIS SPY-1D phased array radar. China’s
defense industrial complex, specifically the Third Academy
with support from the Harbin Institute of Technology, is
aggressively pursuing deployment of a long-range
90
anti-radiation missile.
Some Western sources allege an
extended range version of the YJ-9 may have a range of 400
91
kilometers. Chinese research indicates China’s first
92
generation anti-radiation missile will be air-launched.
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Mission Planning. Mission planning exploits navigation
aids and flight management computers to permit LACMs to
fly along precise, pre-programmed routes. This generally
involves use of a land attack navigation system, including
exploitation of U.S. NAVSTAR GPS and Russia’s
GLONASS, a radar altimeter, an inertial measurement
unit, and a sophisticated flight management computer.
Because mission planning requires a knowledge of the
shape of the terrain and obstructions found along the cruise
missile’s intended flight path, satellite imagery and
geographic information systems (GIS) play an important
93
supporting role.
Much of this technology is available commercially
94
off-the-shelf. Commercial imagery is adequate to plan
routes with relative positional accuracy on the order of tens
of meters. China’s indigenous remote sensing program and
future commercial sources will provide even more precise
data. There are a number of commercially available mission
planning software programs which can manipulate sources
of imagery for robust mission planning for military
purposes.
There are two major mission planning processes: en
route and terminal. Both heavily rely on intelligence. For
the enroute planning process, General Staff Department
(GSD) intelligence and cartography/mapping offices
probably would identify enemy air defenses to avoid and
generate en route terrain data. Routes would be validated
and waypoints en route to the target loaded into the LACM
95
computer. Because of the requirement for large databases
and computer operations, the mission planning process
likely would be centralized in Beijing and then transmitted
to the theater operations command center.
An important en route mission planning technology
under development is terrain contour matching
(TERCOM). A prerequisite for TERCOM ( dixing pipei
zhidao) is generation of electronic maps from highresolution satellite images. TERCOM uses a radar
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altimeter to measure terrain features along its flight path
and correlate these measurements with internally stored
digital maps. The Third Academy has been conducting
96
preliminary research into TERCOM since at least 1988.
There is some indication China is examining integrating
combined GPS/GLONASS receivers on board their missiles
97
as well.
For terminal planning, the most advanced PLA system
under development is the digital scene matching area
correlation (DSMAC) system. DSMAC updates the position
of the missile by matching a stored image to a series of
images sensed in flight. The planning required is
substantial and complex. A PLA targeteer likely would
obtain a photograph of the targeted area and generate
DSMAC scenes for programming into the cruise missile’s
flight computer. The DSMAC images are prepared from
satellite photographs of the target. Higher resolution
images allow for more accurate updates and a better CEP.
PLA GSD intelligence analysts would identify targets of
interest and then either pull the image from the library or
task China’s remote sensing community to procure the
image. PLA GSD targeteers would then select aimpoints to
exploit the most vulnerable aspect of a command and
control facility or airfield. The photograph would then be
transformed into a digital image and loaded onto the LACM
computer. Third Academy engineers believe en route and
terminal mission planning systems can assure a CEP of 16
98
meters or less.
The mission planning process can take up to several
hours. The PLA’s deep attack strategy, however, does not
necessarily require a rapid mission planning process since
most targets on Taiwan would be strategic and static in
nature. If indigenous near-real-time space remote sensing
systems were available, GSD would task the satellite
operators for the imagery. The GSD could also order
quick-turnaround imagery from a foreign provider, such as
Russia, Israel, or France.
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Deployment of a LACM capability likely will spark a
shift in organizational responsibilities. As previously
mentioned, the Second Artillery appears to be a primary
99
procurement agent for ground launched LACMs.
An air
launched Silkworm LACM will likely use PLA Air Force
subordinated B-6s. If the YJ-8 were fielded as a LACM,
tactical fighter-bombers such as the FB-7 would serve as the
primary platform. There are indications the PLA Navy may
be seeking to expand its mission to include conventional
100
missile strikes against land-based targets from the sea.
Technical Trends.
China’s Third Academy intends to upgrade its cruise
missile production capacity, extend the range and speed of
its cruise missiles, diversify its choices of terminal guidance
systems, and lower their radar cross-section.
Production Trends. The Third Academy is upgrading its
ability to design and manufacture highly complex cruise
missiles. They are integrating the use of virtual reality
(xuni xianshi) in cruise missile development, and are using
increasingly sophisticated supercomputers to design the
missiles. Third Academy manufacturing centers have
imported some of the world’s most advanced engineering
workstations, and three, four, and five-axis computer
101
numerically controlled machine tools.
CASC’s
world-class simulation facility in western Beijing also aids
cruise missile development by theoretically reducing
testing requirements by 40-60 percent and shortening
102
overall development time by 30-40 percent.
Acquisition
of advanced Western systems could also reduce production
time—Chinese engineers have reportedly had access to an
intact Tomahawk that fell into Afghanistan territory in
103
August 1998.
Propulsion Systems. Engineers are also working on
better propulsion systems that can increase the lethal range
and/or speed of the cruise missile. Faster cruise missiles
reduce an adversary’s reaction time. In one of China’s most
133

significant aerospace programs, the PLA General
Armament Department (GAD) and the Third Academy are
designing a supersonic combustion ramjet engine (scramjet,
or chaoran chongya fadongji) which can propel a missile at
104
hypersonic speeds of between Mach 4-10.
Engineers are
also working toward more efficient turbojet and turbofan
engines and motors to significantly extend the range of
cruise missiles. The anticipated range of China’s first
generation of land attack cruise missiles would be limited to
around 300-400 kilometers. However, to be able to hit
targets in Japan using a ground launched system, the Third
Academy would have to produce a missile with a 1250-1500
105
kilometer range (750 kilometers for Okinawa).
Radar Signature Reduction. With foreign assistance,
China’s defense industrial complex is also striving to reduce
106
the radar cross-section of their cruise missiles.
The
aerospace industry has produced radar absorbing material
that targets the frequency range in which most acquisition
radar operates (2-18 GHZ). While this material would not
provide complete protection from radar detection, it could
reduce the detection range of defensive radar. Engineers
assert that radar-absorbing material, used in combination
with contour shaping, can reduce the effective range of
107
radar by 75 percent.
Radar absorbent materials and
relatively high speed reduce warning time available to
defenders and compress their timeline for detecting,
tracking, identifying, and engaging the inbound missile.
Infrared Signature Reduction. Third Academy officials
are also working to increase the survivability of their land
attack cruise missiles by reducing their infrared (IR)
signature. This could be achieved by the addition of an IR
reduction tail cone which is designed to mix cool air that has
traveled down the length of the airframe with hot air
emitted from the jet exhaust. This would improve the
survivability against IR sensors and IR homing missiles.
Engineers are attempting to reduce the signature on cruise
missile propellants, and conceal the location of mobile land
108
attack cruise missiles.
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Other Terminal Guidance Systems. Other terminal
sensor technologies under development include passive
imaging infrared, CO2 laser radar, millimeter wave, and
synthetic aperture radar terminal sensors, as well as
various composite systems. R&D into passive imaging
infrared sensors is focused on matching a stored
computerized image with a real infrared image detected by
109
the missile. Third Academy engineers have already laid
the technical foundation for a CO2 laser guidance system, to
110
include the target recognition components.
Chinese
aerospace engineers believe synthetic aperture radar,
millimeter wave radar, infrared imaging, and laser radar
guidance could result in an accuracy of one to three
111
meters.
THE CONVENTIONAL SECOND ARTILLERY
The PLA entity most responsible for deep strike
missions against vital strategic and operational targets is
the Second Artillery (dierpaobing). Since its establishment
in the 1960s, the Second Artillery’s mission has been limited
to nuclear counterstrikes. Since the conclusion of the Gulf
War, however, Chinese planners have diversified the
Second Artillery’s mission to include conventional strikes
against high value strategic targets. The Second Artillery’s
adoption of a conventional strike role marks one of the most
significant developments in PLA modernization. This
discussion of the conventional Second Artillery outlines: 1)
its organizational structure, 2) the vital role of information
denial in Second Artillery operations, and 3) the
conventional theater missile campaign doctrine and
operations.
Organization.
The Second Artillery, with an estimated 90,000
personnel, consists of headquarters elements, six launch
bases (jidi), one engineering design academy, four research
institutes, two command academies, and possibly an early
135
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warning unit.
As key operational strike units, brigades
are likely only assigned one type of missile to facilitate
command and logistics. The Second Artillery headquarters
and subordinate bases oversee warhead and missile storage
facilities; maintenance units; and special warhead/missile
113
transportation services.
The 80302 Unit, headquartered in the mountain resort
town of Huangshan, Jiangxi province, is the Second
Artillery’s most important base for conventional long-range
114
precision strikes against Taiwan.
The Huangshan base
includes both nuclear and conventionally armed theater
missiles. During a wartime situation, multiple
conventional brigades would be subsumed into a
conventional theater missile corps ( juntuan) consisting of a
corps command post, a corps logistics command post, and a
number of subordinate theater missile brigades each with
different types of theater missiles. The corps command post
would largely consist of command authorities from Beijing
115
and Huangshan.
The corps/base also oversees a set of “equipment
assurance units” (zhuangbei baozhang budui ) which
includes a missile/warhead storage unit ( zhuangbei jishu
qinwu budui), a transfer station (zhuanyunzhan), and a
repair depot (tezhuang xiulicang). Other corps/base support
elements include a reconnaissance unit ( jizhen dadui); a
surveying/mapping unit ( cehui dadui); a computer center
(jisuan zhongxin); a weather center (qixiang zhongxin); a
communications regiment ( tongxintuan); an ECM regiment
(dianzi duikangtuan); and an engineering regiment
(gongchengtuan). Additional engineering, air defense, and
116
anti-chemical units can be assigned as needed.
A typical conventional theater missile brigade has a staff
consisting of a headquarters, political, logistics, and
equipment technology (jizhuangbu) departments. Brigade
elements include a mobile brigade command post, a central
depot (known as a “technical position” or jishu zhendi), a
transfer point (zhuanzai changping), and an assigned set of
136

pre-surveyed launch sites (fashe zhendi), as well as a set of
reserve (daiji) launch sites. A conventional missile brigade
also has a set of “equipment assurance sub-units”
117
(zhuangbei baozhang fendui). Brigades have at least four
firing battalions (fasheying), with each battalion assigned
118
at least three-four companies.
Companies subordinate to
the launch battalion likely would be assigned at least one
launcher, an electric power generation vehicle ( fadianche),
a surveying vehicle ( cekongche), a communications
command vehicle (tongxun zhihuiche), and a missile
transport vehicle (daodan yunshuche). Battalions and
companies would be assigned a zone within which to
119
operate.
Information Denial and the Theater Missile
Campaign.
Key to the success of a theater missile campaign is
concealing the forward deployment of brigade elements.
Surprise can only be achieved through denial of foreign
human and technical intelligence assets. To ensure a high
degree of concealment, the Second Artillery has approached
information denial in three ways: 1) communications
security; 2) passive and active counterspace measures, and
3) a supporting space tracking network.
Secure Communications. Denying a potential adversary
the ability to monitor communications and other
electromagnetic emissions is a top priority. Beijing is
examining a wide range of technologies to reduce the
vulnerabilities of its communications to interception or
jamming. Beijing has issued directives to strictly
implement communications security (COMSEC)
120
measures.
Introduction of fiber optics communications
significantly increases its communications security.
Engineers are studying the application of spread spectrum
and frequency hopping technology for Beijing’s satellite
tracking and control network, as well as more secure
121
satellite communications methodologies.
China is also
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investing in more complex encryption ( mimaxue )
122
algorithms.
Passive Counterspace Measures. The doctrinal
requirement for preemption and secrecy is also leading the
PRC toward development of passive and active counterspace measures. The PLA is stressing passive counterspace
operations in an attempt to deny foreign reconnaissance
satellites with information on its disposition of forces and
R&D programs. Writings from the Academy of Military
Sciences (AMS) indicate the PLA has a concerted effort to
defeat opto-electronic, infrared, and radar reconnaissance
systems. Specific measures include the exploitation of
natural camouflage, and deception ( qipian), to include
123
distribution of false indicators and intelligence.
Chinese
R&D into camouflage, concealment, and deception is
explicitly intended to counter air and space-based
124
reconnaissance platforms.
In 1992, COSTIND and CASC
established camouflage standards for missile development
in order to counter foreign optical, infrared, and radar
125
satellite systems.
PLA engineers have also published
technical papers on methods to reduce infrared signature of
126
underground facilities.
Another approach to countering space systems is
through electronic countermeasures. The GAD and China’s
electronics industry appear to be developing a jammer to
127
counter radar satellites.
PLA affiliated publications
assert that China is capable of damaging optical reconnaissance satellites through the use of high-powered
128
lasers.
Such measures would deny an adversary use of a
satellite, but not destroy the platform itself, perhaps
avoiding escalation of the conflict. As a side note, GAD and
CASC are also moving toward fielding jammers intended to
complicate use of communication satellites and NAVSTAR
129
GPS.
Active Counterspace Measures. The PRC is also
examining more lethal measures to negate foreign satellites
if necessary. Open source literature strongly suggests that a
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Chinese direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) program may be
in the model development stage in which the space industry
is identifying various design proposals for seekers and
propulsion systems. Chinese writings indicate R&D of
ASAT systems is intended to discourage attacks on their
own space systems. Technical papers demonstrate some of
the greatest obstacles in developing an active counterspace
capability are with development of a homing kill vehicle and
associated terminal guidance. Specific systems under
evaluation and simulation include infrared, radar, and
130
impulse radar terminal guidance.
Chinese engineers
131
have conducted studies to counter satellite decoys as well.
Space Tracking Network. The key to passive and active
counterspace operations is a space-tracking network that
can monitor satellites passing overhead. China currently
can detect and track most satellites with sufficient accuracy
132
for targeting purposes.
The PLA is modernizing and
expanding its tracking network, which is operated by the
PLA General Armament Department’s China Launch and
Tracking Control General (CLTC).
CLTC is adding
overseas links in Chile and the South Pacific island of
Kiribati, and has contracted with France for access to data
133
from its space-tracking network.
China Academy of
Sciences’ astronomical observatories in Nanjing and
Kunming feed into the CLTC network, providing orbital
prediction data. CAS and CLTC are upgrading their
network of high-resolution telescopes, augmented by laser
tracking devices. China’s space community claims an
134
ability to detect objects in space down to 10 inches.
The
CLTC space tracking network likely supports the Second
Artillery through alert messages indicating that foreign
135
reconnaissance satellites are passing overhead.
The Phased Campaign.
A PLA theater missile campaign could take a number of
forms. An initial option would be to use theater missiles as a
show of force, similar to the missile exercises of 1995-96.
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U.S. reaction to the last limited show of force, however, may
have demonstrated that this option is not viable. If the PLA
indeed desires to deny U.S. intervention through a fait
accompli, a slow, gradual limited use option would permit a
buildup of U.S. forces in the region. PLA operational
concepts call for large scale, preemptive operations.
Preemptive theater missile strikes, carried out in
conjunction with air strikes and special operations, are
intended to create favorable conditions for dominance in all
dimensions of theater warfare.
A theater missile campaign would support achievement
of the “three superiorities” ( sanquan)—information
dominance (zhixinxiquan); air superiority (zhikongquan);
136
and sea superiority (zhihaiquan). Strikes supporting the
quest for information dominance would target the civilian
and military leadership, semi-hardened command and
control centers, weak links in Taiwan’s defense information
infrastructure, key intelligence collection facilities, and
electronic warfare facilities. PLA conventional ballistic and
land attack cruise missiles would attempt to paralyze
(tanhuan) Taiwan’s command and control system by cutting
off fielded military forces from the civilian and military
leadership in Taipei. Anti-radiation missiles would be
137
employed against key radar installations.
To achieve air superiority, the PLA would target key air
defense sites and airfields. The PLA would seek to damage
Taiwan Air Force runways, taxiways, weapons storage
facilities, airfield command posts, and fuel depots to
complicate generation of sorties. Strikes against airbase
runways and taxiways are referred to as an “airbase
blockade” (fengsuo jichang). The objective would be to shock
and paralyze air defense systems to allow a window of
opportunity for follow-on PLAAF strikes and rapid
achievement of air superiority. Air superiority is key to
establishing a no fly zone; enabling freedom of action on the
ocean for a blockade; or permitting greater freedom of action
138
for physical occupation of the island if necessary.
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To achieve sea superiority, PLA writings indicate
prioritization of strikes against naval ports. The key
objective will be to strike naval facilities in the opening
phases of conflict as a means to prevent projection of naval
power and resupply of strategic resources by sea. “Strike
opportunities” exist when ships are concentrated in port or
when they are moving along known transit routes en route
139
to the theater of operations.
Unsubstantiated reports indicate that a phased
campaign could require at least 400 theater missiles
distributed in as many as seven conventional missile
140
brigades.
To maximize firepower for the most likely
scenario, they most probably would be based in the Nanjing
Military Region or chopped to the Taiwan theater of
operations joint command during a crisis. PLA writings
indicate that approximately 50 percent of its total theater
missile inventory would be used in the initial strike phase.
Western sources believe the PLA may deploy as many as
141
650 SRBMs opposite Taiwan over the next several years.
The theater command center ( zhanyi zuozhan zhongxin)
would direct the missile campaign as one component of a
joint strike force that also would include air forces, ground
force artillery and tactical missiles, electronic attack assets,
142
and special operations.
Coordination will be carried out
via a firepower coordination cell ( huoli xietiaozu) within the
143
theater command center.
PLA officers envision a four
phase theater missile campaign: 1) operational
preparations phase (zuozhan zhunbei jieduan); 2) campaign
mobility phase (zhanyi jidong jieduan); 3) missile strike
phase (daodan tuji jieduan); and 4) enemy counterattack
144
phase (kangdi fanji jieduan).
Operational Preparations Phase.
After a CMC determination on the appropriate course of
action (juexin), the operational preparation phase likely
would include development or review of a mobility plan,
increased security, and closer monitoring of foreign
141

satellites and air/naval activity in the Western Pacific.
Working in conjunction with the theater command, missile
reconnaissance officers and planners probably would
review or develop targeting folders. General Staff
Department and theater intelligence staff would exploit
existing intelligence and/or task space-based imaging
assets for updates to support targeting. The firepower
coordination cell within the theater command center would
prioritize detected targets in keeping with the guidance of
higher command for the conduct of the theater campaign
and determine the most effective method of dealing with
those targets. The theater command would de-conflict
strikes so that firepower is not wasted, a complicated and
time-consuming process. Theater commanders also would
modify preplanned targeting of targets that have changed
145
over time.
Campaign Mobility Phase.
During the campaign mobility phase, brigade elements
would deploy to the area of operations in a well-disguised
fashion. Rail is the normal way of moving launchers and
missiles from brigade garrison to a staging area or transfer
146
assembly point (zhuanzai changping).
The individual
launchers would then disperse to pre-surveyed launch sites
(zhendi) within the battalion’s assigned area of operations,
147
not far from rail lines or highways.
A mobile command
and control center would coordinate launches. Rapid
reaction (kuaisu fanying) is essential, requiring a quick
calculation of position, orienting the missile, inputting
targeting data, and scattering in a very short period of time.
Chinese writings indicate that units intend to launch within
148
40 minutes after arrival to the pre-surveyed launch sites.
To reduce reliance on pre-surveyed launch sites, however,
the PLA appears to be integrating GPS onto their mobile
149
launchers.
Communication between firing units and upper
echelons likely would be carried out through a mix of mobile
142

SATCOM, mobile digital microwave, and/or fiber optics.
Due to its high level of security and reliability, the Second
Artillery is trying to hardwire as much of its operational
150
infrastructure as possible with fiber optics.
For security
reasons, any wireless transmissions are to be limited to
eight seconds or less. Operational orders would be
transmitted through an automated command and control
(C2) system due to the complexity and timeliness
requirements of conventional theater missile operations.
PLA officers note the requirement to integrate the Second
Artillery’s automated C2 system with that of the joint
151
theater command’s automated C2 system.
Missile Strike Phase.
During the missile strike phase, Second Artillery units
would support joint theater operations by striking strategic
and operational centers of gravity. Missile firings would be
coordinated with other strike assets and directed against
critical nodes (yaohai) within an enemy’s infrastructure.
Chinese writings indicate that after an initial salvo,
launchers could move to new pre-surveyed launch sites
152
within that brigade’s assigned area of operations.
At
least three raids are feasible if one assumes availability of
153
400 theater missiles for the phased campaign.
The PLA
intends to carry out synchronized launches from a wide
range of azimuths in order to stress active missile defenses
154
and associated battle management systems.
A range of
space-based, airborne, and battlefield intelligence systems
155
are needed to adjust firepower.
The PLA has indicated prioritization of three target
sets: 1) air and missile defense sites; 2) airfields and
surface-to-surface missile sites; and 3) command, control,
communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) facilities.
Neutralizing ground-based air defenses, airfields, and C4I
facilities through multiple theater missile raids would
present a window of opportunity for follow-on air strikes to
consolidate air superiority over the island. PLA missile
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strikes against airfields could deny outside powers the
ability to rush additional military equipment or military
156
supplies to the island.
Some PLA-affiliated analysts
speculate that parallel strikes against airfields, air defense
sites, and other critical targets could permit PLA air
superiority over the skies of Taiwan in as little as 45
157
minutes.
Ground Based Air and Missile Defense. PLA writings
identify ground-based air and missile defense units as
primary targets. The critical node within an air or missile
defense fire unit most likely would be its radar and
command van. If no missile defenses existed, and CASC is
able to meet the PLA’s accuracy requirement of 20-45
meters, then only three to five missiles would be necessary
to cause significant damage to key nodes within a fire unit
with a high degree of confidence. To neutralize active
theater missile defense units, PLA writings indicate use of
coordinated strikes from multiple directions, using a
combination of ballistic missiles, decoy drones, land attack
158
cruise missiles, and/or anti-radiation missiles. Radar and
command vans could be subject to special operations
attacks and electronic countermeasures. Because their
re-entry speed precludes engagement by endo-atmospheric
interceptors, conventional DF-21 MRBMs would be
especially effective in neutralizing lower tier missile
defense fire units. Guided submunition or an FAE payload
159
likely would be the warheads of choice.
Airfields and Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM) Sites.
Another critical target for PLA ballistic and land attack
cruise missile strikes in a Taiwan scenario would be
airfields and SSM sites. Senior Second Artillery officers
write in internal journals that “attack opportunities” ( tuji
de shiji) will also exist against “intervening superpower”
160
forces as they build up airpower in the region.
Airfields
that could support offensive strike operations against the
mainland would be the first priority. An “airfield blockade”
would seek to damage runways, taxiway surfaces, and other
critical nodes within an airbase. The PLA would need large
144

numbers of theater missiles for a complete “airfield
blockade.” However, the PLA would need only a handful to
impede Taiwan’s ability to generate sorties. Strikes against
runways likely would be particularly effective in
161
temporarily pinning down much of the Taiwan Air Force.
Any runway damage would slow aircraft operations, simply
because it takes time to determine the location and extent of
the damage. Destruction of key facilities, such as airbase
command centers, control towers, fuel depots, power
generation facilities, and maintenance hangars would have
a serious effect on air operations. Casualties to pilots and
maintenance crews could be especially traumatic. Use of
runway mines and targeting of unprotected rapid runway
162
repair equipment would complicate recovery operations.
Warheads of choice for runway damage would include
163
penetrator submunitions.
To aid in its training, the PLA has constructed a mock-up
of one of Taiwan’s key airfields. The mock-up of
Chingchuankang (CCK) airfield near Taichung includes an
exact replica of the runway layout, taxiways, fuel storage,
aircraft shelters, and revetments. The replica, located in a
key training area in Gansu, 120 kilometers north of
Jiayuguan, is intended for both theater missile exercises
164
and air strikes.
Leadership Facilities and C4I Centers. The PLA could
strike at the heart of Taiwan’s political and military
leadership to impede the command and control of its forces.
Early warning and technical intelligence collection sites
could be subject to ballistic and anti-radiation missile
strikes and electronic countermeasures. Political and
military leadership facilities, such as the Presidential
Palace and MND headquarters, are soft targets that would
require fewer than five missiles to destroy each with a high
degree of confidence. Fuel air explosive warheads are
considered the optimal choice for strikes against softer
political and military targets. Semi-hardened command
and control and intelligence centers would require
165
penetration warheads.
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Foreign Intervention. The PLA has indicated a
willingness to use highly accurate SRBMs, MRBMs, and
LACMs against U.S. assets, to include key bases in Japan
and aircraft carriers operating in the Western Pacific.
Chinese researchers have conducted extensive feasibility
studies of the use of theater ballistic missiles against
aircraft carriers. Analysts have noted how such a capability
would require four components: ocean surveillance
(haiyang jianshi); mid-course guidance ( zhongduan
zhidao); terminal guidance ( moduan zhidao ); and
applicable control systems to maneuver the reentry vehicle
to the target. PLA proponents have proposed the use of GPS
for mid-course inertial corrections and the use of a
166
millimeter wave seeker for terminal guidance.
Aware of
the vulnerability of millimeter wave seekers to jamming,
PLA engineers are surveying ECCM techniques to ensure
167
effectiveness of terminally guided ballistic missiles.
In
addition to aircraft carriers, Chinese writings indicate other
targets would include regional airbases, naval facilities,
168
and key C4I and logistical nodes.
Counterstrike Phase.
For the counterstrike phase, PLA planners rely on
survivability as a critical aspect of their theater missile
force. In ensuring their survivability, designers believe
three systems in particular pose the greatest challenges to
the survivability of China’s theater missile force: the
F-117A, J-STARS, and AWACS. The most important step
to ensure survivability is counter-reconnaissance
(fanzhencha), that is, denying foreign air and space assets
the ability to detect missile garrisons, storage facilities, and
units in the field. Counter-reconnaissance measures
include decoy launchers and missiles that must match the
optical, infrared, and radar characteristics of real systems.
The Second Artillery also intends to use natural masking,
radiation reflectors, deception, and communications
security. Chinese camouflage is explicitly intended to
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counter U.S. air and space-based reconnaissance plat169
forms.
There are indications that each theater missile brigade
will have an organic electronic countermeasures regiment
equipped with specially designed equipment which
automatically activates an integrated system of radar
jammers, lasers, chaff, flash bombs, and smoke. According
to one report, the system was developed in large part to
counter air-to-ground munitions delivered by aircraft such
170
as the F-117A.
CONCLUSION
A space-based surveillance architecture, the transition
to a force structure dominated by theater missiles, and
adoption of operational principles that stress preemption
and surprise have serious implications for regional
stability. An alleged arsenal of over 650 SRBMs—
augmented by additional conventional MRBMs and
LACMs—could provide Beijing with a conclusive edge in a
future Taiwan Strait conflict. Such a force could also hold
U.S. forces in the western Pacific at risk should a decision be
made to intervene.
China’s growing presence in space is intimately related
to the PLA’s emerging capacity for theater strike
operations. Reconnaissance satellites are important for
strategic and operational intelligence, indications and
warning, and targeting. Space imagery is also needed to
support battle damage assessments. Digitized satellite
imagery is crucial for land attack cruise missile mission
planning. In addition, space systems could enable the
detection, tracking, and targeting of U.S. forward-deployed
assets operating in the western Pacific Ocean. The same
space-tracking network that manages China’s space assets
is crucial for operational security during a theater missile
campaign.
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Operational Implications.
China’s emerging capacity for deep strike missions has a
number of operational implications. First, theater missiles
serve as critical enablers for dominance in other spheres of
warfare. Of most significance is the relationship between
theater missiles and the rapid achievement of air
superiority. Consistent with emerging PLA doctrine of
“rapid war, rapid resolution,” a successful PLA theater
missile campaign could strip Taiwan of its ability to
effectively conduct air operations in a matter of hours (or
minutes, according to PLA propaganda). Strikes against
key air defense units and airfields would result in a
temporary suspension of Taiwan air operations, creating a
more permissive environment for PLA Air Force operations
over the island. Air superiority, like the missile strikes, is
not an end in itself. However, lessons absorbed from the
Gulf War and the air campaign in Yugoslavia have
demonstrated that air superiority enables other missions to
171
take place with reduced costs and greater efficiency.
Furthermore, theater missile operations could also
quickly degrade Taiwan’s capacity for naval warfare and
ground operations. Fifty percent of the PLA’s theater
missile arsenal is to be dedicated toward the opening phase
of conflict. Remaining missiles likely would be held in
reserve to support naval and ground operations. Theater
missile strikes against harbors and piers would complicate
naval operations. Strikes against key bridges and staging
areas would impede Taiwan Army counter-landing
operations.
Also, China’s expanding network of space sensors and
long-range strike assets could pose a fundamental
challenge to the U.S. ability to project power into the
western Pacific Ocean. Increasingly accurate and lethal
theater missiles could raise the costs of U.S. intervention in
conflicts around the periphery of China. Space-based
reconnaissance assets could facilitate detection of U.S. air
and naval deployments into the area of operations. The PLA
148

clearly understands U.S. vulnerabilities that arise from
dependence on in-theater ports, airfields, logistics facilities,
and C2 nodes. Successful fielding of terminally guided
theater ballistic missiles could pose challenges to aircraft
carrier battle groups, especially if operating within range of
172
China’s large inventory of 600-kilometer range SRBMs.
Political Implications.
Developing a capacity for theater missile operations has
political implications as well. Taiwan has enjoyed a
defensive advantage over the mainland for many years.
Adequate warning time and a robust defense has enabled
Taiwan to blunt PLA air, naval, and ground assaults long
enough to allow the international community to adjust to
the situation, decide on a course of action, take diplomatic
action, and/or flow forces to the region if necessary.
However, a successful theater missile campaign—combined
with information operations and air strikes—could enable
Beijing to quickly strip Taiwan of its warfighting capacity.
To maintain the political and military viability of its new
“trump card,” Beijing has launched a coordinated foreign
policy and propaganda campaign to shape the existing
debate within the United States on defensive measures
intended to counter theater missiles. Beijing generally
poses six arguments against missile defenses, including an
173
assertion that defenses will cause an arms race.
Beijing’s
campaign against missile defenses exploits biases by some
within the United States against missile defenses. A
mutually supporting dynamic exists between PRC officials
and U.S. critics whose views on missile defenses are founded
on traditional nuclear stability paradigms.
However, the Taiwan Strait case may be unique in that
it is the first theater in which highly accurate conventional
ballistic missiles dominate the strategic landscape. PRC
officials, echoed by many within U.S. governmental and
academic circles, argue that defenses against the growing
PLA conventional theater missile threat would be
149
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destabilizing since they would spark an arms race.
However, a number of studies have demonstrated that in
the conventional context, defenses generally have not been
the causes of arms races. Conventional arms races are
sparked or intensified by a rapid buildup of offensive
175
capabilities.

The misplaced focus on missile defenses within
academic and policy communities in the United States has
resulted in neglect of at least three dangers presented by
Beijing’s growing arsenal of increasingly accurate and
lethal theater missiles. First, the conventional wisdom is
that force would only be used against Taiwan in the event
the government legally declares the island as an
independent political entity. However, overwhelming
offensive capabilities increase the chances that force could
be used short of a de jure declaration of independence.
Confidence in a quick military victory could lower the
perceived cost of conflict and thus increase Beijing’s
incentives to use force. At a minimum, a decisive PLA
advantage in offensive capabilities would increase risks of
greater PRC bellicose behavior in the cross-Strait
relationship. In addition, the ability to strip Taiwan of its
capacity for military operations—in effect a first strike
176
capability—raises dangers of preemptive war.
The PLA
preemptive strike doctrine is also destabilizing since it
decreases warning time that could allow for diplomatic
intervention. An overwhelming offensive advantage may
also reduce Beijing’s incentives for arms control and
confidence building measures, and reduce their willingness
to compromise in future cross-Strait dialogue.
Second, reduced costs for military action could lead to
another unintended consequence of the theater missile
buildup—a Taiwan punitive deterrent to raise the costs of
PLA military action. At least one punitive deterrent is
Taiwan’s own theater missile capability. A Taiwan ballistic
or land attack cruise missile would serve as a political tool to
raise the costs of PRC military action. Even more ominous
is that a severe collapse in their sense of security could
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prompt Taiwan to renew efforts to develop a nuclear device.
Taiwan is considered by some to have the capacity to
develop nuclear weapons quickly if the need should arise.
Within the last 2 years, there has been an open debate in
Taiwan regarding the utility of developing weapons of mass
177
destruction.
Third, as Taiwan’s national security community debates
the need for a deterrent, the magnitude of the theater
missile challenge may increase domestic pressure for
tactically offensive counterforce operations, to include
preemptive strikes. Theoretical studies have demonstrated
that maintenance of an exclusively defensive force posture
against an overwhelming offensive force is prohibitively
178
expensive.
Tactical offenses in support of a strategically
defensive doctrine are more cost effective. As the PLA
theater missile threat evolves, Taiwan strategists may
adopt operational concepts outlined in U.S. Department of
Defense Joint Pub 3-01.5 that states “the preferred method
of countering enemy theater missile operations is to attack
and destroy or disrupt theater missiles prior to their
launch.” This notion comes as no surprise to the PLA Second
Artillery, an organization whose doctrine rests on the
assumption that their phased campaign would be answered
with Taiwan or U.S. counterattacks.
Theater Missile Countermeasures.
A preemptive strategy that relies on an overwhelming
offensive force is not only destabilizing, but may be risky
from a warfighting perspective. The outlook described
above is admittedly pessimistic and worst-case. The posited
aim of a PLA air and missile campaign is strategic paralysis,
with the expectation being that “paralysis” must somehow
equate to “surrender.” It may not work that way. With
proper preparations, Taiwan, or any other adversary, could
recover from initial attacks. Observers have asserted that
Taipei would fold after the impact of a single missile on
Taiwan. However, lessons from World War II, the Vietnam
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War, and elsewhere have shown that strategic attacks could
179
harden rather than diminish resolve.
A number of steps could be taken to reduce the
operational effectiveness of the PLA theater missiles and
supporting surveillance assets. The theater missile problem
is already forcing the Taiwan military to modernize in a way
that they would not have otherwise. The only way to
effectively counter a large-scale theater missile threat is
through jointness and innovative warfighting concepts
commonly associated with the RMA. Assuming requisite
changes and investments are made, the PLA’s ability to
achieve a decisive victory over Taiwan is not assured.
Perhaps the most important countermeasure is a
survivable C4I architecture and robust passive defenses.
Passive defense includes: 1) tactical warning; 2) reducing
the effectiveness of PLA targeting through operational
security, deception, and mobility; 3) reducing vulnerability
through hardening, redundancy and robustness, dispersal,
and effective civil defense; and 4) recovery and
reconstitution. In addition, the PLA’s successful fielding of
sophisticated terminal guidance systems would be
accompanied by a new set of vulnerabilities. GPS, and
optical, radar, and millimeter wave seekers can be jammed,
180
as could the PLA’s future space reconnaissance assets.
Furthermore, the complexity of a theater missile
campaign presents opportunities for “induced friction.” The
challenges presented by an overwhelming capacity for
offensive operations would naturally prompt defenders to
prevent the launch of theater missiles. This would be
carried out by attacking elements of the overall system,
including such actions as destroying launch platforms,
reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting platforms,
command and control nodes, missile stocks, and transport
infrastructure. Strikes against selected nodes in a theater
missile brigade could have significant systemic effects that
could reduce the frequency or intensity of theater missile
strikes.
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The effectiveness of theater ballistic and land attack
cruise missiles strikes could also be reduced through active
missile defenses. Exclusive reliance on active defenses,
however, would be cost prohibitive and only partially
effective against the type of theater missile threat that
Taiwan is expected to face. The most serious challenge to
active defenses may be the tyranny of geography—Taiwan
is situated close enough to the mainland to allow the PLA to
launch from a wide range of azimuths. Multi-axis theater
ballistic missile attacks could stress even the best battle
management and command, control, and communication
systems, especially if combined with air and LACM strikes,
181
electronic attack, and special operations.
In the end, however, the optimal solution lies in creating
incentives for Beijing to moderate its theater missile
deployments. The first step is recognizing the destabilizing
nature of the PLA theater missile buildup. While urging
PLA restraint in deploying theater missiles opposite
Taiwan is a worthwhile endeavor, one should not be overly
sanguine about the chances for success. Theater missiles
are an integral part of the PLA’s overall modernization
objectives. As long as the PLA seeks to develop the kind of
force that could give the PRC a decisive military advantage
over Taiwan, then the ability to freeze or roll back theater
missile deployments will be limited. Nevertheless, greater
effort must be made to convince the civilian leadership in
Beijing that the large-scale deployment of offensive
weapons would adversely affect regional stability and that
resolution of sovereignty disputes through other than
peaceful means is not a viable option.
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security assistance, in accordance with U.S. domestic law under the
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CHAPTER 6
PLA AIR FORCE OPERATIONS
AND MODERNIZATION
Kenneth W. Allen
Introduction.
The Central Military Commission has called for the urgent
upgrading of the country’s Air Force to neutralize growing
threats from regional neighbors and other countries. . . . Our
country now faces a serious challenge. . . . China needs to
develop airborne early warning systems and foster research in
the development of high-tech electronic combat systems. . . . If
threatened from the air, China must have the ability to carry
its defense strike capability to targets outside its own
airspace.
Jiefangjun Bao, April 7, 19961
The Chinese Air Force plans to acquire state-of-the-art
weapons systems by early next century, including early
warning planes, electronic warfare warplanes, and surfaceto-air missiles. The PLA Air Force is now able to fight both
defensive and offensive battles under high-tech conditions.
Liu Shunyao, PLA Air Force Commander,
April 19972
China’s Air Force has significantly improved its combat
readiness. During 1998, pilots achieved a record of per capita
flying time, the highest since 1985, in spite of heavy summer
flooding and a program to restructure the Air Force. Pilots
paid particular attention to improving basic flying techniques.
The fact that 66 percent of air units conducted highly
successful long-distance mobile maneuvers under harsh
weather conditions indicated that China’s Air Force has greatly
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enhanced its combat readiness.
Wu Guangyu,
PLA Air Force Deputy Commander,
January 19983
We should build an Air Force capable of both offensive and
defensive operations with Chinese characteristics.
Jiang Zemin, March 19994

China’s Air Force, known as the People’s Liberation
Army Air Force (PLAAF), is in a crucial transition period, as
it changes from an obsolescent giant to a modern force
prepared to fight local, limited wars under high-tech
conditions. The PLAAF is slowly moving from a defensive
force dominated by 1950s vintage combat aircraft with short
legs and limited all-weather intercept capabilities to an
offensive-oriented force with extended range and greater
lethality. While new aircraft like the J-10, J-11 (Su-27), and
Su-30 are gradually introduced into the force, older aircraft
like the J-7 and J-8 are being modified with better avionics
and air-to-air missiles to bridge the gap. The new combat
aircraft force of the 21st century will be controlled by
airborne early warning aircraft, refueled by tankers, and
supported by electronic countermeasure and intelligence
collection aircraft. The PLAAF is forging ahead with
advanced tactics and logistics techniques for its newer
aircraft, while sustaining the operational capabilities of its
older inventory. In addition to its combat aircraft, the
PLAAF is improving its surface-to-air missile force and
mobility for its elite airborne corps. In 10 years the PLAAF
will be a much smaller force, but will have greater range and
5
lethality than the PLAAF of the 1990s.
PLAAF writings indicate that it has an impressive
history defending China. The PLAAF established its
credibility during the Korean War, the 1958 Taiwan Strait
Crisis, and the Vietnam War, but it has not conducted any
large-scale air battles since then. The official PLAAF
history states that it has shot down 1,474 and damaged
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2,344 aircraft of all types. Analysis of these figures shows
that PLAAF aircraft have shot down or damaged only about
200 aircraft during air-to-air combat, most of which
occurred during the Korean War. The PLAAF’s antiaircraft
artillery (AAA) and surface-to-air missiles (SAM) shot down
or damaged the remaining 3,600 aircraft. The PLAAF’s
SAM forces are particularly proud of shooting down five
Nationalist Air Force U-2 reconnaissance planes between
6
1963 and 1967. The last PLAAF combat took place in
October 1987, when a SAM shot down a Vietnamese MiG-21
that had crossed the border.
The PLAAF readily admits that its equipment is
backwards, but modernization is taking place across the
board, including equipment, tactics, training, logistics, and
maintenance. Unlike the 1980s, there are very few PLAAF
leaders left who fought in the Korean War. Today’s Air
Force leaders have put forth an optimistic vision of the
future. Unfortunately, the PLAAF does not provide many
solid clues as to how it plans to reach that vision. One of the
biggest problems foreigners have researching the PLAAF
is the lack of open source information. Even when
information is available, it focuses on the vision, not on the
process. Most Western writings on the PLAAF tend to focus
on the acquisition of hardware, such as the Russian Su-27s,
7
Su-30s, Il-76s, and S-300s. These articles pay little
attention to the “software” issues, including leadership,
missions and organization, strategy and doctrine,
personnel, support equipment, operations, training,
logistics, maintenance, and C4I (command, control,
8
communications, computers, and intelligence).
This chapter will address the PLAAF’s operational
capabilities and modernization. The first part will provide
statements by the PLAAF’s commander, Lieutenant
General Liu Shunyao, describing the PLAAF’s past,
present, and future. The next part will look at the PLAAF’s
missions and organizational structure, including the
aviation, air defense, and airborne forces. The third part
will assess the air activity that has occurred over the
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Taiwan Strait in reaction to President Lee Teng-hui’s July
9, 1999, statements about “state-to-state” relations between
Taiwan and the mainland. The chapter will also address
China’s neighbors’ perceptions of the PLAAF. The final part
will provide conclusions.
PLAAF Commander’s Assessment.
Lieutenant General Liu Shunyao has had several
interviews with Chinese reporters since he became PLAAF
9
commander in December 1996. The first of these
interviews coincided with Taiwan’s receipt of the first group
of 150 F-16 fighters from the United States and 60 Mirage
2000-5s from France. The interviews also came after the
PLAAF had already received several Russian Su-27
fighters, Il-76 transports, and S-300 SAMs. The PLAAF had
also deployed its first indigenous B-6 airborne refueling
aircraft for its J-8II fighters, and had ordered the first Il-76
airborne early warning platform from Russia and Israel.
During the interviews, Commander Liu stressed that
the aviation troops formed the Air Force’s backbone. The
PLAAF culture has always focused on the role of aircraft as
the core of the force, even though the air defense (SAM and
AAA) forces have shot down more aircraft. He also
emphasized that the PLAAF’s 15th Airborne Army, which
has also become more integrated into the PLA’s joint
operations, has established “fist” units that are now more
mobile and have longer range as a result of acquiring
10
several Russian Il-76 transports.
While discussing the PLAAF’s current capabilities,
Commander Liu has focused on the ability to fight defensive
and offensive battles under high-tech conditions. The shift
from strictly defensive to offensive capabilities derived from
the PLAAF’s post-Gulf War realization that precision
guided missiles (PGMs) and long-range cruise missiles had
changed the rules of warfare. This realization was one of the
driving forces for the PLAAF to acquire modern weapon
systems from Russia. As a result of modernizing its weapon
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systems, the Air Force has been able to changes its tactics,
extend its combat range, and practice providing support for
ground and naval operations.
Liu and other PLAAF officials continue to emphasize
that three-quarters of its pilots are now able to fly in
all-weather conditions; the percentage of category “A”
combat regiments, an indicator of the Air Force’s combat
effectiveness, has reached 95.5 percent; and that the Air
11
Force has a 16-year flight safety record. As for flying in
all-weather conditions, there is some question as to exactly
what types of flying the pilots conduct under visual flight
regulations (VFR) and night flying conditions. Are these
types of flights flown only on cloudless, moonlit nights, or
during cloudy, pitch-black conditions over long distances
while engaged in air intercept training? Since the Chinese
media rarely reports aircraft accidents, there is no way to
verify the accuracy of the flight safety record, but this claim,
also, is questionable. For example, there are credible
reports that Cao Shuangming, the PLAAF commander from
1992-94, was relieved of duty partly due to a series of
aircraft accidents that took place under his command.
Furthermore, since the PLAAF rarely trains using rapid
aircraft turn around sorties and most engines can only be
used from 100 to 300 hours before they are overhauled, the
maintenance record would probably be reduced
considerably during periods of sustained use, such as
during a conflict.
Given the PLAAF’s current limitations, Commander Liu
and other Air Force leaders have expressed an optimistic
vision of the future. As the Air Force upgrades the
capabilities of its current inventory with foreign technology,
begins producing the J-10 and J-11 (Su-27) aircraft, and
acquires new fighters (Su-30) and airborne early warning
aircraft and SAMs, the PLAAF will be able to extend its
range, increase its firepower, and change its tactics through
the use of improved electronic warfare, night training, and
joint campaign training. The PLAAF will also focus its
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efforts on research and development, while importing some
high-tech weapons.
The debate in China about importing weapon systems
versus domestically producing them continues. For
example, a July 1999 report in Science and Technology
Daily complained that China’s achievements in many areas
over the past 20 years have attracted world attention, but
the aviation industry has increasingly lagged behind. The
aviation industry continues to have a sprawling
organization with weak facilities and low standards, and
the gap between it and the aviation industries of the
developed western countries is widening. The article
lamented that this is cause for anxiety, because without a
12
strong defense there can be no genuine overall strength.
There is also a debate among foreign analysts about how
much China’s aviation industry has been able to learn from
foreign aircraft manufacturers and transfer the knowledge
to producing combat aircraft. Foreign aircraft
manufacturers have routinely complained for almost 2
decades that they have spent time and money training
Chinese technicians to work on a specific commercial
aircraft project, only to have those technicians disappear to
some unknown project and be replaced by a new batch of
trainees.
While some observers see China’s aviation industry as
large and stagnant, other observers cite some centers of
excellence. Facilities such as the Chengdu Aircraft
Company, Xian Aircraft Company, and Shenyang Aircraft
Company have made significant progress through joint
ventures with Western companies and assistance from
Russia and Israel. For example, Boeing 737 tail sections are
produced in China with no U.S. backup. These ventures
have provided both access to Western manufacturing
processes and valuable technical and managerial training.
While these are derived from commercial aircraft
manufacturing, the processes are generally the same for a
mostly metal fighter aircraft like the J-10 and the Su-27.
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Only time will tell how these aircraft production programs
will turn out. Because of the size of China’s air forces,
however, any modernization plan will require Chinese
production to be economically feasible.
As the PLAAF upgrades its weapons systems, it must
also modernize its organizational structure, tactics,
training, and support capabilities. One problem associated
with analyzing the PLAAF is determining which changes
are being tested and which changes are being implemented.
PLA journals often discuss research or changes that have
taken place at the unit level. Some analysts, however,
assume that these changes have been, or will be,
implemented throughout the force. This is not necessarily
the case. The PLAAF, like the PLA as a whole, has a
complex method of introducing new ideas, weapon systems,
and tactics into the force. The General Armaments
Department has attempted to streamline this process, but
only time will tell whether or not it is successful.
After identifying a problem, the PLAAF systematically
seeks a solution. First, the appropriate research institute
and/or the PLAAF Command College studies the problem
from a theoretical perspective and makes recommenda13
tions.
Next, PLAAF Headquarters approves the
recommendations. After this, the theories are tested at the
unit level. Occasionally, separate units test different
alternatives simultaneously. Based upon evaluations,
competing theories may be accepted, modified, or rejected.
After the competing theories are tested and accepted at the
unit level, they are tested at the next level, and so forth up
the organizational structure. At some point, the PLAAF
selects one of the theories and begins implementing it
force-wide, starting again at the unit level.
This is a time-consuming process and involves a
tremendous amount of coordination. The problem becomes
even more complex if the theory being tested involves more
than one PLAAF branch or PLA service. Whereas a change
in flying tactics involves only the PLAAF’s aviation branch,
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changes in the logistics system to support joint service
operations involves the entire PLA. For example, the 1995
and 1996 exercises opposite Taiwan were intended as a
show of force, but they also provided the PLA with the
opportunity to test joint training that had been evolving
since the end of the Gulf War.
Doctrine and Strategy.
The PLAAF’s evolution of operational capabilities is tied
to the evolution of the PLA’s overall doctrine and strategy.
China’s communist leaders have long seen themselves as
encircled by real or potentially hostile forces threatening
the regime’s security. They have also long sought to define a
doctrine and strategy to deal with this situation. The PLA’s
doctrine has evolved from Mao Zedong’s basic doctrine of
people’s war, which still retains a measure of influence in
Chinese thinking, at least in broad conceptual terms. In
1985, the CMC radically revised China’s doctrine and
strategic defense policy by directing the armed forces to
change from preparation for an “early, major, and nuclear
war” to preparing for “local limited wars around China’s
borders, including its maritime territories and claims.”
Following the Gulf War, this doctrine was amended to “fight
local wars under modern, high-technology conditions.”
Thus, people’s war has evolved as a blend of defense and
offense, and has been modified to incorporate various
strategies, including active defense and the rapid-reaction
14
strategy.
In its essence, the people’s war doctrine reflects a
strategy of weakness. Since the PLA was founded in 1927, it
has had to develop strategies for defeating adversaries who
had superior weapons and equipment. That this dilemma
should continue into the 21st century is no doubt frustrating
to members of the current military hierarchy.
While people’s war places special emphasis on defensive
strategy and on the factor of manpower over weapons, the
PLA has never ignored the need for an offensive strategy.
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The PLA’s involvement in the Korean and Vietnam wars,
plus its attacks against India in 1962 and Vietnam in
1979—which were followed by quick, unilateral
withdrawals—were all described as defensive operations.
At the same time, Mao long recognized the value of utilizing
superior force to overwhelm China’s adversaries. Within
the people’s war doctrine, the basic military strategy Mao
formulated, known as active defense, was one of a
protracted, defensive war.
In a recent paper, Dr. Paul Godwin states that,
the PLA has been shifting over the past 20 years from
continental defense in depth to peripheral defense and
maritime force projection, and from a ground-force dominated
approach to war, to a multi-service joint operations doctrine.
In conceptualizing the battlefield, the PLA has shifted from a
two-dimensional concept, where the ground war was the
central focus, to a multidimensional battlespace, where space
and cyberspace play roles as important as the traditional
air-land-sea dimensions. The PLA has faced the major
difficulty of the absence of any period of stability in which it
could complete the organizational, training, and logistics
changes required to implement a revised strategy and
operational doctrine.15

Although PLAAF writings mention the broader PLA
doctrine and strategic concepts of people’s war, people’s war
under modern conditions, and people’s war under modern,
high-tech conditions, they tend to focus more on campaign
strategy, campaign tactics, and tactical training.
As an arm of the PLA, the PLAAF traditionally has
conducted its combat operations as a series of subordinate
campaigns within the PLA’s overall campaign. The PLAAF
describes a campaign as “using from one to many aviation,
air defense, or airborne units to carry out a series of
combined battles according to a general battle plan to
achieve a specified strategic or campaign objective in a
16
specified time.” During March 1997, Commander Liu
stated the PLAAF must improve its capabilities in actual
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combat by highlighting campaign and tactical training. He
emphasized that campaign training involves air deterrence,
air interdiction, air strikes, and participation in joint
17
exercises.
Although the PLA has always had an active defense
strategy, one of the PLAAF’s most significant developments
in the past couple of years has been the public emphasis by
Chinese leaders, including CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin, on
the PLAAF’s capability to fight offensive battles. What this
means is that the PLAAF is beginning to acquire the types of
weapon systems, such as the Su-27 and Il-76, that will allow
the PLAAF to change its doctrine appropriately and move
away from its purely defensive missions.
PLAAF Rapid-Reaction Force.
The PLAAF’s Airborne Troops. One of the PLAAF’s most
important changes in campaign strategy took place in 1992,
when the Air Force’s 15th Airborne Army began changing
into a rapid-reaction force (RRF). Although PLAAF
airpower discussions in the late 1980s included ideas about
fist units, these discussions centered on the airborne forces
and not the aviation units. While the airborne forces were
clearly included in plans for the RRF, it appears that the
airborne forces did not actually form any operational RRFs
18
until around 1992.
According to an October 1993 Jane’s Defence Weekly
report, China was in the process of changing the 15th
Airborne Army’s three brigades into divisions, in order to
boost their rapid-response power. The 43rd Brigade, based
in Kaifeng, was the first brigade to undergo expansion to a
division. The other two brigades, the 44th at Yingshan and
45th at Huangpi, followed suit shortly thereafter. Military
planners had apparently decided that brigade-size forces
were too small for their assigned combat missions. Chinese
brigades normally have about 3,000 to 4,000 troops, and
19
ground force divisions have about 15,000 troops. The
airborne units are composed of eight types of troops: scouts,
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infantry, artillerymen, signalmen, engineers, antichemical
warfare corps, and automobile corps.
The 1999 Department of Defense’s (DoD) assessment of
the PLA describes the 15th Airborne Army as consisting of
three airborne divisions, each with about 10,000 troops. The
15th Airborne Army is China’s primary quick reaction force
and has been designated as a strategic rapid reaction unit,
but the airborne units remain handicapped by insufficient
airlift. Acquisition of additional aircraft and modern
equipment, together with the increased emphasis on
utilizing airborne forces during training exercises, would
marginally improve the airborne army’s combat capa20
bilities.
According to Commander Liu, however, since the
PLAAF began receiving several Russian Il-76 transports in
1992, the airborne troops now have all-terrain, all-weather,
21
omni-directional combat capabilities. In order to adapt to
various adverse operational conditions, the airborne units
have conducted exercises in the snowfields of the Greater
Khingan Mountains (Da Xinganling), the hot jungles on the
Shiwan Mountains in Guangxi, and the Kunlun Plateau,
22
located 4,600 meters above sea level where the air is thin.
Airborne troop training over the past few years appears
to have focused primarily in and around Tibet. At the same
time, however, some airborne training has also
concentrated on a Taiwan scenario. By reporting this type of
activity, the government is apparently trying to send a
signal to inhabitants of Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang that the
airborne forces are preparing for internal contingencies,
23
should the need arise. Reporting of these types of exercises
also points out some of the airborne forces’ limitations. For
example, during the 1996 military exercise opposite
Taiwan, the PLAAF inserted a small contingent of airborne
troops onto Haitan island, but this portion of the exercise
was scaled down due to inclement weather, again calling the
24
reliability of Liu’s statement into question.
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Aviation Rapid Reaction Force Units . Serious
discussions about establishing aviation RRF units did not
occur until around the early 1990s, which coincided with
China’s purchase of the first Russian Su-27s and Il-76s.
According to interviews with foreign air force officers in
Asia, the PLAAF’s rapid-reaction aviation units are
currently composed of J-7, J-8, and Su-27 fighters and Il-76
transports. Although the bulk of the PLAAF consists of J-6
25
fighters, the RRF does not include any of these aircraft.
The PLA’s rapid-reaction strategy is based on the
premise that China will only be engaged in local wars for the
foreseeable future, and that the PLA must strike quickly to
end the war and meet Beijing’s political objectives.
Furthermore, cost is a big factor, since equipment is
becoming more expensive and the cost of maintaining older
26
weapon systems is rising.
PLAAF Missions and Organizational Structure.
Over the past 50 years, the PLAAF has endeavored to
undertake an exceptionally broad range of operational
missions. The first mission the CMC assigned to the PLAAF
in 1949 was the air defense of Beijing and Shanghai against
Nationalist air raids. This mission expanded to include
northeast China during the Korean War and to the
southeast provinces during the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis.
Although Western writings normally refer to air defense as
including aircraft, AAA, and SAMs, the PLAAF makes a
clear distinction between its aviation troops (aircraft) and
air defense (AAA/SAM) troops.
Today, the PLAAF still describes its primary mission as
defending China’s territorial airspace. However, this
mission can best be described as defending China’s major
cities and industrial areas, which can clearly be seen by
looking at the location of the PLAAF’s airfields, combat
aircraft, SAMs, and AAA. As the PLAAF acquires aircraft
and SAMs with longer ranges, these envelopes will
gradually expand. Although the PLAAF states that its
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secondary mission is supporting ground and naval forces, it
has never successfully carried out direct support to the
ground troops and officially states that it can only support
them indirectly. The PLAAF still describes a joint exercise
as having aircraft airborne at the same time that its own
SAM and AAA units or that some ground force units are
active in a different area. It is also questionable just how
much the PLAAF can actually support the ground and naval
forces in the future. The PLAAF lacks the proper aircraft
and joint experience to accomplish close air support or
interdiction and has only recently made nascent inroads
into the overwater training necessary for naval air support.
Support for the naval forces is left up primarily to the naval
air force.
Published PLAAF sources also refer to informal, tertiary
missions, such as assisting socialist construction, providing
air services for disaster relief and air rescues, and artificial
27
rainmaking support for farmers.
The PLAAF also
supports other maritime activities. For example, according
to a May 1998 Xinhua report from Guangzhou, the PLAAF
was to conduct inspection flights in the coastal waters off
Guangdong Province, as well as the Zhujiang River delta
area, in order to enforce the May to September fishing ban.
Guangdong Province and the South China Sea Branch of
the National Bureau of Oceanography had requested the
inspections in order to counter serious problems in
excessive, unpaid, and disorderly utilization of maritime
28
resources.
In the absence of broader PLAAF mission statements,
one must look at the PLAAF’s organizational structure,
operational branch functions, force locations, weapon
systems, and planned weapons acquisitions, in order to
analyze the PLAAF’s full range of missions.
Administratively, the PLAAF’s chain-of-command is
organized into four levels: headquarters air force; seven
military region air force (MRAF) headquarters; air corps
29
and command posts; and operational units. Headquarters
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Air Force is equivalent to the U.S. Air Force’s Air Staff and
is organized administratively into four first level or major
departments—headquarters, political, logistics, and
armament—and their subordinate elements (second level
30
departments, bureaus, divisions, offices, and sections).
The PLA’s military region (MR) headquarters is responsible
for combined operations, and the MRAF commander, who is
also an MR deputy commander, is responsible for flight
operations within the MR. The seven military regions are
Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Jinan,
and Chengdu. Each echelon below Headquarters Air Force
from the MRAF headquarters to the lowest level in the
chain-of-command basically mirrors this administrative
structure.
In order to perform its operational missions, the PLAAF
is organized into branches—aviation, AAA, SAM, radar,
and communications. The PLA’s airborne troops belong to
the Air Force, and sometimes, but not always, are noted as
the PLAAF’s sixth branch. The PLAAF also has schools,
logistics units, repair facilities, research institutes,
hospitals, and sanitoriums as part of its organizational
structure. The Air Force’s Logistics Department has its own
water transport craft and boat troops to ship fuel to PLAAF
units along the Yangtze River and coast. The PLAAF’s
31
political structure ensures Party control at all levels. By
looking at modernization of the PLAAF’s six branches, it is
possible to understand more fully the scope of the Air
Force’s operations and capabilities.
The PLAAF’s Aviation Branch. The PLAAF was formed
around its aviation troops ( hangkongbing), which remain
the Air Force’s main arm. The aviation troops are organized
into fighters, ground attack aircraft, bombers, transports,
and reconnaissance aircraft. These aircraft are organized
into air divisions, regiments, groups, squadrons, and
associated maintenance, logistics, and support units. The
support units are organized into regiments, battalions, and
companies. There are also independent air regiments and
groups, which conduct specialized missions, such as
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operational test and evaluation of equipment, reconnaissance and surveying, troop transport, and reforestation. For
the most part, these special mission aircraft include
reconnaissance fighters and Il-14 and Yun-5 transports. Air
divisions can be directly subordinate to Headquarters Air
Force, an MRAF headquarters, an air corps, or a command
post.
A typical air division headquarters consists of the
command staff and administrative organization. These
organizations are responsible for combat training, political
training, supply, and maintenance support for the division.
Each division and regiment has a Party committee and a
standing committee, of which the political commissar serves
as the secretary for both committees. The division’s Party
committee consists of the standing committee, which
includes the division’s command staff, plus the commanders
and political commissars of each subordinate regiment.
Because the PLAAF has historically been synonymous
with the aviation troops, the Headquarters Department’s
second level Operations Department has basically
functioned as the “Aviation Troop Department.” The
Operations Department also is responsible for the airborne
troops. This is in contrast to the separate second level
departments that have been established for the radar,
32
communications, and AAA/SAM branches.
This
separation of aviation and air defense permeates the entire
chain-of-command, keeping administrative firewalls
between the aviators and the rest of the PLAAF.
Origins of the Aviation Branch. When the PLAAF was
established, its aviation troops were organized into several
brigades with three to four regiments each. For example,
the 4th Combined Brigade was established at Nanjing in
June 1950 and became the PLAAF’s first aviation troop
unit. It consisted of 10th and 11th Pursuit Regiments, the
12th Bomber Regiment, and the 13th Attack Regiment. By
the end of 1950, these brigades reduced the number of
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regiments to two, dropped the type of unit (Pursuit/Attack/
33
Bomber) from the name, and became air divisions.
Since 1951, the number for regiments per division has
fluctuated between two and three, depending upon the
number of aircraft available and the changing missions.
Some flying academies have up to four regiments. By the
end of May 1951, the PLAAF had 17 air divisions, each with
two regiments, including 12 pursuit divisions, 2 attack
divisions, 2 bomber divisions, and 1 transport division. This
expanded rapidly, so that by March 1953, a total of 28 air
divisions and 56 air regiments were formed. At the same
time, each division began changing from two regiments
back to three. By early 1954, the PLAAF had 28 air divisions
and 70 air regiments, with 3,000 aircraft.
From 1960-65, more air divisions were created to guard
the coast. From 1966-76, aviation troop units were
expanded to cover the rest of China. Although the PLAAF
had 50 air divisions by the mid-1980s, the number was
reduced to around 45 by 1990 as older aircraft were
34
gradually taken out of the inventory.
According to the 1999 DoD report, the PLAAF currently
numbers over 400,000 personnel with approximately 4,500
combat aircraft organized in some 30 air divisions. The
PLAAF also maintains about 150 transport aircraft in two
35
air divisions. A PLAAF air division can have one or more
air regiments per airfield, with each airfield assigned a field
station for logistics support. Although a division can have
more than one type of aircraft (i.e., J-7s and J-8s), each
regiment typically has the same type of aircraft. The table of
organization and equipment (TO&E) for a typical air
regiment consists of from 25-32 aircraft, but may actually
have more or less assigned. The regiment is the basic
organization for training and operations. Each regiment
has three flying groups and one aircraft maintenance group.
Each flying group is further divided into three squadrons.
The division has about one and one-half to two pilots per
aircraft. Although the pilots are assigned to squadrons,
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each with three to five pilots, the aircraft are assigned to the
regiment as a whole, not just to the squadrons. Each pilot,
however, normally only flies one to three airframes, so they
become familiar with each aircraft’s handling capabilities.
The average pilot remains in the Air Force until he or she
36
retires. The PLAAF established age limits for its pilots in
the 1980s: fighter and ground-attack pilots, 43–45 years;
bomber pilots, 48–50 years; transport pilots, 55 years;
helicopter pilots, 47–50 years; and female pilots, 48 years.
The average fighter and ground-attack pilot is 28 years old.
Flight Training.
To help build esprit de corps, the PLAAF began awarding
four pilot ratings in 1986—special, first, second, and third
grade—which are awarded after the pilots complete their
initial and upgrade training at an operational unit. The
criteria includes time-on-station, flying hours, “flying in
weather,” and special missions. In addition, the PLAAF
awards aircrew ratings to navigators, communications and
gunnery personnel, and instructor pilots. According to a
1989 PLAAF report, of the 10,000 pilots in the entire
PLAAF at that time, 7 percent of the total and 15 to 20
37
percent of the fighter pilots were special grade. There are
differing reports about the educational background of
today’s PLAAF pilots. In April 1999, Commander Liu stated
that all air division and regiment leaders are special-grade
or first grade pilots, and one-half of the pilots in the flight
38
units are college-educated. This is in contrast to an
interview in 1989 with then-PLAAF Political Commissar
Zhu Guang, who stated that all the pilots had a college
education or above, and to a 1999 article by John Lewis and
Xue Litai that states,
In 1997, the PLAAF finished drafting its training programs for
high-tech wars, but in carrying them out, it has encountered a
fundamental problem because only 20.7 percent of the air
officers are college graduates. Quick fixes or short-term
training classes cannot solve the lack of qualified technical
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personnel to operate high-tech air weapons in an environment
that attracts the best to civilian occupations.39

There are no ready explanations for this apparent drop
in college educated officers, especially since all PLAAF
officers must attend a PLAAF 4-year academy, many of
which now offer post-graduate degrees as well.
Based upon an analysis of Chinese literature and
interviews in China, it is evident that PLAAF pilots do not
fly as many hours as their Western counterparts. According
to interviews with PLAAF and foreign air force officials, the
PLAAF’s flying hours have not changed appreciably over
the past 15 years, but they have changed their training
techniques. Since the end of the 1970s, bomber pilots have
consistently flown an average of 80 hours per year; fighter
pilots 100 to 110 hours; and A-5 ground attack pilots up to
40
150 hours. This compares to about 215 hours per year for
U.S. Air Force bomber, fighter, and attack crews. USAF
pilots also conduct numerous hours training on advanced
41
simulators.
Based on interviews in Asia, it appears that PLAAF
pilots are flying the Su-27s between 60-100 hours per year,
and supplementing this with flight time in J-7s. These
interviews also indicate that every country considers the
PLAAF’s Su-27s as their primary concern, regardless of how
many hours the pilots train. The acquisition of these aircraft
has definitely had a significant psychological impact on
China’s neighbors.
Since 1996, PLAAF pilots have been noted flying in more
sophisticated simulated air-to-air combat with newlyformed aggressor units, employing jamming, flying over the
Taiwan Strait, conducting live missile firings over the East
China Sea, dropping parachute-retarded bombs at a bomb
range. There are also Chinese writings that the PLAAF
conducts post-mission analysis of aerial combat using
information from flight data recorders that contain
information from the air data computer and possibly some
fire control data. The Chinese are also seeking Air Combat
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Maneuvering Instrumentation (ACMI) pods similar to
those used by Western forces. These pods send information
to ground personnel so they can evaluate aerial engage42
ments on a real-time basis.
Although the PLAAF may not fly as many hours as the
USAF, the PLAAF believes that its training is improving
and is adequate to conduct its missions. Some Air Force
leaders firmly believe that their intelligence, mobility, and
attack capabilities will be sufficient to allow them to react
appropriately to any situation, including gaining air
superiority, supporting the ground forces, and conducting
counterattacks against targets inside the enemy’s borders.
Furthermore, interviews with foreign air force officials
indicate that they believe Western reporting does not take
into account how the PLAAF matches up against China’s
neighbors. For example, Commander Liu noted that
aviation units during 1996 exceeded their annual training
plan requirements by 1.8 percent. Highlights during that
time included night flying, live bombing and missile firing,
training over the ocean, low-altitude flights, and emergency
mobility deployments to other airfields. This type of
training accounted for 45 percent of the planned annual
43
training time. What the article failed to state was that
most of this training took place in a single exercise opposite
Taiwan, and that several portions of the exercise were
curtailed due to inclement weather.
To round out the PLAAF’s tactical training and help
make up for the limited number of flying hours per year, the
PLAAF has increased its use of flight simulators. The
PLAAF now reportedly conducts more than 90 percent of its
tactical and technological training on simulators. The
PLAAF has developed a full-spectrum spherical screen
simulator, three-dimensional flight simulator, and in-flight
refueling plane simulator for pilots to train and develop
special flight and air strike skills under simulated combat
conditions. Simulation capabilities have evolved from
electromechanical simulation to laser, electronic, and
computer simulation; from technical simulation to tactical
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and campaign simulation; and from the simulation of a
single armament or aircraft type to integrated simulation of
the main battle arms combined with multiple aircraft types
44
and various forms of weaponry.
If these types of
simulators have, in fact, become operational at all aviation
units, then they will definitely help supplement pilot
training, which is minimal at best. During the 1980s, the
Air Force only had a few nonstandard simulators. Most of
the pilots trained on an instrument board—a mock cockpit
with a wooden panel containing all of the cockpit’s
instrument dials on it.
In January 1999, PLAAF Deputy Commander Wu
Guangyu emphasized the PLAAF’s increased readiness by
stating,
China’s Air Force has significantly improved its combat
readiness. During 1998, pilots achieved a record of per capita
flying time, the highest since 1985, in spite of heavy summer
flooding and a program to restructure the Air Force. Pilots paid
particular attention to improving basic flying techniques. The
fact that sixty-six percent of air units conducted highly
successful long-distance mobile maneuvers under harsh
weather conditions indicated that China’s Air Force has greatly
enhanced its combat readiness.45

Commander Liu also discussed training reforms by
stating that several units have been selected to carry out a
series of reforms on tactics. Those units have tried,
demonstrated, and refined a series of advanced combat
theories and propositions in live-fire training exercises.
They have scored excellent initial results in mobile
operations, air strike, air superiority, air control, night
46
attacks, and defensive operations.
PLAAF Aggressor Unit. The statements above most
47
likely describe the PLAAF’s “Blue Army” aggressor units.
According to several Jiefangjun Bao articles and interviews
with PLA and non-Chinese air force officials, the PLAAF
has established an aggressor unit at its Flight Test and
Training Center at Cangxian to simulate offensive and
208

defensive operations against the “Red Army.”
1997 Jiefangjun Bao article reported that,
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An April

The Blue Army aggressor unit is equipped with advanced
equipment and flown by special-grade and first-grade pilots.
This unit has fought numerous air battles with every PLAAF
combat aircraft unit, in order to help improve the PLAAF’s
high-tech combat effectiveness and improve their knowledge
of tactics. The specialized unit has emerged as a strong enemy
force in simulated air battles, which has led the PLAAF to
make numerous changes in its tactical training. In light of
China’s training situation, the specialized unit has launched
no-notice preemptive strikes under real combat conditions.49

The air tactics concepts that the Cangxian training
center has developed against the aggressor unit are
reportedly now being moved to the unit level, where several
units have begun to turn these concepts into live-fire
exercises. According to the April 1997 Jiefangjun Bao
article, the PLAAF has obtained some initial results in
important combat study areas, such as maneuverable
combat, air attack, fighting for air supremacy, night attack,
and defense. As a result of this training, the PLAAF has
adopted a new training syllabus characterized by
adaptability to combat situations under future high-tech
conditions.
According to various interviews, similar aggressor units
have been established in each of the seven military regions.
The aggressor aircraft engage in exercises with local units,
employing dissimilar aircraft air intercepts utilizing
50
evasive maneuvers. Although interviews indicated that
the aggressor unit consists primarily of J-7 and J-8
interceptors and does not have any Su-27s assigned as of
yet, this situation may have changed. A recent news article
from Hong Kong described an exercise where,
Four Blue Army Su-27s, simulating Taiwan Air Force F-16s,
flew from an undisclosed airfield in North China [probably
Cangxian] and conducted air-to-ground attacks against
enemy targets. The report noted that the aggressor Su-27s
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flew a total of 1,600 kilometers, with two SU-27s conducting
strikes on a Red Army missile position, a command post, and
two radar positions. The Su-27s also destroyed eighteen J-7s
parked on the airfield. The remaining two Su-27s flew cover for
the other two aircraft and shot down several J-7s in air-to-air
combat.51

If the aggressor squadron now has Su-27s permanently
assigned, this is a significant step forward in tactical
52
training for the PLAAF. The article also points out,
however, the J-7s weaknesses in conducting their air
defense mission. Whereas the Su-27s radar system and
AAMs are capable of shooting down aircraft
beyond-visual-range (BVR) in a head-on aerial engagement,
the J-7s and older J-8s do not have either capability. The
J-7s and J-8s must be within visual range and do not have a
head-on intercept capability.
As a result of this more aggressive training program,
PLAAF pilots have intensified their training under
different weather conditions, at lower altitudes, and, most
53
significantly, over water. They have also practiced rapid
deployment to permanent and auxiliary airfields. The
PLAAF has also improved its navigation capabilities. There
is a density of radio navigation aids (Tactical Air Navigation
[TACAN] for the J-7 and J-8 and Short Range Radio
Navigation System [RSBN] for the Su-27) available within
China. In addition, the Chinese have indicated that they
have retrofitted some of their aircraft with global
positioning systems (GPS). Furthermore, the Su-27 and
some J-8s have an inertial navigation system (INS) and can
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use their radar to navigate using islands and coastlines.
In conjunction with these operational changes during
the 1990s, the Air Force has had to adjust its logistics,
including spare parts acquisition, storage, and distribution,
and maintenance practices to meet these new challenges.
These adjustments include computerizing individual
logistics and maintenance operations, and then networking
the computers within the unit and among different units at
the same and higher levels. It has also meant establishing
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small logistics and maintenance teams capable of deploying
by rail or air at a moment’s notice to accompany the unit’s
aircraft deployment.
On several occasions, many PLAAF units have formed
offensive and defensive exercise teams with Navy, Army,
and Air Force AAA, radar, and SAM troops to conduct
exercises modeled on future warfare. One Xinhua article
stated that the PLAAF has generally considered flying
low-altitude bombing raids over the ocean as dangerous,
since the water and sky look almost the same to the pilot.
According to the article, pilots have overcome this difficulty
and have now flown large bomber groups less than 100
meters above the sea, hitting all the intended targets. These
pilots are now experimenting with new tactics, such as
flying close to strategic points at sea, launching surgical air
strikes against enemy troops, waging offensive air
campaigns, conducting over-the-horizon air combat, and
55
imposing air and sea blockades. These types of missions
are new for the PLAAF, since the PLA Naval Air Force
previously was responsible for support to the Navy and
overwater intercepts of hostile targets.
PLAAF’s Gobi Desert Training Center . In 1958, the
PLAAF built a large center for testing its AAMs and SAMs
56
in the Gobi Desert near Dingxin, Gansu Province. During
the mid-1990s, the Air Force began expanding this base to
include a tactics training center, where multiple PLAAF
units could practice the tactics developed at Cangxian and
tested in individual units throughout the force. An October
1996 Jiefangjun Bao article described the training center as
follows:
The Air Force recently established a modern, comprehensive
air tactical training base marked by combat training under
actual combat conditions. The training base has air and
ground tactical training ranges, simulated runways built to
scale, a SAM base, AAA positions, radars, radar support
vehicles, simulated enemy command posts, ammunition
depots, and oil depots, which look real. A large number of
simulated tanks are also deployed in combat positions.57
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The article also described the training base’s command
and control center.
Training directors and air division commanders receive air
combat reports, direct air battles, and communicate with
combat planes in the air. They monitor units in the exercise, and
direct unit deployment and movement in a timely fashion
through use of the base’s advanced facilities. A monitoring,
control, and appraisal system installed in the base’s command
center receives information in a timely manner on each plane’s
flight path, course, speed, altitude, and other parameters. The
system monitors the activity through video recording, radar,
and flight orientation systems, so training directors will have
accurate information to evaluate the training results.58

The training center probably includes the mock up of a
Taiwan Air Force airfield. According to an April 1999 report
in Taiwan’s China Times Express, “China has built a
military airfield near Dingxin airfield in northwestern
Gansu Province, that is identical to the Taiwan Air Force’s
Chingchuankang (CCK) airbase in central Taiwan, so the
59
PLAAF can practice bombing the island.” Building mock
enemy airfields is not an uncommon practice among air
forces of the world, and provides realistic training
opportunities.
Following the PLAAF’s participation in the joint service
exercise near Taiwan in early 1996, the PLAAF conducted a
two-day, large-scale, offensive-defensive exercise utilizing
its aggressor unit at the Gobi Desert training center during
September 1996.
The exercise directors made it clear from the beginning that this
exercise was to be conducted under unknown conditions. Almost
all of the exercise’s contents were new to the PLAAF
participants, including using dissimilar aircraft in coordinated,
joint offensive-counteroffensive attacks against ground targets
and in air-to-air combat under electronic warfare conditions.
The Air Force conducted the exercise under the principle that
none of the participants would receive prior information about
the enemy’s deployments, combat tasks, battlefield targets, or
flight routes during different stages of the exercise. The
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exercise, which was almost canceled because one of the
participating aircraft crashed en route, included aerial combat
to seize air superiority, bomber and ground attack aircraft
strikes on targets after avoiding enemy intercepting planes,
and airborne landing and anti-airborne landing operations.60

This report provides a valuable glimpse at the PLAAF’s
combat philosophy. Specifically, the directors assumed that
they would know very little about the enemy just before or
during the battle, due to the lack of real-time
reconnaissance capabilities. Therefore, the attack must be
planned on insufficient data. Yet another Xinhua report in
1998 stated, “During an early 1997 live-fire exercise
involving various types of planes, command posts of eight
air divisions explored tactics and conducted training on the
61
base’s advanced training systems and facilities.” Although
the number of aircraft involved in these exercises was not
specified, the PLAAF’s philosophy has been to deploy
overwhelming numbers of aircraft to a theater. For
example, during the 1979 border conflict with Vietnam, the
PLAAF deployed approximately 700 aircraft to the border
area. However, while air force officials in Taiwan speculate
that the PLAAF would attack Taiwan with waves totaling
several hundred aircraft, there are no indications in PLAAF
writings that it routinely trains with more than 4-8 aircraft
in the air at a time.
Upgrading the Guangzhou MRAF . The PLAAF has
designated certain military regions for the most rapid
modernization and training. According to a July 22, 1999,
Guangzhou Yangcheng Wanbao article, the Guangzhou
MRAF has conducted advanced training with all of the
PLAAF’s branches. The PLA apparently chose to highlight
these types of activities in the Guangzhou MR as a warning
to Taiwan. This article appeared shortly after Taiwan’s
President Lee Teng-hui announced his “state-to-state”
theory on July 9.
Reportedly, all of the Su-27 and J-8II fighter pilots have
met the requirements for all-weather flights and for flying
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the lead plane of a four-aircraft formation; the B-6 bomber
unit has had excellent results in long-range bombing raids;
the Il-76 and Y-8 transport unit has notably enhanced its
long-range air transport and combat capability; and the
SAM, AAA, and radar units enhanced their air defense
62
net. The article further detailed the specific types of
training the fighter and bomber units conducted.
The fighter units successfully conducted tactical drills,
including over-the-horizon air combat, multi-target attack,
electronic countermeasure warfare, and offshore live
ammunition firing. The bomber unit conducted training for the
first time involving multi-wave, multi-target, all-weather,
long-range, live ammunition bombing. Fully loaded with bombs,
cells with multiple aircraft [probably eight aircraft] took off
before dawn and flew over half of China to conduct timely and
accurate bombing at an unidentified range in northwest China
[probably the Gobi Desert training center]. From the desert
range, they then flew to an island off the southeast coast to
attack targets there. Upon completion of their bomb runs, they
returned home in a rainstorm, landing after dusk.63

The Guangzhou report provided additional details about
the PLAAF’s airborne, SAM, and AAA training as follows:
For the first time, the Guangzhou MRAF transport unit
conducted a 6-hour training flight in complicated weather
conditions late at night. The aircraft also conducted airborne
exercises in an unfamiliar highland cold zone without ground
command, ground marks, and weather information. The SAM
unit became combat capable in less than one year after receiving
new [unidentified] equipment in 1998. In June 1999, the fully
armed SAM unit deployed by vehicle to the Gobi Desert training
center in northwest China. The exercise involved multiple
goals, including “dismantling, leaving, advancing, and
launching” as well as “food, shelter, management, and storage.”
While at the training range, the unit employed its new missiles
to attack low-altitude, close-range targets in an electronic
warfare environment for the first time, and hit every target.64

Weapon Systems. The PLAAF’s weapons systems are a
combination of old, modified, and new aviation (aircraft)
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and air defense (SAM and AAA) systems. Since the early
1990s, the PLAAF has retired over 1,000 of its older combat
65
aircraft, storing them at Rugao airfield in central China.
According to the U.S. Department of Defense report on the
Taiwan Strait balance,
The PLAAF inventory includes over 2,200 obsolete J-6/Farmer
fighters (last produced in 1979), several hundred J-7/Fishbed
and J-8/Finback fighters, and over 40 Su-27/Flankers. In
addition, the PLAAF has 500 A-5/Fantan (modified MiG-19)
ground attack aircraft and about 500 bombers, including
B-6/Badger and obsolete B-5/Beagle. Both its aerial refueling
and airborne early warning (AEW) programs are behind
schedule, as are several of its indigenous aircraft development
programs. By 2005, the PLAAF will possess nearly 2,200
tactical fighter aircraft, 500 ground attack aircraft, and 400
bombers, as older aircraft are retired. The majority of the
mainland’s air fleet still will be composed of second and third
generation aircraft augmented by a limited number of fourth
generation platforms.66

Fighters. By 2010, the PLAAF’s fighter force will most
likely consist of between 1,500 and 2,000 aircraft, with
almost the entire J-6s and early model J-7s retired. The
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remaining force will consist of modified J-7s and J-8s.
These aircraft will initially be complemented by and then
replaced by the J-11 (Su-27), J-10, and Su-30. The J-10 was
developed to replace the J-6, J-7, and A-5. The Su-27 is an
air superiority aircraft, replacing the J-8 in this mission.
The Su-30 is being purchased for deep strike/interdiction
and air superiority, much like the U.S. F-15E, and will
replace the older B-5/Beagle bombers. All of these newer
aircraft will have greater range and payload, and will not
replace the older aircraft on a one-for-one basis.
There are differing opinions about the long-term
viability of various indigenous programs, such as the J-7,
J-8, and J-10 program, all of which have been considered for
elimination at one time or another since the mid-1970s.
During the 1970s and 1980s, China had no alternative to
domestic production, these programs had a history of
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important bureaucratic support, and hundreds of millions
of dollars had already been spent on the programs.
Therefore, they continued through the 1980s at a moderate
pace, while China began searching for foreign aircraft.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, the aviation ministry opted to
provide significant upgrades to these aircraft using
domestic and foreign subsystems and foreign technical
68
assistance.
Over the past decade, some analysts have had doubts
whether the J-10, which is under development in Chengdu,
will eventually be operationally deployed, while others have
predicted that the J-10 will become one of the PLAAF’s most
69
important fighters in the next century. The J-10 program
began in the late 1960s. After numerous technical
difficulties, the Chinese asked the Israelis in the early
1980s to assist them with a new design based on the Israeli
Lavi (U.S. F-16 derivative) fighter, and full-scale
cooperation began officially by 1984. The J-10 project was
launched on a full scale in 1987 and began receiving Russian
70
assistance in the early 1990s. The J-10 conducted its first
test flight in March 1998, at least 2 years behind schedule,
and is still undergoing testing and evaluation as more
prototypes are produced. Predictions for deployment to an
operational base range from 2003 to 2010, depending upon
problems encountered in the test and evaluation phase. The
J-10, which most likely will be armed with advanced beyond
visual range (BVR), active radar (AR) air-to-air missiles
(AAM) and may be air refuelable, is designed for counter-air
71
and interdiction like the Lavi and F-16.
One of the PLAAF’s most significant events in the past
50 years was China’s agreement with Russia in 1990 to
purchase 48 SU-27 fighters and then to “produce” up to 200
72
of the aircraft in China over the next 10 to 15 years. The
SU-27s produced in China will be known as the J-11. The
first batch of 26 aircraft arrived at the 3rd Air Division in
Wuhu (Nanjing Military Region) in 1992, followed by a
second group of 22 more at Suixi airfield (Guangzhou MR) in
1996. The first two domestically assembled Su-27s
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reportedly made their initial flights in December 1998.
According to the DoD report, the Su-27s are the only fighter
aircraft in the PLAAF inventory with sufficient combat
radius to allow extended operations beyond China’s
74
borders. Like the J-10 program, there are differing
opinions about the long-term viability of the Su-27/J-11
75
program. While some analysts focus on the negative
aspects of the program, such as Russia’s restrictions on
allowing China to produce the avionics and engines, other
analysts note that China is moving ahead rapidly to develop
its own engines and avionics for the aircraft and will not
need the Russian systems.
Reports from Russia indicate that China is negotiating
to purchase an additional 20 Su-27UBK two-seat trainer
aircraft at a price of $35 million dollars each. The PLAAF
originally received a total of four trainers along with 24
single-seat Su-27s for Wuhu and 22 single-seat Su-27s for
76
Suixi. Some analysts predict the PLAAF will purchase as
many as 40-60 Su-27UBK to complement the full
production run of approximately 200 J-11s. The PLAAF
typically has four to six trainers per regiment. The
Su-27UBK is fully combat capable and will likely be used to
train pilots for both the Su-27SK and Su-30MKK. Delivery
of the first trainers is expected within the next year, but the
delivery schedule will probably match the production
schedule of the J-11s at Shenyang, which will take the rest
77
of the decade to complete.

China is also negotiating with Russia to acquire and
possibly co-produce the Su-30 multi-role aircraft that the
PLAAF would use for deep strike/interdiction and air
superiority. Although China is fully expected to receive
some Su-30s, probably in 2001, there is still much confusion
and speculation about the actual number and terms of the
contract, including whether or not they will be co-produced
in China. The figures have ranged from purchase of 20 to 72
78
aircraft and co-production of up to 250 aircraft. There are
also questions about whether the PLA Navy’s Air Force will
also receive the Su-30. Information from the 1999 Moscow
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air show indicates the Su-30MKK version being offered to
China is significantly less capable than the Su-30MKI sold
79
to India.
Air-to-Air Missiles. The PLAAF has progressed further
with its AAMs in the 1990s than any previous decade. Not
only has the Air Force received advanced AAMs from
Russia, but also pilots have had more opportunities to fire
live missiles during training. According to the DoD report,
The PLAAF currently has a number of advanced AAMs in its
inventory, including the Russian-built AA-10a/Alamo and
AA-11/Archer infrared (IR) AAM carried on the Su-27. China’s
J-7 is capable of carrying the PL-2A and PL-5B IR AAMs, as well
as the all-aspect PL-8 IR AAMs, while its J-8IIs are capable of
carrying the PL-2A, PL-5B, PL-8, and the beyond visual range
(BVR) semi-active radar (SAR) PL-4 and PL-10 AAMs. By 2005,
Beijing likely will have an active radar (AR) AAM in its
inventory and could adapt it for use on a larger number of
platforms. The PLAAF also is developing BVR AAMs for use
aboard its J-10 fourth generation fighter aircraft.80

Bombers. The PLAAF received its first Soviet
Il-28/Beagles in 1950 and TU-16/ Badgers in 1959.
Thereafter, China modified the Il-28 design and produced it
in Harbin as the B-5. China also modified the TU-16 and
81
produced it in Xian as the B-6. The first B-5 and B-6
entered the PLAAF in 1967 and 1969, respectively. While
the B-5 is no longer in production, the B-6 has been modified
several times and is still produced primarily as a
replacement for older airframes and for new missions, such
as standoff cruise missiles and jamming. According to the
DoD report,
Today, China’s bombers include the B-6 and the B-5. The B-5’s
slow speed and lack of standoff capability make this platform an
extremely vulnerable target. The B-6 also is an aging aircraft,
but it is being produced in several versions. One variant is
designed to carry an antiship cruise missile (ASCM), while
another is being developed to carry an air-launched cruise
missile (ALCM). The B-5 is being phased out of the inventory,
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but it is still used in training and would probably be employed
along with the B-6 bomber during a military conflict.82

In addition, the Chinese have shown ECM variants of
the B-5 and B-6. These aircraft were developed in the
mid-1980s to provide standoff ECM support to their bomber
fleet. While their effectiveness is unknown, intended
victims would be enemy air defense early warning systems
and their associated ground control intercept (GCI)
structures that would impede interceptors from being
vectored to an incoming bomber force.
Transports. One of the PLAAF’s combat missions is to
provide airlift in support of PLA operations. Until the
mid-1990s, however, the PLAAF was unable to transport
ground forces rapidly to distant parts of the country or
sustain ground operations for extended periods due to
antiquated aircraft and the lack of large-capacity aircraft.
The PLAAF transport force is now capable of supporting the
PLA at increased levels for a limited time and rapidly
deploying to internal trouble spots. According to the DoD
report,
The PLAAF’s current complement of large transport aircraft
is limited to about a dozen Il-76/Candids and about 50
Y-8/Cubs, the remainder of the transport force consists of
smaller aircraft like the An-24/Coke, An-26/Curl, and
Y-5/Colt. Beijing can be expected to purchase a few additional
Russian Il-76s or similarly sized foreign aircraft. The ongoing
expansion of China’s civil aircraft fleet will also allow the
PLAAF to use the country’s civil airlines to supplement its
transport capability during crises.83

Use of civil aircraft is not new to the PLAAF. During the
1989 Tiananmen situation, civil aircraft were used to
transport PLA troops to Beijing. In addition, military
officials in New Delhi reported that the PLA used civil
84
aircraft to ferry troops to Tibet during a recent exercise.
There are limits, however, to using civil aircraft to ferry
troops into a hostile environment.
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Airborne Early Warning. The PLAAF is also moving
forward rapidly with its AEW program:
In 1996, China signed a $250 million contract with Israeli
Aircraft Industries (IAI) and Russia’s Beriev to have IAI’s
subsidiary Elta install its Phalcon AEW radar in an Il-76 based
Beriev A-50/Mainstay airframe. The aircraft will have a fixed
radome housing a triangular phased array radar antenna to
give the system 360-degree coverage, rather than using a
rotating radome. The Il-76 will be equipped with electronic
surveillance/electronic intelligence (ESM/ELINT) and
communications intelligence (COMINT) systems. The first
airframe was delivered to Israel in October 1999 and should
arrive in China sometime in 2000. While the PLAAF reportedly
has a requirement for 15-20 AEW aircraft, they currently have
an option for only four airframes worth about $1 billion.
Meanwhile, China has been negotiating with GEC-Marconi for
an Argus radar system, which is also intended for an Il-76 but
has not yet been mated to the airframe, and may still be flight
tested against the Phalcon system before a final decision is
made.85

The PLAAF has been searching for an AEW aircraft for
about 15 years, including the unsuccessful modification of a
Soviet-built TU-4 in the 1980s. Although the PLAAF should
receive its first Il-76/Phalcon platform in the near future,
some analysts have doubts whether the PLAAF will
actually acquire all four aircraft. China has a history of
trying to acquire one or two foreign systems and then having
the aviation ministry try to copy them. There is a good
possibility China might try to do the same with this AEW
aircraft. Meanwhile, other analysts believe that the
86
Il-76/Phalcon system will move forward rapidly.
Intelligence Collection Aircraft. China maintains the
most extensive signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities of
all the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The SIGINT
systems include several dozen ground stations, half a dozen
ships, truck-mounted systems, airborne systems, and a
limited satellite collection capability. These capabilities
have been significantly enhanced over the past decade,
particularly with respect to electronic warfare (EW)
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operations. Aerial reconnaissance includes photographic
and electronics intelligence (ELINT) activities. The
principal Chinese airborne ELINT platform is the fourengine turboprop EY-8, an indigenous development of the
Soviet An-12/Cub. The system is designed to detect,
identify, analyze and locate land-based or shipborne radar
emitters with a high probability of intercept. Israel has
reportedly assisted development of China’s airborne
ELINT/EW capability, whereby several Chinese systems
87
are derived from Israeli systems.
Based on a Jane’s Defence Weekly article, the PLAAF has
also operationally deployed its first generation of locally
developed long-range ELINT aircraft in early 1999.
According to the report,
Four modified TU-154 aircraft, fitted with radomes, have been
deployed in the Nanjing MR opposite Taiwan, and at least
eight more are on order. Although specifications of the aircraft
are not known, some of the TU-154s may have limited airborne
control and electronic warfare capabilities. Development of
the aircraft was done at the PLAAF’s Nanyuan airfield,
located just south of Beijing.88

People’s Liberation Army Naval Air Force . The PLA
Naval air force was established in August 1950 as a
separate administrative department within Navy
Headquarters and as a separate PLA Navy operational
branch. There are differing opinions concerning whether or
not the Naval air force’s modernization is keeping pace with
the PLAAF. Although Naval air force has received the FB-7
and its bombers are equipped with air-to-surface cruise
missiles, the PLAAF has received all of the Su-27s and most
of the J-8II fighters so far. In addition, the PLAAF has
begun flying over water, which heretofore was a Naval air
force mission only. Naval air force’s missions include
protecting China’s coastal airspace, providing air support
for naval forces at sea, and conducting maritime search and
rescue operations. The DoD report states,
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The PLANAF has only a limited maritime strike capability with
some 150 non-standoff B-6s, A-5/Fantans, and B-5s. These
aircraft would be only marginally effective against most modern
navies. Some of the approximately 30 B-6Ds provide the
PLANAF with a cruise missile ship interdiction strike
capability, utilizing the C-601/Kraken ASCM. The
standoff-capable FB-7 fighter-bomber, equipped with the
C-801/ASCM, will become operational in the next 2 to 3 years. It
likely will augment the B-6 and eventually replace some of the
B-5s and A-5s in the PLANAF’s inventory.89

According to interviews in Asia, the FB-7 is in the
operational test and evaluation (OT&E) phase known as
production finalization. The PLANAF already has 12 FB-7s
in its inventory, although they may not be considered
operational. Several of the aircraft overflew Beijing during
the PRC’s 50th anniversary on October 1, 1999. Various
problems associated with the aircraft were revealed in a
June 18, 1998, article in People’s Navy, but these changes
were minor modifications that took place during the OT&E
phase:
The PLANAF had to improve the FB-7 after receiving them.
When the aircraft first arrived, it was still being tested,
manufactured, and improved. The transceivers easily burned
out, and the fuel tanks had to be replaced periodically. As a
result, the regiment added a protector to the transceiver, and
devised an easier way to replace the fuel tank. More innovations
followed, including checking the fueling procedure without
starting the engine; checking the fueling valve without
increasing pressure; a faster way to hang, connect, and test a
model of a missile; and a device to prevent engine cough caused
by exhaust from missile launching that led to engine shutdown
in mid-air. The regiment also found ways to protect the new
equipment against heat, humidity, corrosion, rat infestation,
and typhoons.90

The PLANAF has also secured the purchase of their own
AEW aircraft, the SkyMaster AEW system from the United
Kingdom. According to Defense News they have purchased
up to eight AEW systems for installation on the Y-8. The
SkyMaster includes both AEW and maritime patrol
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functions, which fits well with PLANAF plans. While it
would be of marginal use against a dedicated fighter attack,
it is well suited to direct intercept of long-range maritime
91
patrol aircraft.
Air Defense Troops.
During the 1990s, the PLAAF has upgraded its air
defense (nonaircraft) capabilities. This involves three of the
PLAAF’s branches: SAM, AAA, and radar troops. While the
PLAAF has modernized its SAMs significantly in terms of
quality, if not quantity, the overall air defense network is
quite weak. According to the DoD assessment,
Beijing is expending tremendous effort establishing an
Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) at both the strategic
and tactical levels. China’s air defense technology currently
lags behind western standards and its current IADS
capability lacks many crucial components. Beijing probably
could establish a fully operational national IADS within the
next twenty years, but clearly not by 2005. China has a
rudimentary tactical IADS capability in the form of its mobile
Tactical Air Defense System (TADS).92

The PLA readily admits that it has problems with its air
defense network. For example, a July 14, 1998, article in
Jiefangjun Bao provided insight into this problem. The
article stated that,
Air battles in the 21st century will be a form of combat which
shows information warfare at its highest. In order to seize
superiority in information, the attacking side will adopt
electronic suppression, electronic deception, and route
selection to prevent the defensive side from reacting on time.
Stealth planes, in particular, will greatly reduce the detection
range. The PLAAF will have to advance its air defense early
warning equipment in order to be able to detect invading
targets early, extend the early warning range, and seize the
necessary time and space for fighting air defense battles.93

The article further stated that,
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As precision guidance technology develops, the launch distance
of different types of air-to-ground missiles and aerial guided
bombs will increase. These advancements will result in combat
aircraft changing their methods of launching surprise attacks
against ground targets. Instead of overhead bombing, the
aircraft can now launch munitions from outside the enemy’s
range of fire or even from outside the air defense area. If the
PLAAF continues to use the method of air defense at key points
or key areas, attacking aircraft will have already completed
their bombing and safely returned home before the PLAAF’s air
defense system could even react. Therefore, the PLAAF must
enlarge its effective air defense area and shoot down enemy
aircraft before they can even launch their air-to-ground
weapons. The PLAAF must persist in a dynamic air defense
system by moving forces rapidly and concentrating firepower in
order to enlarge the effective air defense area. The PLA must
also organize all of its air defense forces under centralized and
unified operational command.94

Given the PLAAF’s acknowledged weakness in these
areas, Commander Liu has stated the Air Force’s SAM units
are engaged in an evolution from single-type air defense
missiles and equipment to new integrated air defense
systems, combining high, medium, and low-altitude, long
95
and short-range missiles.
Since the early 1990s, the PLAAF has purchased two
regiments of S-300 (SA-10) and one regiment of Tor-M1
(SA-15) SAMs from Russia. During late 1998, Beijing was
reportedly negotiating with Moscow to acquire two
96
additional S-300 regiments and one Tor-M1 regiment.
Although most of the S-300s are currently based near
Beijing, some of them were reportedly deployed near
Fuzhou during the 1996 Taiwan Strait exercise for exercise
97
play and as a precautionary measure.
China has also developed the FT-2000 mobile SAM. This
SAM is based on the S-300 and is designed to engage
radiating aircraft, such as airborne jammers and airborne
warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft. China first
tested the FT-2000 in September 1998, then conducted the
98
first field trials during a series of exercises in 1999.
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Air Activity Over the Taiwan Strait: A Case Study.
On July 9, 1999, President Lee Teng-hui in Taiwan
declared that relations between Taiwan and mainland
China should be conducted on a “state-to-state” basis.
Shortly thereafter, the PLAAF increased the number of
sorties over the Taiwan Strait, including crossing over the
99
centerline of the Strait several times. This issue generated
a lot of interest and speculation about the possibility of an
aircraft incident occurring, either by accident or on purpose
by either side, that could start a war across the Strait.
On August 10, a Taiwan Ministry of National Defense
(MND) spokesperson stated that:
eight J-8 fighters have deployed to Fuzhou airbase and are
conducting flights over the Taiwan Strait. There are about 150
aircraft permanently stationed in Fujian’s coastal areas. In
addition, Su-27 fighters stationed in Guangdong Province
have begun training activities in areas close to the center
line.100

Although not stated, the Su-27s were probably flying direct
missions to and from the Strait from their home base at
Suixi. The Su-27s stationed at Wuhu were probably also
involved.
Although the number of PLAAF sorties increased
following President Lee’s statement, this was not really new
activity. The PLAAF was actively involved during the PLA’s
large-scale exercises opposite Taiwan during March 1996.
According to available open source material,
The exercise included 12,000 Air Force and 3,000 naval air
force servicemen. More than 280 aircraft deployed to the
exercise area and conducted 680 sorties, including eighty-two
transport sorties. Over 800 combat aircraft were within a
combat readiness of 550 miles or were on the alert.101

Another report stated the PLA deployed fewer than 100
additional aircraft to the thirteen Fujian airfields from
other bases, raising the total to only 226 aircraft. Based on a
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briefing by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, the PLA
102
conducted a total of 1,755 sorties during the exercise.
Further press reporting stated that the PLAAF deployed
aircraft from its second and third-line airfields to first-line
airfields, where they conducted their exercise activity. It
took about 3.5 hours for the PLAAF fighters to prepare for
takeoff, compared to the 10 hours they had needed
previously. In addition, the PLAAF demonstrated rapid
aircraft sortie regeneration of 40 minutes, which was
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considerably quicker than in the past.
In November 1998, the commander of a Taiwan Air
Force Mirage-2000 fighter group stated,
Following the air battles that took place over the Taiwan Strait
in 1958, our fighters have kept a distance of 35 miles from the
mainland’s coast, while the Chinese Communist fighters
usually carry out their duties close to their own coast line. If two
Communist jet fighters took off, the Taiwan Air Force would
dispatch four planes to watch them. Maintaining a tacit
agreement on an invisible centerline of the Strait, neither side
has conducted any provocative flights. In the past, there was a
tacit agreement that “we leave when you come, and we come
when you leave.” Recently, however, the Chinese Communist
fighters have conducted frequent intentional flights across the
central line of the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan Air Force F-16 and
Mirage 2000 aircraft could detect Chinese Communist fighters
on their radar screens. The Communist aircraft were probably
attempting to collect information about the training of our
new-generation fighters.104

There are several explanations for the increased
activity, in addition to reacting to President Lee’s
statement. Since its founding in 1949, the PLAAF has
consistently tried to carry out its mission of controlling
China’s airspace. During the early 1950s, the PLAAF was a
fledgling service and focused all of its efforts in the
northeast and on the Korean War. During that period,
Taiwan’s Air Force controlled the skies over southeast
China as far north as Shanghai. Therefore, besides
defending the border with Korea, the PLAAF’s immediate
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task was to provide air defense for the major cities, such as
Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin. It was not until after the
1958 Taiwan Strait crisis that the PLAAF had a permanent
presence in the provinces opposite Taiwan. Even then,
Taiwan continued to fly U-2 reconnaissance flights over the
mainland until the late 1960s. Since 1958, there have not
been any serious air engagements over the Strait.
According to a Taiwan Ministry of National Defense
(MND) spokesman in August 1999, “Following Beijing’s
1996 military exercise, Communist Chinese aircraft have
105
been flying more often in the Taiwan Strait.”
Although
the media began focusing on the PLAAF’s increased air
activity after President Lee’s statement, a knowledgeable
source in Taiwan indicated that the PLAAF began
increasing its flight activity near the centerline in June
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1998.
There are several probable reasons why the PLAAF has
stepped up its flight activity over the Strait since 1996 and
near the centerline in 1998. First, the CMC wanted to
challenge the fact that Taiwan’s Air Force has basically
owned the entire airspace over the Taiwan Strait since the
1950s and the PLAAF could not effectively challenge this
control. Taiwan’s fighter and reconnaissance aircraft have
routinely crossed the centerline, and transport aircraft
ferry supplies to troops on Jinmen and Mazu. The PLAAF
had little choice but to have a tacit agreement on the
centerline, so that it could at least have the facade of some
control over the Strait. Even so, the mainland officially
refutes the idea of a centerline, stating that Taiwan is a part
of China, so there cannot be a centerline over a body of water
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that belongs to China.
The PLAAF also probably felt compelled to react to
significant changes in Taiwan’s Air Force or lose the
opportunity to have any presence at all over the Strait.
These changes included Taiwan’s Air Force commissioning
its first indigenous defensive fighter (IDF) squadron in
December 1994, and the first French Mirage 2000-5 and
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U.S. F-16 squadrons in October 1997.
Liu Shunyao, who
became the new PLAAF commander in December 1996,
began emphasizing the PLAAF’s offensive capabilities
when Taiwan received the first Mirages and F-16s in April
1997.
During July and August 1999, only 12 PLAAF aircraft
were airborne at any time, not all of which were over the
Strait, and the PLAAF flew only about 30 total sorties per
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day. However, these sorties were a significant change for
both air forces. Over 1,000 civil air flights fly through
Taiwan’s airspace daily. Most of the airspace immediately
north and south of Taiwan, flying to/from Taipei and
Kaohsiung, is dedicated to civil air routes, which means that
Taiwan’s Air Force is forced to conduct its training in the
Strait and to the east of the island. These sorties, and any
future such activity, force Taiwan’s Air Force to divert
aircraft from their regular training regimen to conduct
patrol duties (punching holes in the sky) in the Strait.
Although the PLAAF did not fly that many sorties in the
Strait, Beijing sent a clear message that the PLAAF could
fly in the Strait if it wanted to.
The PLAAF’s Force Opposite Taiwan . Much of the PLA’s
modernization efforts over the past decade have focused on
Taiwan. While the PLA has had a sizeable force in the
Nanjing Military Region opposite Taiwan since the 1958
Strait crisis, the biggest change during the 1990s involved
improving the quality of the PLAAF’s equipment. According
to the Republic of China: 1998 National Defense Report ,
The PLAAF can station 1,200 combat aircraft and maneuver 59
air transports to carry two airborne regiments for operational
missions out of the thirteen military-civilian airports within 270
miles of Taiwan proper. The PLAAF stations and deploys its
aircraft into three areas based on their distance from Taiwan:
first line (270 miles), second line (550 miles), and third line
(beyond 550 miles). At present, the PLAAF has 1,300 aircraft
stationed on the air bases within 550 miles from Taiwan, of
which 600 have a radius of operation over Taiwan proper. The
Su-27s, with a combat radius of just less than 900 miles, can also
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cover Taiwan from their bases at Wuhu, Anhui Province, and
Suixi, Guangdong Province.110

Under current circumstances, once the PLAAF has
deployed several hundred aircraft near Taiwan, it must
then coordinate an air attack. Although the PLAAF has
been practicing this, it is not there yet. The chief difficulty is
simply exercising strict ground control intercept (GCI) over
large numbers of aircraft simultaneously. According to a
U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence briefing, during the 1996
exercises, PLAAF and PLA Naval Air Force fighters and
bombers engaged in simulated and live bombing, fighter
escort for bombers, air-to-air combat training, and other
routine training. The PLAAF’s airborne forces were also
111
involved in airdrop activity.
The key to any conflict for the PLAAF is sustained
combat, and the PLAAF has not yet demonstrated the
capability to conduct sustained, high intensity operations.
The PLAAF does not have any real-world experience in
planning and executing the kind of high intensity air
campaign that has proven so successful in recent U.S. and
NATO operations. For example, during the early stages of
the conflict in Kosovo, allied air forces deployed
approximately 400 aircraft to the area. On the third day of
operations alone, allied aircraft flew 249 sorties in one day.
By the end of the conflict, the number of U.S. and NATO
combat aircraft participating in strike delivery rose from
214 to 590 aircraft. According to Pentagon information,
23,000 bombs and missiles were used. The maximum
intensity of operations of Allied Air Forces was reached on
May 21 when 1,000 sorties were flown, 800 of which were
combat missions. These figures demonstrate the capability
needed to ramp up and maintain high intensity operations,
orchestrate operations through a unified daily air tasking
order (ATO), and the need to sustain intense air operations
112
when faced with a determined adversary.
Interviews with Taiwan and Japanese officials in early
1999 indicate that the PLAAF has been rotating J-7 and J-8
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aircraft from designated rapid reaction units in and out of
Fujian Province on 6-month rotations since the 1996 crisis,
in order to conduct area familiarization training. Furthermore, aircraft from Fujian Province have been deploying to
and from airbases outside Fujian during the same day,
providing them with the ability to move out of the area
rapidly if the need arose. In addition, all PLAAF pilots
within the Nanjing Military Region have been conducting
live air-to-air missile firing over water since 1996. These
aircraft have probably been designated as part of the
PLAAF’s rapid-reaction force for action against Taiwan.
One would expect these aircraft to be deployed to the
area en masse if the PLAAF were going to attack Taiwan.
For example, during the 1979 border conflict with Vietnam,
the PLAAF deployed almost 20,000 aviation, SAM and AAA
troops and 700 aircraft to the border area opposite Vietnam
over a 45-day period leading up to the start of the conflict.
Yet none of these aircraft engaged in any activity across the
border so as not to escalate the conflict based on the tacit
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rules-of-engagement (ROE) for both sides at the time.
There is always the possibility of an accidental shoot
down occurring, but there is a low probability, unless it is
pre-planned. The reason for this is that each side has
established unilateral ROEs. For example, Taiwan’s Air
Force is under the guidance to “neither avoid the
Communist planes nor provoke them. The order to attack an
intruder must come from Taiwan’s Chief of the General
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Staff.” On the mainland side, the PLAAF probably has
specific ROEs as well. For example, during the 1958 Strait
Crisis, the PRC’s Central Military Commission established
the following three ROEs: (1) the Air Force could not enter
the high seas to conduct operations; (2) if the Nationalist Air
Force did not bomb the mainland, the PLAAF could not
bomb Quemoy and Matsu; and, (3) the Air Force was not
allowed to attack the U.S. military, but could defend against
115
any U.S. aircraft entering Chinese territory.
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The current aerial cat and mouse game over the Strait
actually helps each side prepare for potential conflict, while
at the same time helping to avoid conflict. Each side has the
opportunity to determine how long it takes for the other side
to scramble its aircraft upon detection of an intruder, to
reach a specific spot over the Strait, and to determine what
altitude and speed these aircraft conduct their missions.
Each side can also test the limits by intruding into the
other’s airspace to see what type of a reaction they get. They
also have the opportunity to employ their air intercept radar
to detect, track, monitor and shadow opposing aircraft,
significantly enhancing their confidence in their defensive
capability. Concurrently, these defensive reactions against
the probes by intruder aircraft demonstrate and reinforce a
vigilant air defense posture to the opposing force.
These types of exercises also afford each side the
opportunity to coordinate their flight activity with the
ground-based air defense systems, including their radar,
antiaircraft artillery, and surface-to-air missile units. For
example, one of the biggest problems the PLAAF, and the
PLA as a whole, will face if China engages in a conflict with
Taiwan is coordination between aircraft and ground-based
air defense forces. Ever since the Korean War, the PLA Air
Force and Army have had to agree on some basic ROEs, so
that the Army’s and PLAAF’s AAA and SAMs do not shoot
down the PLAAF’s aircraft. This is even further complicated
if they must also coordinate with the Navy.
Today, the primary means of coordination between
PLAAF aircraft and ground-based air defense units is
airspace differentiation. The PLA’s air defense system
relies heavily on airspace control measures and procedural
control (essentially flying air corridors, adhering to strict
altitudes and in-area time limits, or speed controls).
Although most, if not all of the PLAAF’s aircraft have some
type of an identification friend or foe (IFF) system, the best
method for coordinating aircraft movement with the ground
forces or a ground controller is through the use of a secure
and reliable electronic identification (EID), which utilizes a
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reliable IFF or other means. Moreover, it is not clear
whether the older J-6 and J-7 aircraft have adequate
navigation equipment (inertial navigation system/INS is
desirable because it is an on-board system) to maintain a
reasonable adherence to air corridors during flights over
water. The FB-7 has an INS and doppler navigation, and
most likely has TACAN. The PLAAF recognizes these
weaknesses and recent PLA news reports have highlighted
the PLAAF’s efforts to conduct training over water for their
pilots.
In the situation over the Taiwan Strait, just because an
aircraft “locks on” to another aircraft with its radar, does not
necessarily mean that it is going to fire a missile. Most pilots
or ground controllers do not have the authority to fire a
missile unless told to do so by much higher authority. In this
case, the intruder will most likely have already peeled off
and returned to his airspace. This time provides the
opportunity for each side to take a deep breath and cool
down. In the current situation, I would say that the
probability of an accidental firing is fairly minimal.
If war does break out, there will be more than just
aircraft involved. The mainland will most likely begin the
attack on Taiwan with ballistic missiles in order to degrade
Taiwan’s command and control capability, as well as to try
to destroy aircraft on the ground before they can take off.
Although PLA writers have advocated a quick strike on
Taiwan to achieve victory within 2 weeks so that the United
States cannot come to Taiwan’s aid, this is easier said than
done. There will be definite political, as well as military
signals, coming from the mainland that should provide
enough time for all parties, including the United States, to
try to achieve some type of political settlement and/or
pre-position military resources in the region before war
breaks out.
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Conclusion.
There is no simple description of the PLAAF’s
operational capabilities. The PLAAF is in the process of
modernizing, but it still has a long way to go. Parts of the
PLAAF are clearly obsolete, yet other parts have the most
modern, sophisticated aircraft, SAMs, and software. The
key to the PLAAF’s modernization is integrating all of the
different components, including its branches and new and
old weapon systems, into a single operational unit within
the PLAAF and with the rest of the PLA as a whole. As one
China watcher recently stated, “It is not just a matter of the
glass being half empty or half full, because the glass is
getting bigger.”
During discussions of the PLAAF, a former U.S. Air
Force Chief of Staff identified the following questions that
he would want to know about China’s airpower:
•What is their battle doctrine?
•Is their organizational direction defensive or offensive?
•Which classic air missions do they cover effectively—
air defense, counter-air, conventional strike?
•What is their basic employment concept for these air
missions—manned aircraft, ground or air launched
missiles?
•What kind of support packages do they have—defense
suppression, air escort, tanker support?
•What kind of power projection capability does their
equipment represent—range, payload?
•How modern is the capability—precision guided
weapons, battlespace surveillance?
•What is their equipment and personnel readiness
status?
•What size, duration, and location of operations can they
sustain with logistics support?
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As discussed in this chapter, the PLAAF clearly comes up
lacking in most of these categories. However, during
interviews in Japan, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and India,
defense officials repeatedly said that the United States
cannot just look at the PLAAF through Western eyes.
Everyone in these countries agreed that the PLAAF is not
necessarily capable of sustained combat today, but it is
moving in the direction of a more modern offensive force
over the next 15 to 20 years. Each of these countries is
looking carefully at China’s intentions and taking the
long-term view of China’s potential capabilities.
At the same time, however, it is my opinion based on
interviews in the region that most of the countries
surrounding China do not have a thorough understanding
of the PLAAF. For example, other than Taiwan and Japan,
there are very few assets or analysts dedicated to just the
PLAAF. The majority of the countries in Asia have only one
military attaché in Beijing, most of whom do not speak
Chinese, and who concentrate primarily on the macro-level
PLA strategic issues, rather than on operational
capabilities. In addition, most of the countries in Asia focus
only on the PLAAF forces in their immediate border region,
rather than on the PLAAF as a whole. They also tend to
focus on hardware issues only (i.e., how many Su-27s does
China have), rather than on the software issues.
The PLAAF is still primarily a defensive force, but,
through the acquisition of systems with longer ranges and
more lethal bombs and missiles, it is moving gradually
toward having an offensive capability. Although the PLAAF
is acquiring some systems to support the air defense
mission, such as refueling, ECM, and airborne early
warning platforms, it will be several years before these
systems can be fully integrated into the force, and even
then, only in limited numbers. The PLAAF still lacks
precision guided munitions and a battlespace surveillance
capability, but China is working on these capabilities. The
PLAAF is beginning to train its forces in mobile operations,
but is still hindered by institutional, organizational, and
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equipment limitations that hinder mobile operations.
Furthermore, the PLAAF is not yet capable of round-theclock or sustained operations.
There is little doubt that what the PLAAF has done over
the past decade is impressive. The Air Force has acquired
limited numbers of Russia’s most sophisticated weapon
systems, but still must rely on Russia for long-term logistics
support. The PLAAF will continue to rely on imported
weapons systems to modernize its force, but is moving
toward developing and producing better domestic engines,
avionics, and missiles. Air combat training has become
more realistic, including more live air-to-air missile launch
training, but the pilots still lack sufficient flying hours due
to engine and airframe limitations. While the PLAAF’s Blue
Force aggressor program has obviously been successful, it
has pointed out even more starkly the limitations of aircraft
like the J-6, J-7, and J-8.
With the acquisition of several Russian Il-76 transports,
the PLAAF’s 15th Airborne Army has been able to train in
more locations around China, but the focus is still on use for
domestic situations rather than situations outside China’s
borders.
Although Commander Liu Shunyao states that the
PLAAF has the capability to support ground and naval
operations, the Air Force’s ability to do this is questionable.
The PLA as a whole is just beginning to address joint
operations and logistics. Very little information is available
in open source material about PLAAF support for the
PLAN, which would entail joint exercises and some type of
joint command and control structure. As for supporting the
ground forces, the PLAAF has consistently stated that it
cannot provide direct support for the ground forces. Nothing
has occurred over the past decade to change this philosophy.
Su-30 will not replace the A-5. While the Su-30 will replace
the B-5 in the interdiction and deep strike mission, there are
not ready replacements for the A-5, whose mission is
battlefield interdiction and ground attack.
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While the PLAAF can look proudly at its accomplishments in equipment acquisition and training over the past
decade, the bulk of the aviation force still consists of aging
J-6, J-7, and J-8 interceptors, only some of which have an
all-weather capability. China’s aviation industry is working
toward designing and producing a modern aircraft to meet
the PLAAF’s needs in 15 years, but will still need foreign
assistance from Russia and Israel along the way. Therefore,
the PLAAF will still be relying on Russian support for the
near term. Once China’s next generation of domestically
produced aircraft, such as the J-10, improved FB-7, and
XXJ, are operationally deployed, we will have a better
understanding of how far China’s aviation industry has
come.
The PLAAF will continue to analyze its needs and
implement changes as it can, but there will also continue to
be resource and system limitations that will hinder the
PLAAF’s overall modernization drive and operational
capabilities. China will eventually have to face the fact that
there are limitations on how many foreign aircraft it can
buy. If the PLAAF is going to replace its current fleet of
aircraft, it will have to rely on China’s aviation industry to
provide much of the necessary components or the Air Force
will not be able to afford it. The PLAAF simply cannot afford
to continue purchasing Russian aircraft at $35-40 million
apiece, plus rely on the Russian supply line. Finally, the
PLAAF’s leadership must also accept aircraft losses as part
of a more vigorous, realistic training program.
In closing, a clear distinction must be made between the
PLAAF’s capabilities and intentions. Even if the PLAAF is
not the most modern force, the PLAAF’s leaders will salute
smartly and use every means available to achieve victory if
the CMC tasks them to go into battle.
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CHAPTER 7
THE KOSOVO WAR:
IMPLICATIONS FOR TAIWAN
Arthur Waldron
Kosovo will not be remembered as one of NATO’s signal
successes. That is bad news, for the long-standing People’s
Republic of China (PRC) plans to use force in a similar
manner to bring Taiwan under Beijing’s control. Nearly a
year after North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
sorties ceased, the Serbian government of Slobodan
Milosevic remains in power, and the situation on the ground
in Kosovo is as volatile as ever. More troops may be sent
there, but no solution is in sight.
The lessons of NATO’s Kosovo campaign, both
diplomatic and military, throw into doubt the fundamental
strategy that Beijing has long employed against Taiwan.
The strategy is pure realpolitik of the type familiar during
most of the 20th century. Diplomatically, the goal was to
isolate and delegitimize the island globally by securing
recognition of China’s absolute sovereignty from the leading
powers, and to pressure the government in Taipei with the
assistance of the United States, in particular. Held in
reserve was a military threat, including nuclear weapons,
not only against the people of the island, but also against
any country that might have considered aiding it. Until
recently, this strategy worked quite well.
But, as Beijing realizes, the Kosovo campaign throws
these calculations into question. From the diplomatic point
of view, Kosovo suggests that the concept of absolute
sovereignty is weakening. No one doubted, after all, that
Kosovo was part of Serbia. Increasingly, it seems, as a
Canadian diplomat put it, “Sovereignty is no excuse for
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1

human rights abuses.” As for the military, the prospect
that a few well-placed missiles might bring Taipei to heel
faded dramatically when the flurry of Tomahawk missiles
U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright hoped would
nudge Milosevic to talks had no such effect. Instead, there
ensued an inconclusive 78-day bombing campaign, in which
the full might of NATO, stronger by any measure than
China, was hard put to dominate little Serbia and its
dictators’ dictator—a smaller and far weaker target, by any
measure, than democratic Taiwan.
Not surprisingly, the rhetoric from Beijing became
almost frantic as the story unfolded. The attack published
in the People’s Daily of June 22, 1999, perhaps takes the
prize—its (unfavorable) comparison of the United States to
Hitler is as scurrilous as anything to come out of Beijing
since the Korean War:
. . . Hitler not only used in war what were considered to be the
most advanced weapons of the time, such as airplanes, tanks,
and long-range artillery, to massacre peaceful citizens in
anti-fascist countries, but also built concentration camps in
Auschwitz and in other areas to slaughter Jews and prisoners of
war with “advanced” technology. Executioners drove hundreds
and thousands of people into gas chambers and poured cyanide
through air holes in the roof, killing them all. Today, the U.S.
hegemonists use high-tech weapons to attack the FRY’s
[Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] civilian facilities, several
hundred miles away from the battlefield or with laser and global
positioning system several thousand meters in the sky, treating
innocent and peaceful citizens as live targets. The flagrant use
of missiles by the U.S.-led NATO to attack the Chinese embassy
in Yugoslavia was a barbaric atrocity that the then Nazi
Germany had not dared to commit.2

But Beijing’s response has been confused: praising
Milosevic (but not really helping him, even in the U.N.),
attempting a speedy reconciliation with Russia (which, like
China, has no desire to alienate the West), adding thick
layers of theatricality and menace to quite justified
indignation at the mistaken U.S. bombing of the Chinese
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embassy, playing hard to get over World Trade
Organization (WTO) accession, and other issues.
China senses that Kosovo is an indication of how
thoroughly the post-Cold War world is failing to fulfill her
hopes. Given that China draws strength from effective
operations in the international environment, this poses a
serious problem—and one to which there is no solution in
the current framework of Chinese strategic thinking.
Diplomacy.
China is deeply concerned by the way the international
law of sovereignty, on which Chinese governments
throughout this century have staked so much, is beginning
to incorporate troublesome notions such as self-determination and human rights.
The first line of defense is to deny that human rights
abuses exist. “Remarks and reports on Yugoslavia’s
so-called ‘ethnic cleansing’ have different interpretations,”
3
said Zhu Bangzao, foreign ministry spokesman. The West
has been spouting “misleading and demagogic propaganda
about the FRY’s ‘ethnic cleansing’ and ‘oppression of human
rights’ in Kosovo.” The International Court of Justice has
even declared Milosevic a war criminal and “openly
appealed to the FRY people to overthrow the FRY
government”—and, as final twist of the knife, threatened to
withhold financial aid from Serbia until Milosevic is
4
replaced. But acknowledgment of the truth had appeared
as early as April 20, 1999, in the China Economic Times: “on
the road to exile, the Serbs believe everything is permitted.
They are raping women, killing and robbing refugees, no
5
one can stop them”—it quoted a refugee as saying.
China today engages in appalling repression against its
own people, minorities included, and threatens the same to
Taiwan, all under the rubric of sovereignty. But if Kosovo is
a precedent, the world community could conceivably
condemn Beijing for this. They might even indict some
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Chinese officials, or call upon the Chinese people to
overthrow their designated leaders—or (perhaps the most
realistic worry)—refuse money (as they are refusing it for
the Three Gorges Dam) out of some cockamamie concept of
freedom.
The prospect is particularly worrying because,
throughout this century, China, when weak, has drawn
strength from international law, which it has attempted to
use to unify itself. Thus in the 1920s, the provisions of the
Washington treaties were distorted into a foreign guarantee
of Chinese unity. In the 1930s, international law was used
powerfully against Japan, and since the 1970s, China has
used the U.N. and its legal structures to stifle and isolate
Taiwan, just as Taiwan used them against China until it left
the organization in 1971. China in the past has used
international law to leverage its own claims. Now that legal
system is starting to be used to leverage other sorts of
claims.
Most important here are “so-called ‘democracy’ and
‘human rights’” and the advocacy of “fighting for values
[instead of territory]” to which “the United States and its
allies now give wide publicity.” This is directed against
socialist countries as well as developing countries that are
not socialist but that do not obey the United States.
Moreover, the United States uses “common values” as a
6
bonding agent for consolidating its relations with its allies.
We have an odd blend here. Note the reaffirmation of
socialism, jarring in a China that is supposed to be
reforming. And the sense that the socialist camp is
beleaguered. But there is also an odd sort of caricature
“realism” here, odd given the ideological definitions also
used. Countries are supposed to fight over territory and
resources, not “values” (though socialism is presumably a
value). And there is a recognition that, despite all the
rhetoric about U.S. military power being the source of its
hegemony, actually “common values” have something to do
with it.
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The threat, moreover, is spreading. The U.N. used to be a
reliable bastion for third world dictators and communists,
but now a lot of democrats have turned up there, so much so
that the U.N. itself ended up endorsing the Kosovo
operation. And the “heads of NATO countries have even
claimed that if the United Nations does not allow itself to be
manipulated, they will separately form a so-called ‘Alliance
of Democratic Countries’”—in which China presumably
7
would not even have a seat, let alone a veto.
The U.N. used to insist on absolute sovereignty and
noninterference, as a series of declarations in 1949 and 1965
made clear. Now it is abandoning that. On June 10, 1999,
the Security Council passed a resolution legitimizing the
bombing campaign and the occupation of Kosovo—and
China only abstained. Rhetoric, obviously, and pretty poor
at that—but not without a kernel of truth, which is that the
post-Cold War world has developed in a way entirely
different from what China expected, and that is most
unwelcome. China expected NATO to dissolve, to be
replaced by a series of power centers—Europe, Russia,
Japan, and so forth—among which China could work its
usual diplomatic stratagems of ever shifting orientations.
But instead, NATO not only survived, it expanded—and it
found as its new mission something to do with human
rights. Its ambitions became global. Conquest of the
“strategically important Balkans” (strategically important
for what?) would permit NATO to move east, “eventually
gaining control of the whole Europe, including Russia.”
That Western pincer would be matched by the Alliance with
its “important accomplice, Japan” and culminate in
8
dominating the world.
This led to the position taken by China early in the
conflict that Serbia was the “red fortress of Europe,” waving
the red flag heroically against the “so-called ‘Western
democratic community’;” Milosevic was a doughty worker’s
hero, a “second Tito,” and “A man of iron who does not bend
to the West, and a folk hero who can make his nation follow
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him with a single call or raise of an arm” (better than Jiang
9
Zemin?) —characterizations that were sadly disappointing.
But in practical terms, China did very little to help the
Serbs. Pro-Serbian rallies in Beijing were halted, and when
it came to the crunch in the U.N., the dreaded Chinese veto
shrank into an abstention. “The Chinese are ready to defend
10
Serbia down to the last Russian,” one diplomat observed.
Implications for Taiwan.
In Switzerland, Jiang Zemin referred to NATO’s actions
as “new gunboat policy,” and the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) issued internal circulars on the “hegemonic acts” of
the United States in the Balkans. Revising the so-called
pro-U.S. foreign policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping, senior
Politburo members drew comparisons between Kosovo on
one hand, and Taiwan and Tibet on the other, in closed-door
sessions.
If U.S.-led foreign powers could wantonly interfere in
Yugoslavia in support of a pro-independence movement, the
precedent could conceivably be used one day with reference to
Taiwan, Tibet or Xinjiang.11

The intervention demonstrated that in the world today,
moral and humanitarian considerations favoring
self-determination and opposing terror and ethnic
cleansing clearly trump old-fashioned absolute sovereignty
of the sort that China claims over, say, Tibet (where it has
certainly committed appalling atrocities) or Taiwan.
This suggests that Taiwan’s claims to democratic
legitimacy will have an impact even on a world that has
largely acquiesced in China’s claims of sovereignty, to the
extent that China could scarcely expect support from
anyone if it were actually to attack Taiwan, while many
states would cooperate with the few who might actively
support the island.
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In other words, even given sovereignty, a military
solution would be sufficiently unwelcome to the rest of the
world that it might not work at all or, even if it did, be
accepted. We see signs of this sort of attitude in the
international reaction to Taipei’s “liang guo lun” [two states
theory] of Republic of China (ROC)-PRC relations—i.e., like
the former two Germanys, they are two states within one
nation. Condemnation has come from China, predictably
enough, from the U.S. State Department, and from some
American China watchers. But the fact that Taiwan is a
democracy enters into it increasingly, as in a letter to the
New York Times:
. . . you correctly point out that the Taiwanese exercise
democracy; on the other hand you fail to consider the
possibility that President Lee Teng-hui’s proclamation of a
“state-to-state” relationship to China reflects longtime public
opinion in Taiwan.12

This can only be worrying to China. In the past, Beijing
has managed to avoid condemnation on the grounds of
human rights by blurring the issues, baiting foreigners with
the prospect of financial gain, and issuing threats. It was on
the latter that China seemed to move most actively after the
Kosovo war. But here again, the lessons were not
encouraging.
The Use of Force.
Force would seem to have become a more attractive
option for China’s leaders in the years since the Tiananmen
Massacre and Deng Xiaoping’s incapacitation and death.
Deng was strong enough at home to recognize China’s
weakness abroad and to understand that her true long-term
interests would be served by peace and economic
development. This did not stop him from promoting nuclear
and missile programs, or even from invading sovereign
Vietnam, but it did give him immunity to the appeal of
xenophobia, nationalism, and the “splendid little war” as
tools of domestic statecraft.
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His successors are quite different. They are weak and
divided at home. They could seek legitimacy through reform
but understand that would mean abolishing their own jobs.
So, not surprisingly perhaps, they have turned to
nationalistic slogans at home and saber rattling abroad.
One lesson of Kosovo (and of the collapse of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics) is that, according to Wang
Yizhou of the World Economics and Politics Research
Institute, “We cannot be soft-hearted or tolerant toward any
separatist groups, including those in Tibet, Taiwan, and
13
Xinjiang.”
Undergirding this has been an assessment of the
international community and of the utility of force. Until
recently, the Chinese view has been that the post-Cold War
international community was resolving itself into a group of
competing blocs, among which China could play its games of
triangulation. Until recently as well, the Chinese view has
been that ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons could form
the foundation of a military force that would almost
guarantee a form of hegemony in Asia.
These two big facts would permit the regime to notch up
some important achievements in the years ahead. Taiwan
would be intimidated into settling or be conquered; Japan
would be nobbled militarily and forced to acknowledge
Chinese primacy; and Korea would become a close friend,
the South China Sea a Chinese lake, and the United States
a presence offstage somewhere around Hawaii. Kosovo
turned all these calculations upside down.
The PRC government faces a plate full of problems, of
which Taiwan is rather minor. (Indeed, given all the money
Taiwan pours into China and the market it provides, an
independent Taiwan is actually a net plus). A “splendid
little war” with Taiwan might look like just the ticket to
soothe some of these problems, by diverting attention away
from the undemocratic system, the corrupt leadership, and
so forth, toward foreign issues. But as will be seen, such a
war would be neither splendid nor little.
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In this respect, if China launched such an attack on
Taiwan, it would be in a similar position to NATO, where
most of its people cared not at all about what was going on in
Kosovo. That fact meant that NATO had to fight a very safe
war and ask for no sacrifices. Its leadership was moreover
undermined by President Clinton’s well-known evasion of
military service. Had Milosevic been able to follow-up on his
successful downing of an F-117 plane or inflict other
dramatic damage on NATO, the Alliance would most likely
have called off the war.
The same sort of dynamic would apply in China. The
levels of pilot and other losses one can reasonably
anticipate, not to mention some strong counterstrikes from
Taiwan, would probably convince most Chinese that the
island was not worth the bones of a single “Shandong Hao
Han.” Furthermore, as happened in NATO, as soon as a
Taiwan crisis protracted, political authority would be
stretched to the limit, all the more so because in China there
are no legitimating mechanisms for authority. A quick
victory would win laurels for the central government, but
setbacks would translate into defections of all sorts: local
leaders would tilt away and withhold funds; political rivals
would make hay; and insurgents in Xinjiang might try
something. The whole Chinese dominance hierarchy could
begin to collapse into anarchy. (War would have the
opposite effect in Taiwan, where public opinion would be
solidified).
Remember there is an asymmetry in interests. China
has NO vital interest in Taiwan: the island poses no threat
whatsoever to her, unless we consider the example of
democracy to be a threat to a dictatorial regime, and that is
not a military threat. Far more serious challenges to China’s
military position are posed currently by India’s accelerating
development of nuclear forces and a blue water navy, and
South Korea’s growing submarine force and increasing
numbers of missiles, and in the future by a possible Russian
turn against China and Japan’s shift to military great
power status (which looks likely to be accelerated by current
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Chinese moves). To be sure, the current Beijing leadership
places great emphasis on Taiwan as terra irredenta, part of
the motherland not yet redeemed (though it makes no such
claims on Mongolia (whose independence China
recognizes), even though Mongolia is arguably at least as
important strategically and was part of the Qing Chinese
empire far longer than was Taiwan. Without dismissing the
national unification concerns entirely, it can perhaps be
noted that neither Mao nor Deng, both nationalists, were
anywhere near so insistent as is the current leadership.
Indeed, one may suspect that the rather weak Jiang Zemin
leadership sees truculence over Taiwan as a way to rally
nationalistic opinion and—who knows?—possibly even
persuade the United States to lean even harder on Taipei to
come to terms. And surely they understand that a war over
Taiwan would be popular only if it was easy and succeeded
quickly. To expend substantial blood and treasure there
would be unpopular. Abandonment of such a venture, by
contrast, would cost little and be accepted easily. Taiwan,
however, would have no less than a SURVIVAL interest:
defeat would mean enslavement and loss of independent
existence. What a Finnish student once remarked at the
Naval War College also applies to Taiwan: “Our country
does not have the concept of limited war.”
In this respect, the issue of force against Taiwan is for
Jiang Zemin not unlike what the issue of force against
Kosovo was for Clinton. Arguably, Clinton’s lack of military
experience and consequent need to prove himself made him
more likely to use force against Kosovo, particularly after
NATO painted itself into a corner over the negotiations.
Neither Mao nor Deng had any such need to prove
themselves, but Jiang, who lacks any military experience
but relies on the military as the ultimate prop of his rule,
may feel one. Like Clinton, however, he will be attracted
only to what looks to be an easy, short, and relatively
bloodless conflict. Some in the Chinese military speak of
winning a war over Taiwan in 24 hours (the plan for Kosovo
was 48). Hence all the more reason for Beijing, above all, to
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take note of what really happened: how badly the war went
compared to expectations, and how much damage it did to
the credibility of both NATO leaders and forces.
The Allied Operation.
Although it would be stretching things to call the Kosovo
operation a success, what the Chinese saw operationally
was undoubtedly troubling. By Chinese standards the
Serbian military is by no means obsolete, yet it proved
powerless to interfere with the allied air campaign, not to
mention incapable of striking back against their attackers
in any way. True, things might have been different had
NATO moved in on the ground, attacking entrenched
positions, but that proved unnecessary.
The U.S. Army would probably have proved too “heavy”
to be brought into the operation, had that been necessary.
But the new weapons that will form the core of the U.S.
military in a decade’s time, moreover, did very well. The
problem was not enough of them. Boeing’s Joint Direct
Attack Munitions (JDAM), Raytheon’s AGM-154 Joint
Standoff Weapon (JSOW), and the Lockheed Martin Joint
Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)—all so-called
“smart weapons”—did well enough that Pentagon planners
intend to give them a primary role in U.S. forces. The B-2A
14
Spirit also performed unexpectedly well.
One problem was the NATO shortage of so-called “low
quantity—high utilization” weapons, such as the Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWACS), Joint Surveillance
Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and U.S. Navy and
U.S. Marine Corps EA-6B Prowler jamming aircraft.
Compared to China, NATO’s order of battle contains large
numbers of these elements, but scarcely enough to deal with
the challenges posed by little Serbia even with units pulled
in from all over the globe, including Asia. Even so, rather
rudimentary Serb deception proved highly effective.
Alliance pilots may have destroyed far fewer tanks, for
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example, than previously thought, because so many of the
15
targets were decoys and were also difficult to hit.
What would all this mean for a potential Taiwan
operation? The island would be an incomparably tougher
target than was Serbia. NATO has far greater electronic
warfare capabilities than China, and the Republic of China
(Taiwan) countermeasures are far better than what Serbia
possesses. Yet NATO was unable to completely suppress its
adversary. That bodes ill for any Chinese operation.
Furthermore, Serbia had no ability to strike NATO
bases and anti-aircraft capabilities that are far inferior to
the ROC. Yet the Serbian air threat environment was
sufficient to force NATO aircraft to fly too high for optimal
operations. What NATO was unable to do against Serbia in
78 days, China is unlikely to be able to do against Taiwan.
Second, the style of military intervention that China
increasingly envisions proved highly ineffective in the
Kosovo war, even when carried out by NATO’s experts and
against a state far smaller and weaker and isolated than is
Taiwan.
Secretary of State Albright, it will be recalled, sought in
the Kosovo case to nudge Milosevic back to the negotiating
table at Rambouillet by means of a whiff of Tomahawk
missiles. These were of course duly fired, but, instead of
scurrying back to France, Milosevic sat tight, and the NATO
campaign grew steadily for 77 days, until more than 600
aircraft were involved. A great deal of damage was
done—but still, Milosevic yielded only when he was offered
far better terms than the Rambouillet deal.
This experience merely confirms again what we have
learned repeatedly from World War II to Vietnam to the
Gulf War—bombing alone is not enough to win, let alone
win quickly. This is particularly true when conventional
warheads are used: they are relatively weak compared to
the cost of the missiles. Hitler’s V-2s were a technological
marvel, but they no effect on Britain.
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If we apply the Balkan parallel almost exactly to the
Taiwan Strait, the scenario would be something like this.
China and Taiwan reach an impasse in negotiations, and
Taiwan goes home. PRC warns and then begins firing
missiles at the island. After 78 days, PRC then backs down
and compromises with Taiwan.
That would be bad enough given the Tiananmen Square
standard for obedience that still prevails in China. But even
that outcome is unlikely. For as Clausewitz reminds us, in
warfare, reaction is correlated to action—not in fixed
mathematical fashion as in physics, but rather “actively,”
which is to say, unpredictably.
China could not deliver the kind of sustained
punishment to Taiwan that NATO did to Yugoslavia and,
furthermore, even if no other states intervened, Taiwan
would be unlikely simply to accept 77 days of pounding as
Yugoslavia did. It would react by striking back at China
with great destructiveness.
Defense.
NATO was unable to effectively cripple even
Yugoslavia’s relatively simple air defenses; for a much
weaker China to destroy the air defenses of a much stronger
Taiwan would be far more difficult. Certainly large
numbers of pilots would be lost, and, even then, victory
would be most uncertain. The same is true for maritime
operations.
The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) only
intensifies this reality. A first-hand observer reports that
damage by NATO’s precision guided munitions to Yugoslav
targets was comparable in many cases to what could only
have been achieved by nuclear weapons in the past—yet
almost without collateral damage. Key nodes of every sort
were effectively disabled at relatively low cost.
Waging an offensive like NATO’s requires large and
vulnerable bases, logistical trains, communications, and so
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forth. Had Yugoslavia possessed some cruise missile and
other RMA sorts of capabilities, it could have wreaked havoc
on NATO bases in Italy and elsewhere.
Massing troops and aircraft for an operation against
Taiwan would be a protracted and difficult business that
could be crippled by precision strikes against transportation
and other infrastructure. What was intended to be a
lightning strike could bog down and protract. A worst case
for the PRC would be a repeat of the Guningtou battle that
destroyed a Chinese expeditionary force attacking Jinmen
16
in October 1949.
The difference being that, whereas 50
years ago the PRC forces were trapped on the beaches of
Jinmen and annihilated by ground fire after their landing
craft had all been sunk, in this scenario the expeditionary
forces trapped in Fujian Province would be cut off from the
rest of China and then destroyed from the air.
Theater Missile Defense.
China wants great-power-style influence, but it cannot
afford great-power-style forces, nor is it willing to adopt the
cooperative diplomatic norms that give the United States or
Great Britain their real influence. So it has fixed on ballistic
missiles and nuclear weapons as shortcuts to such
influence, massively investing in such systems. The
problem is that, even in the best of times, the ballistic
missile with nuclear warhead is useful chiefly as a
deterrent, to keep someone else from attacking you, rather
than as an instrument of coercion—given that the threat to
drop atomic bombs on someone with whom you simply
disagree seems far too risky to be at all plausible.
Those limitations are now compounded by two others.
First is that of countervailing moves and retaliation. The
sort of missile and precision guided munitions threat being
discussed here is not Taiwan-specific. It potentially
threatens any state within China’s range, and such states
will behave accordingly. It is hard to imagine that Japan,
Korea, Taiwan, and other states will simply stand by as
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China deploys its DF-31s. They will certainly speed up
development of their own missile forces.
Add to this is the dawning U.S. recognition that missile
defense is essential, and progress is being made in, for
example, the Navy theater-wide system. This system could
be deployed on ships to threatened areas and destroy a
respectable percentage of missiles in flight. That fact would
greatly reduce both the psychological and the military
impact of a missile barrage. Not surprisingly, PRC opposes
it. But the lesson of Kosovo is that you need such a system,
otherwise you are naked to your adversary, and this lesson
is not lost on the other Asian states. China’s renewed
threats early in 2000 to use missiles only remind the region
of the threat, and make defensive action even more likely.
Collateral Aspects.
Even in the Yugoslav case where civilian deaths were
relatively limited, NATO public opinion was deeply
troubled by innocent deaths. In a Taiwan Strait scenario,
collateral damage would be far greater and also better
documented. PRC would be attacking a Taiwan full of local
and foreign journalists, as well as diplomatic representatives from all over the world, most of them deeply
sympathetic (as was not the case in Belgrade) with the
plight of the locals, whatever their governments might
think. Large amounts of foreign property and investment
would also be at stake. A great deal would be covered in real
time by CNN and other such outlets. Not only would this be
a public relations disaster for China, it would almost
certainly move the rest of the world to act—as it did in
Yugoslavia—for humanitarian reasons, in spite of the
considerations of sovereignty. This would be particularly
true if the conflict became protracted. The likelihood of such
protraction, underlined by the Kosovo experience, is
perhaps the single most worrying aspect of the whole thing
for China.
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Financial markets would also be harmed. It goes without
saying that Taiwan would suffer severe losses, but so, too,
would China. When President Lee gave his July 1999
interview regarding statehood, Taipei markets fell—but so
did Hong Kong’s and Shanghai’s, and the same happened in
early 2000 when Beijing again turned up the temperature.
China’s economy is already on a downward trajectory and
needs all the foreign investment it can get. Hostilities
around Taiwan would almost certainly stop the flow—not
only from Taiwan itself, but also from Japan and Europe,
and probably from Hong Kong as well, because, as markets
there fell and trade stopped, few would be in the mood to
invest.
Furthermore, and this should be stressed, a Kosovostyle attack on Taiwan would undoubtedly close U.S.
markets completely to Chinese exports. Nothing from
China would be permitted into the country. Given China’s
great dependence on foreign sales and foreign currency, this
would be a disaster.
International Aspects.
If one envisions a PRC attack on Taiwan as looking like
Kosovo, then it is hard to imagine any way that the rest of
the world would stay out. We are talking about the heart of
maritime Asia, as well as major sea-lanes, where billions of
dollars of commerce pass daily. The immediate pressure
would be on China to stop—and once stopped, the Chinese
attack, like the NATO bombing, would be difficult to restart.
Having initiated war and then been forced to back down,
China would be in a weaker negotiating position than at the
outset. An attack on Taiwan would click the lock on a circle
of alliances that would effectively contain China, with
Japan almost certainly joining.
What of the doomsday scenarios: Chinese nuclear
threats against Japan or the United States, cruise missile
attacks on U.S. carriers, neutron bomb “ethnic cleansing” of

270

Taiwan that would leave the valuable infrastructure intact
to be inhabited by a new, more tractable population?
War does, of course, bring disaster. But disasters come
from desperation, not calculation, and the operation we are
hypothesizing would be, like Secretary Albright’s war,
intended to be strictly limited. When such a limited
operation failed in Kosovo, NATO escalated, but against an
adversary that was itself incapable of escalating and that
had no ally willing to run the risk on its behalf. To escalate
against Taiwan, however, would invite desperate
retaliation from the island, while to attack U.S. forces would
guarantee a U.S. response.
The states most likely to use weapons of mass
destruction are not the great powers who stand to lose a
great deal in any war, but rather those countries or regimes
for whom defeat can mean destruction or collapse—Israel,
North Korea, Iraq, Pakistan, and so forth—to which one
could add Taiwan and South Korea, were they nuclear
powers. RMA, however, may render nuclear explosions
obsolete, given the kind of damage that new-style
conventional weapons can do.
Taiwan in particular is developing non-nuclear weapons
systems that can nevertheless do substantial damage to
China. Given the political weakness of the Chinese regime
and the need it would have for a quick and costless victory,
the complications such weapons would introduce could well
undo the entire strategy—even if the rest of the world did
nothing.
Chinese Responses.
China should have learned a great deal about its own
diplomatic and military weakness in the course of the
Kosovo war. Traditional Chinese strategy stresses splitting
alliances and playing one power off against another. But in
spite of Chinese efforts to lobby “soft” NATO countries such
as Italy, the Western alliance stayed united to the end of the
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campaign. Nor did the hope China placed on Russia
materialize. Moscow stood aside even though it could very
easily have disrupted NATO’s plans. Finally, the rest of the
world, as represented in the United Nations, proved a weak
reed for China as well. On May 13, 1999, China failed to get
17
the Security Council to “deplore” the bombing. These
results must have been disappointing, given the stress
China lays on her influence in international institutions
and the power of her veto.
Rhetoric at the time suggested that frustration over
failed diplomacy turned into anti-Americanism in China.
The United States emerged as the spider spinning the web
in which China itself feels increasingly entangled—a web of
economic dependence, of international norms, and
increasingly of sanctions, utterly at odds with the Chinese
government’s policies—though perhaps not unwelcome by a
lot of China’s people. But almost a year later another
explanation is also beginning to emerge. This is that the
debate over Kosovo fits into and exacerbates an already
existing struggle within the Chinese government in which
domestic hard-liners such as Jiang Zemin are increasingly
positioning themselves beside the international hard-liners
in the military to attempt to master the ever more volatile
domestic situation.
Certainly some of the rhetoric sounded as if it was
intended for domestic political consumption, not for
analytical purposes. One article predicted that NATO
would spread into Asia, and that “the first Asian state to join
NATO could be Taiwan” to be followed by Xinjiang, at the
18
urging of Turkey. But who can doubt that the Turks of
Xinjiang are increasingly restive, well-armed, and in touch
with the rest of the Islamic and Turkish world of Central
Asia, and that Chinese attempts to woo Kazakhstan have
not proved entirely successful? The problem is a real one,
and at the moment Beijing has no answer for it except
threats and repression—which failed in the past when the
Turks were weaker, the Chinese stronger, and the
international community in the dark.
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Likewise with Taiwan. It probably will not join NATO.
But if one were asked to choose the more probable course of
events, given China’s escalating threats: do the United
States and Japan cut Taiwan off and force it to sign on the
dotted line? Or do they gradually increase their ties,
providing key diplomatic support and missile defense—
with the effect of frustrating China’s efforts—then I think
the second is far more likely, as China understands.
The problem with Tibet is similar. It cannot be
suppressed. The Chinese plan to choose and educate the
next Dalai Lama was unworkable even before the current
Dalai Lama dispatched it by stating that he would not be
reincarnated as a Tibetan under Chinese control. The
kidnapping by China of the Panchen Lama and the flight to
India of the Karmapa Lama further underline the
impossibility of Chinese plans. India is less strong militarily
than China but also less overextended, and its presence to
the south and sympathy for Tibet guarantees that this issue
will not disappear.
Nor can China be certain that the United States might
attempt to coerce China as it did Kosovo with hightechnology weaponry. North Korea certainly fears that it
may be a target. Pyongyang watched the war far more
closely than it did the Gulf War, and has evidently
expressed fear to Beijing that it could be the next
19
Yugoslavia—and it could be.
In fact, Western use of force against China proper would
probably be as ineffective as the Kosovo operation and a
good deal messier. China is not good at force projection, and
not only because she lacks the hardware. Force projection
goes against traditional approaches to war, which lay stress
on using the opponent’s own weight to bring him down.
Western force can halt Chinese attacks outward anywhere
in Asia—but it cannot bring Beijing to terms. If it did not
escalate to the nuclear level, a possibility not to be excluded,
a Kosovo-style operation against China would most likely
simply go on and on, as China absorbed the punishment and
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occasionally struck back, hoping to get lucky one day and
kill enough Americans to force an agonizing reappraisal on
Washington. That was how China dealt with Japan half a
century ago.
Still the question arises for Beijing, Pyongyang, and the
others of how the United States is to be kept out? Nuclear
threats seem one possibility. Wang Xiaodong, author of a
recent article on nationalism and democracy, believes that
building precision weapons (as some in the PLA
undoubtedly want) makes no sense. He says:
We must strengthen our nuclear capability . . . We need much
more weapons of mass destruction which can reach cities in
North America. It is important to remember that the key
difference between China and Serbia . . . is that we have the
nuclear bomb.20

That sounds plausible until one considers that the Soviet
Union had many more bombs than the United States, and
that didn’t save it. Furthermore, the sort of buildup of
nuclear weapons in which China is currently involved will
certainly elicit a countervailing response, even if not
immediately. Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and other
Asian countries will join India in the recognition that only
their own deterrent can ultimately deter a threatening
China. American attempts to discourage them from
developing such capabilities will only make the situation
worse. But an Asia containing several nuclear powers with
advanced missiles and other forces comparable to what
China is developing now can only hurt China’s interests.
The United States operates with other powers by allying
with them. China at present seems to prefer to threaten
them.
Conclusion.
The trends that have so worried China look likely to
continue. Democratization is a risky process, but it proceeds
apace in Asia, where Indonesia most recently has chosen
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that pathway—and not coincidentally, granted
independence to East Timor, a major step toward ending
conflict and restoring peace in the area. In China itself,
problems are now of such complexity that it is hard to
imagine the autocratic government will be able to deal with
them. Few of these problems have anything to do with
foreign policy: the genuinely big issues in China involve
such things as unemployment, environmental degradation,
the need for law and democracy, and the rights of citizens.
Nor can the government any longer simply pretend, as it did
in the past, to have solved these problems. Penetration of
international news and the rising educational level have
decisively undermined the effectiveness of central
propaganda. Meanwhile the willingness of hundreds of
members of the China Democratic Party to go to prison
rather than recant, and the continued failure of Beijing’s
much-ballyhooed campaign to “crush” the Falun Gong
organization, further demonstrate the steady erosion of the
center’s power. Xinjiang shows no sign of calming down
despite a massive military presence, and Tibet is similarly
deadlocked. These problems show how the great currents of
contemporary history are affecting China. Nor is military
might an answer. It cannot solve domestic problems, and, as
Kosovo shows, it is almost equally helpless against external
problems.
Beijing continues to talk about a decisive conquest of
Taiwan by means of missiles and smart bombs, so rapid that
Washington would have no time to act even if it chose to. But
the reality, as China must realize, is that such an onslaught
would be indecisive and quickly escalate.
Kosovo shows just how appealing such fantasies
continue to be to states that should know better. That force
is rarely as effective as hoped for and often escalates out of
control is a lesson that Europe and the United States should
have learned in the 20th century. Far better that China
should learn it by studying Kosovo than by experimenting
with Taiwan.
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CHAPTER 8
CHINA’S MARITIME STRATEGY
Bernard D. Cole
Introduction.
The Asia-Pacific is an overwhelmingly maritime region,
defined by the Pacific and Indian Oceans; and by the Yellow,
East China, and South China Seas, which border the nation
for which they are named. The state of maritime strategic
thought in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) today, and
the likely development of that thought over the course of the
next decade, are open questions. Their answer requires,
first, a review of the geo-political context facing Chinese
maritime strategists. Second, a discussion of the
development of maritime strategy in the PRC will be
followed by a brief review of specific maritime strategic
missions and capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN). Finally, future prospects for the navy’s
strategic role will be surveyed.
In 1953, Mao Zedong wrote “we must build a strong navy
for the purpose of fighting against imperialist aggression.”
In 1979, Deng Xiaoping called for “a strong navy with
modern combat capability,” and in 1997, Jiang Zemin urged
1
the navy to “build up the nation’s maritime Great Wall.”
China is clearly expanding and modernizing its navy, about
to celebrate its fiftieth year, by focusing both on the
hardware and strategy required for a modern fleet.
The PRC has not been reluctant to use military force,
including warships, to resolve international disputes—
2
more than 16 times, in fact, since 1949. A major goal of
China’s naval modernization is to change the PLAN from a
coastal, “brown-water” force to an open ocean “blue water”
3
force. “Blue water” is part of a maritime strategy paradigm
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that includes “brown” and “green” water. Brown water
refers to littoral ocean areas, within about 100 nautical
4
miles (nm) of the coastline; green water is less definite,
referring to ocean areas from about 100 nm to the next
significant land formation. For China, green water extends
from brown water to Okinawa or from brown water
throughout the South China Sea (SCS). “Blue water” is
represented by General Liu Huaqing’s “second island
chain,” delineated by a line from Japan through the Bonin
Islands, the Mariana Islands, and the Caroline Islands. A
“blue-water” PLAN, then, will have to be capable of
controlling events to a distance of at least 1,500 nm from
China’s coast, including the Yellow, East China, and South
China Seas.
The classic maritime strategic phrase for such control is
“Command of the Sea,” most simply defined as the ability to
use the sea while denying its use to an adversary. “Sea
Control” is a lesser but nonetheless powerful concept,
defined as a nation’s ability to “command” a discrete ocean
area for a limited period of time—sufficient to achieve
limited strategic goals.
The counterpoint to sea control is “Sea Denial”: denying
an adversary use of a discrete maritime area without using
it oneself. All of these concepts require a nation to be
effective in the air, as well as on and beneath the ocean
surface. Sea denial in littoral waters is a particularly
attractive and inexpensive option for even a small naval
power, if it has access to mines, missiles, small surface ships
5
and submarines, and shore-based aircraft—as does China.
China is learning that modern navies are technologydependent and resource-intensive; they cannot be built (or
6
even bought) quickly. Indeed, as the noted British
strategist Julian Corbett implied, “modern naval strategy
may be the application of professional experience to the
7
solution of technical problems.”
Several factors influence modern naval strategy
making. These include:
280

1. Training and education programs; professional
specialization of the officer corps;
2. naval systems and platforms costs, capabilities, and
sustainability;
3. the national scientific and industrial infrastructure
for research, development, and production of naval warfare
technology and systems;
4. the ability to derive doctrine and tactics;
5. the ability to administer, operate, and command and
control tactical units beyond individual ships;
6. sources of intelligence, and its production, analysis,
and dissemination;
7. service-wide naval strategic planning;
8. national naval leadership; and,
9. the place held by naval strategists in the national
8
strategy-making structure.
We will return to these points to evaluate China’s
development of a maritime strategy.
Maritime strategy should reflect Colin Gray’s dictum
that “man lives on the land, not on the sea, and conflict at
sea has strategic meaning only with reference to what its
outcome enables, or implies, for the course of events on
9
land.” Gray cautions, however, that in all the history of
war, “the enemy who is confined to a land strategy is in the
10
end defeated.” China historically has viewed the sea as an
invasion route by foreign aggressors, rather than as a
medium for achieving national goals. This attitude appears
to have changed during the past decade and a half, as
China’s view of post-Cold War East Asia has focused on
off-shore sovereignty, economic, and resource issues.
Adopting a maritime strategy requires naval leadership
with a strong voice in the always-contentious national and
military resource allocation process. Also relevant is the
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recent development in maritime strategy, epitomized by
U.S. adoption of the “From the Sea . . .” Series of strategy
documents, that sea control, per se, while still important, is
being matched in significance by the ability to project naval
power ashore, to directly affect events on the land. This
development will heighten, not lessen, the importance of sea
power.
Strategy, Politics, and Geography.
China historically has been a continental rather than a
maritime power, despite possessing over 11,000 miles of
coastline and more than 6,000 islands. China has only
episodically built and employed a strong navy, most
recently over a century ago, during the late 19th century
“Self-Strengthening Movement.”
The Chinese currently view the international security
situation in Asia as peaceful but dangerous. President Jiang
Zemin was recently quoted as stating that the world “is
moving deeper towards . . . . the relaxation of the
international situation and world peace,” but that “the Cold
War mentality still lingers on as hegemonism and power
politics manifest themselves . . . . New forms of ‘gunboat
11
policy’ are rampant.”
From Beijing’s point of view, U.S. naval dominance in
East Asia seems assured in the near term. In the longer
term, however, the American presence is unclear and Japan
is a military threat. The maritime environment also directly
impacts China’s most serious resource problems: energy
12
and food, both of which depend on the sea.
Since the U.S.-led NATO war against Serbia, the
Chinese press has been marked by strong condemnation of
the “new gunboat policy” the United States is accused of
pursuing, “under the cover of . . . so-called security
13
globalization,” a plan “to dominate the world.” In the
Asia-Pacific region, the United States is charged with using
the new defense agreement with Japan and theater missile
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defense (TMD) “to prepare the ground for future military
intervention,” and with a “Eurasian strategy” to position
the United States for a “one superpower-dominated ‘U.S.
14
century’.”
China insists it is a developing country still facing
15
injustice and unfair treatment on the international scene.
General Zhang Wannian, Vice-Chairman of the Central
Military Commission (CMC), reportedly has stated that
China is “threatened by hegemonism and power politics, by
militarism, and by foreign military intervention in Taiwan.
16
. . . [We] must absolutely not lower our guard.” He accuses
the United States of seeking the collapse of the Beijing
regime during a “full-fledged civil war,” as a result of which
17
China “will disintegrate.”
This is a strategic picture of China besieged by a hostile
world in which the United States pushes the west and a
militaristic Japan to contain China and prevent it from
attaining its rightful stature as a world power. What
maritime strategy will serve China’s national security
concerns—especially in view of U.S. determination to place
18
“humanitarian rights” above national boundaries?
The Navy and China’s Defense Modernization.
The current Chinese campaign to modernize its military
follows the “sea change” in strategic thinking that occurred
in 1985, when expectations of global nuclear war or
large-scale conflict with the Soviet Union gave way to a
focus on small, local wars on China’s periphery. The local,
limited wars envisioned include (1) small-scale conflicts in
disputed border areas; (2) conflicts over disputed islands or
ocean areas; (3) surprise air attacks; (4) deliberate
incursions into China; and (5) counterattacks by China
against an aggressor or “to uphold justice and dispel
19
threats.”
This was an extremely important shift for Chinese
maritime strategic thought. It moved the navy from army
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acolyte to prominent participant in possible operational
scenarios, including threats from Japan, Taiwan, India, and
contentious maritime claims.
Following this strategic change, China reduced the
number of military personnel, but to increase rather than
decrease military power, as the nation seeks to fund
state-of-the-art technology at the cost of low-skilled ground
troops. The PLAN particularly benefits from this
phenomenon, since compared to much army equipment, the
systems required by naval forces are technologically
intense, require long periods of research and development,
and demand operating personnel who are intellectually
capable and the product of extensive training. Furthermore,
advanced naval systems require large investments in
maintenance and logistical support.
The PLAN was also able to continue older programs,
including the development of nuclear-powered submarines
and the expansion of aviation forces to gain control of the air
over ocean areas. The marine corps, first formed in 1954 but
disestablished in 1957, was reorganized in 1980 for additional amphibious assault capability.
The Evolution of Maritime Strategy in China.
China has always focused on continental security
concerns, but has not ignored its maritime boundaries.
Witness the early 15th century voyages of Zheng He to the
east coast of Africa and the Persian Gulf. These cruises
represented a standard of Chinese shipbuilding, voyage
management, and navigation ability well beyond European
capabilities. Zheng He led a large fleet of ships, the largest
displacing over 400 tons, half-way around the world at a
time when Portuguese explorers were still feeling their way
down the west coast of Africa in 50-ton caravels.
The Ming rulers deliberately ended these voyages for
domestic financial and policy reasons, just at the time when
the European nations were seizing upon them as a means to
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achieve economic wealth and to proselytize. By the late 18th
century, the Europeans were the maritime powers of the
20
world, and China their victim.
China under much of the Qing Dynasty was an Asian
maritime power, in terms of oceanic trade and fishing, but
did not build a navy capable of defending the nation against
maritime interlopers. Late 19th century efforts to correct
this shortcoming lacked both a coherent strategic rationale
and adequate support from the national government; the
nascent Chinese fleet came to grief in defeats by France in
1884 and Japan in 1895.
The regimes of the first half of the 20th century
developed a navy almost entirely through seizing former
Qing warships or obtaining them from foreign nations. No
distinct maritime strategy was developed.
The Early Years: 1949-1954. The communist victory in
1949 was an army victory; there was no navy arm of the
PLA. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) did believe,
however, that China’s 19th and 20th century humiliation
had been greatly facilitated by the imperialists’ ability to
invade from the sea. The new government in Beijing
understood the need to defend its coastline and island
territories, and considered itself threatened by two
would-be aggressors: the truncated Kuomintang (KMT)
regime that had fled to Taiwan, and the United States.
The PLA was unable to project power across even the
relatively narrow (90-110 nm) Taiwan Strait in 1949 to
complete the defeat of the KMT forces. Although expelled
from the mainland, Chiang Kai-shek still possessed a navy
effective enough to stop the PLA at the water’s edge. Hence,
the new Chinese regime in 1949 immediately moved to
create a navy to continue the fight against Chiang’s forces
and to defend the nation against “imperialist aggression
21
from the sea.” A new Chinese navy was also needed to
establish law and order on coastal and riverine waters, to
combat the KMT blockade, to help the army capture the
off-shore islands still occupied by the KMT, and to prepare
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for the capture of Taiwan. The “East China Navy” was
organized in 1949, and the PLAN was officially established
22
in May 1950.
The Taiwan government continued to conduct hostile
operations against the mainland, raiding coastal
installations, landing agents, attacking mainland
merchant craft and fishing vessels, and threatening
invasion on a larger scale. China needed a defensive navy,
one that would be relatively inexpensive to build, and could
23
be quickly manned and trained.
The new PLAN, established with Soviet assistance and
guidance, consisted for the most part of small patrol craft
suitable to combat the coastal threat from Taiwan. The
Soviet military assistance obtained by Mao Zedong during
his 1949-50 visit to Moscow included naval equipment and
advisors, who instilled the Soviet “Young School” of
maritime strategy. The Young School, developed in the
Soviet Union shortly after World War I, was based on
conditions particular to post-revolutionary Russia:
1. a new regime that was under military and political
attack by several capitalist countries and had not
completely quelled domestic fighting;
2. furthermore, a regime that expected to be besieged and
attacked by capitalist nations, with amphibious invasion a
current fact and future threat, especially from “the ultimate
24
bastion of imperialism, the United States.”
3. a navy that was in disarray;
4. budgetary shortages that limited the amount
available to spend on expensive naval systems;
5. lack of an industrial infrastructure to indigenously
produce modern naval armaments; and,
6. a maritime frontier that was hemmed in by
adversarial fleets and bases.

286

These conditions applied to China in 1949, as well, as did
the additional problems of no recent maritime tradition or
trained naval force.
The Soviet Union sent an initial cadre of 500 naval
advisors to China in 1950, which grew to between 1,500 and
2,000 by 1953. These advisors paralleled the Chinese
chain-of-command from Beijing headquarters to individual
ships and squadrons, thus inculcating Soviet naval doctrine
in the new navy. “Large numbers” of Chinese officers,
including the new head of the PLAN, General Xiao
25
Jingguang, received training in the Soviet Union. Soviet
assistance included four old submarines, two destroyers,
and a large number of patrol boats. This unimpressive force
also included about 10 corvettes, 40 ex-U.S. landing craft,
and several dozen miscellaneous river gunboats, mine26
sweepers, and yard craft, all seized from the Nationalists.
A large shore-based infrastructure, including shipyards,
naval colleges, and extensive coastal fortifications, was also
27
built with Soviet help. The high point of the cooperative
period with the Soviets was the February 1959 “New
Technology Agreement,” which provided for the sale to
China of additional conventionally powered submarines,
28
torpedo boats, and missile boats. Although its maritime
strategy in the early 1950s was primarily defensive, Beijing
worked to develop the offensive capability to recover the
many offshore islands still occupied by the KMT, which was
29
to culminate in the conquest of Taiwan in August 1950.
When President Harry Truman ordered the U.S.
Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait in June 1950 at the
outset of the Korean War, he explained America’s reentry
into the Chinese civil war as a means of preventing either
side from attacking the other. Actually, he was committing
the United States to the defense of Taiwan—after having
30
refused to do so for many months.
President Dwight Eisenhower announced in February
1953 that the U.S. fleet would no longer interfere in the
strait, thus in theory “unleashing” Nationalist forces on
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Taiwan to attack China. In December 1953, Mao Zedong
assigned the PLAN three priority missions: (1) eliminate
KMT naval interference and ensure safe navigation; (2)
prepare to recover Taiwan; and (3) oppose aggression from
the sea.
The Chinese and Taiwanese forces resumed amphibious
attacks and counter-attacks, which ended in Chinese
possession of all the significant offshore islands except
Quemoy, Matsu, and, of course, Taiwan. The PLA also
succeeded in stopping most of the attacks on merchant and
fishing vessels, as well as the Taiwanese raids on the
mainland. The PLAN had been organized, sent to sea, and
proven effective as a Soviet-style coastal defense force,
while adhering to the rubric of “People’s War.”
The Years of 1955-1959. The Korean War experience
must have presented mixed lessons to the Chinese Navy.
The amphibious landing at Inchon in September 1950 was a
major turning point of the war, while allied command of the
sea allowed free employment of aircraft carriers and
battleships to bombard Chinese and North Korean forces. It
was not significantly a maritime conflict, however, and the
PLA may have thought in 1954 it had demonstrated the
ability to campaign successfully without maritime support.
Beijing thought the American invasion threat could be
countered by relatively short-range defensive sea forces; no
ocean-going Chinese navy was planned after 1954. During
the latter part of the decade, after China’s commanders had
witnessed first hand in Korea the effects of modern
weaponry, and had been threatened with nuclear warfare,
some PLA leaders wanted to modify Mao’s theory of
“People’s War” to one of “People’s War Under Modern
Conditions.” Their ability to build a PLA on this principle,
however, was limited by the necessity to continue
conforming to Maoist ideology.
The heart of China’s national security strategy
continued to be one of “active defense”: the enemy would be
lured inside China’s borders while the nation mobilized. A
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strategic offensive would then be launched to drive the
invader from China. The navy tried to modernize, with an
emphasis on technology and technical training, while
adhering to a brown water defensive strategy.
Attempts in the 1950s to develop a specific and perhaps
independent strategic role for the PLA fell victim to the
triumph of politics over technology. One prominent victim
was Minister of Defense Marshal Peng Dehuai, who
stressed the importance of scientific and technological
progress and supposedly opined, with respect to the navy,
31
that “People’s War and such stuff are outdated [at sea].”
Throughout the ideological turmoil of the late 1950s and the
1960s, Beijing did invest heavily in a determined effort to
develop nuclear weapons, missiles, and the nuclear32
powered submarines from which they could be launched.
A New Situation: 1960-1976. By 1960, the PLAN was
considerably larger than in 1955, but it had made limited
strides towards modernization. The force centered around
eight ex-Soviet destroyers, two dozen old Soviet submarines, and a motley collection of foreign-built patrol boats,
landing craft, and yard craft. The only vessels built in China
33
were some of the patrol boats.
The 1960s were marked by major foreign and domestic
events that further constrained Chinese interest in
developing a sea-going navy and attendant strategy. Most
important was the split with the Soviet Union, signaled
during Nikita Krushchev’s October 1959 meeting with Mao
Zedong in Beijing, and dramatically executed in mid-1960,
when Krushchev withdrew Soviet advisors (and their plans)
from China. Beijing’s massive civilian and military
development projects were left in turmoil. Other significant
events in the early 1960s included war with India, the
reemerging Vietnam conflict, turmoil in the newly emerging
African states, and would-be revolutionary movements
throughout Southeast Asia.
These factors continued to limit PLAN modernization in
the 1960s. Marshal Lin Biao, as minister of defense,
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attempted to follow a policy of technological development
with “politics in command.” The decade ended, however,
with Lin coming down solidly on the side of “politics,”
34
writing “long live the victory of people’s war.”
The massive Soviet threat and the PLA’s lack of mobility
drove China’s national security strategy: very large ground
forces were needed. Mao’s concept of People’s War remained
the guidance for the small navy as well as the other
branches of the PLA, as did continued adherence to the
Young School—modified by the development of nuclear35
powered ballistic missile submarines.
America’s involvement in Vietnam and Taiwan’s failure
to act on the rhetoric of invading the mainland meant that
36
China faced no overseas threat. By the end of the decade,
however, relations with the Soviet Union had deteriorated
to the point of armed conflict along the Amur River. The
former ally was now the enemy. Soon the erstwhile enemy,
the United States, would be China’s strategic ally.
Internally, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
(GPCR) made impossible any shift from Maoist theology;
hence, the navy continued to follow a strategy of coastal
defense. This meant serving as an extension of the army,
with little modernization: People’s War held that
technology and weaponry were insignificant compared to
the effect of revolutionary soldiers imbued with Mao’s
ideology. In May 1975, however, at a meeting of the CMC,
Mao Zedong reportedly directed the development of a
37
modern navy.
The GPCR seriously hampered
technological development, even in the relatively
sacrosanct missile, submarine, and nuclear weapon
development programs. PLAN development was probably
retarded by a decade or more, because of the program
restrictions and personnel losses that resulted from the
political maelstrom.
Even at the end of the GPCR, PLAN modernization was
hamstrung by the “Gang of Four.” Mao’s widow, Jiang Qing,
led the attack on naval missile development. Another
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member, Zhang Chunqiao, expressed the Gang’s anti-navy
38
position and support for the “continentalist view.” By
1970, however, the PLAN had moved into the missile age,
deploying a Soviet-designed ballistic missile submarine and
39
10 Soviet-built patrol boats armed with cruise missiles.
After the GPCR. As the 1970s progressed PLAN strategic
missions still fell under the Young School: assistance to the
army; off-shore patrol against criminal activities such as
smuggling, piracy, and illegal immigration; life-saving; and
safety of navigation. Beijing also perceived its ancient
antagonist, Japan, reemerging as a military force to be
reckoned with.
Meanwhile, the Soviet Navy in the 1960s and 1970s had
undergone a dramatic change under the leadership of
Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, partly from the impetus of the
Cuban Missile Crisis’s demonstration of Soviet maritime
weakness. Under Gorshkov’s guidance, the Soviets
attempted to build a worldwide fleet to match that of the
United States. This fleet’s missions in time of war were:
1. defense of off-shore areas; countering an adversary’s
strategic strike systems;
2. sea control in Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) Submarine
operating areas;
3. strategic nuclear strike;
4. disrupting an adversary’s sea lines of communications
(SLOCs); and,
5. protecting friendly SLOCs.
Gorshkov’s maritime strategy also included specific
peacetime tasks: (1) showing the flag; (2) gaining
international respect; (3) supporting economic interests; (4)
managing crises; (5) limiting an adversary’s options; (6)
exercising local sea control; and, (7) use in local wars. 40
A similar naval revolution did not occur in China in the
1960s or 1970s, but when the Soviet Union demonstrated its
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new global naval power in the 1975 Okean exercises, Beijing
strategists moved the Soviets to the top of the list of China’s
maritime threats. The strategy of People’s War was deemed
insufficient. Maritime strategic thought was reinvigorated,
as Chinese planners thought about extending naval power
beyond the immediate coastal arena against potential
Soviet actions.
Concern about Soviet aggression rose in concert with
continued determination to ensure the viability of Beijing’s
territorial claims throughout East Asia. Taiwan was the
most important of these, but China also had claims in the
East and South China Seas. In 1974 a brief but effective
action against South Vietnamese naval forces in the SCS
resulted in Chinese possession of the disputed Paracel
Islands.
Beijing ended the 1970s without a clear maritime
strategy. Fear of the Soviet Union provided impetus to the
development of a seaborne nuclear deterrent force, with
Mao declaring that the navy had to be built up “to make it
41
dreadful to the enemy.” The PLAN for the first time was
led by Chinese-built warships: Luda-class guided-missile
destroyers, frigates, and fast attack missile boats. The
submarine force included the first Chinese-built
nuclear-powered attack submarine, as well as about 60
conventionally powered boats. The 1970s saw the
deployment of the first PLAN that was primarily
Chinese-built, although still heavily dependent on Soviet
42
designs.
At the end of the decade, however, Deng Xiaoping
reemphasized the navy’s role as a coastal defense force, a
view retained throughout the first half of the 1980s. At that
point, the navy came to be viewed as something more than
an adjunct to the ground forces. Maritime power was
emerging as an important instrument of national security
strategy.
PLAN expansion and modernization were spurred by
the coastal concentration of China’s burgeoning economy
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and many military facilities. Furthermore, the resources
necessary for a modernized PLAN became available as a
result of China’s dramatic economic development and
increasing wealth. The navy’s strategy began developing
beyond coastal defense.
China’s widening maritime interests and increased
budget resources after 1979 did give rise to increased
interest in a strong navy of large modern warships, similar
to that championed by Gorshkov. If built, the new force
would have to be capable of projecting power throughout the
area Beijing considered important to its national
security—all of East Asia—and to execute the post-1985
strategic rationale from massive continental war to regional
wars on China’s periphery.
Liu Huaqing’s Vision. The chief architect of China’s
emerging maritime strategy in the 1980s was General Liu
Huaqing, commander of the PLAN from 1982 to 1987 and
then Vice-Chairman of the CMC to September 1997. Liu
advanced a maritime strategy designed to address China’s
national security concerns, and one that would thrive in the
43
army-dominated PLA.
Liu wanted to change the PLAN’s national mission from
coastal defense to “offshore active defense.” This strategy
was described as including: (1) stubborn defense near the
shore; (2) mobile warfare at sea; and, (3) surprise
44
guerrilla-like attacks at sea. He delineated two strategic
maritime areas the nation should be capable of controlling.
The first of these, under Stage One of Liu’s strategy,
includes the Yellow Sea, facing Korea and Japan; the
western East China Sea (ECS), including Taiwan; and the
45
SCS. These fall within China’s defined area of vital
national interests: territorial claims, natural resources, and
coastal defense. The area is also delineated by the “first
island chain,” a line north to south from the Aleutians
through the Kuriles, Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the
Philippines, and Indonesia. The goal for establishing
Chinese control of this maritime area was 2000 .
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The second strategic maritime area, under Stage Two of
Liu’s strategy, is delineated by the “second island chain,”a
north-south line from the Kuriles through Japan, the
Bonins, the Marianas, and the Carolines, and would mean
Beijing’s control of all of East Asia’s vast ocean areas,
46
nominally by 2020. China’s ability to control this area
would demand very significant national resources for its
navy and air force. It would also require, first, that the
United States withdraw its military presence from the
region. Second, Japan would have to sit idly by in the face of
U.S. withdrawal, and not engage in a maritime and
aerospace arms race.
Ironically, defining “stages” of maritime theaters by
fixed geographic boundaries reveals a strong continentalist
perspective, even in the mind of China’s most prominent
post-1949 admiral. It violates the argument of western
maritime strategists that while the soldier thinks of terrain
and theaters, the sailor of necessity thinks in wider terms,
outside immediate physical limits—there is no “terrain” at
47
sea.
The third stage of Liu’s maritime strategy describes the
PLAN as a global force by 2050. A step towards this goal
occurred in the spring of 1997, when within a 3-month
period China deployed multi-ship task groups composed of
warships and logistics support vessels, one to Southeast
Asia and a second to North, Central, and South America.
This was the widest-ranging Chinese naval deployment
since the voyages of Zheng He and was a significant
accomplishment.
Scenarios. Liu’s strategy outlines a possible direction for
future modernization and growth. It delineates control of
vast oceanic expanses; however, a very difficult task simply
by virtue of the geography, not to mention other nations that
would object to Chinese hegemony over such a large portion
of the earth’s surface. Of course, the PLAN is currently
incapable of executing its missions within even the “First
Island Chain,” although the target year will soon be here.
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Recent deployments to the Western Hemisphere were just
an initial step; there currently is no hard evidence that
China’s national leadership has decided to shift its budget
priorities to the extent necessary for realization of Liu
48
Huaqing’s Phase II by 2020.
Liu Huaqing is no fool and one suspects that this
three-phase strategic progression was designed primarily
for domestic consumption, to win resources for the PLAN.
Liu would have been following a path not unlike that
pursued by naval expansionists in turn-of-the-century
America and Germany as they built modern navies in
conjunction with their nations’ rapidly expanding
economies. Liu directed study and elaboration of his
strategic concepts, which emphasized naval missions well
to seaward of the coastal zone that has formed the basis for
49
past PRC maritime strategy. PLAN modernization is not
viable without a well-articulated offshore mission,
supporting China as the strongest maritime power in East
Asia and as a major power in the Pacific.
The PLAN has not been tasked with all of the “new”
Soviet maritime strategic objectives of the 1970s. It has no
“FBM operating areas” to control, for instance, and its
“strategic nuclear strike” capability is almost non-existent—
but both of these missions will require support if China
succeeds in building and deploying three or more new (Type
50
094) ballistic missile submarines.
The PLAN has, however, adopted peacetime strategic
missions almost identical to those outlined by Gorshkov—
who cited the American threat as his basic justification for a
strong navy. Writing in 1975, he accused the United States
of following an “oceanic strategy” of aggression against the
51
Soviet Union. Chinese strategists today use similar words;
the Soviet-Russian maritime strategic influence remains
52
strong in China’s navy.
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Maritime Strategic Interests.
Jiang Zemin has been quoted as pledging the PLAN “to
safeguard the sovereignty of China’s territorial waters,
uphold the country’s unity and social stability and create a
safe and stable environment for the nation’s economic
53
development.” The PLAN’s primary mission is defense of
the homeland, a formidable task, given China’s long sea
frontier from Korea south to the Indochinese Peninsula.
This great maritime sweep is marked by major offshore
island chains from Japan to the Philippines, New Guinea,
and Indonesia, as well as by numerous lesser islands.
The PLAN’s ambition to play a central national security
role is evidenced in the 1991 statement by then PLAN
vice-chief, Vice Admiral Cheng Mingshang, that the navy is
the tool of the state’s foreign policy . . . . an international navy
can project its presence far away from home. It can even appear
at the sea close to the coastal lines of the target countries . . . .
This has made the navy the most active strategic force in
peacetime, a pillar for the country’s foreign policy and the
embodiment of the country’s will and power.54

Economic justification for a strong Chinese navy rests on
the concentration of modern economic interests and growth
in the special development zones clustered along China’s
seaboard. 5 5 Seabed minerals, especially potential
petroleum deposits in the SCS, are also important, and
there is evidence of significant deposits elsewhere on the
continental shelf, including around the Diaoyutai between
Taiwan and Okinawa, also claimed by Japan as the
Senkaku Islands.
China’s most urgent international security
concerns—Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the South China Sea—lie
to seaward and have a strong maritime flavor. The national
civilian and military leadership must decide how to allocate
defense resources among the various services to deal best
with these concerns—and the associated maritime
sovereignty issues.
296

Additional missions for the Chinese Navy include
anti-smuggling, anti-piracy, fisheries protection, and
56
defense of SLOCs. This last mission is supported by the
fact that as much as 50 percent of China’s economy depends
on foreign trade, about 90 percent of which is transported in
maritime shipping. China’s large and growing merchant
57
fleet calls at over 600 ports in more than 150 countries.
Northeast Asia. China’s North Sea Fleet is responsible
for the area from the Korean Border (the Yalu River) to
about 35°-10’N, corresponding to Shenyang, Beijing, and
Jinan Military Regions. Its primary bases are at Yuchi,
Chengshan, Weihai, Huludao, Lushun, and its
headquarters, Qingdao. Its force structure includes two
submarine, three escort, one mine warfare, and one
58
amphibious squadrons.
This fleet faces a complex
maritime situation: three other Northeast Asian
nations—Russia, South Korea, and Japan—already possess
capable navies, although Russia’s fleet is only a shadow of
its former self.
Korea is particularly sensitive because North Korea may
be armed with nuclear weapons. Beijing’s relationship with
the peninsula is also complicated by the ethnic Korean
population in China’s northeastern provinces.
Japan is not as pressing an issue, but in terms of China’s
national strategic concerns looms very large on the horizon
of the next century. Ancient disputes and rancor combined
with World War II grievances and suspicion of future
Japanese aggression create an edgy relationship. It is
inherently a maritime relationship, given the seas that lie
between the two nations act as a natural barrier to any but
seaborne or airborne interaction.
Taiwan. Taiwan of course is the essence of Beijing’s
strategic concerns. Despite concern about the United
States, China refuses to renounce the use of military force to
ensure the reunification of Taiwan. Beijing must count on
the PLAN for policy options ranging from intimidation to
59
outright invasion.
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The East Sea Fleet presumably has local planning
responsibility for contingency operations involving Taiwan.
This fleet is responsible for the area from about 35 °-10’N to
23°-30’N, which corresponds to the Nanjing Military
Region. In addition to its headquarters at Ningbo, it has
bases at Shanghai, Wusong, Dinghai, Hangzhou, Xiamen,
and Xiangshan. Its forces include two submarine, two
escort, one mine warfare, and one amphibious squadrons. It
no doubt would be able to call on the resources of the entire
60
PLAN, in the event of a crisis.
The South China Sea. The SCS is also a maritime issue
for Beijing. This relatively small but contiguous oceanic
area embodies important economic and political strategic
issues. These include rich fisheries; possible large
petroleum, natural gas, and manganese reserves; vital
SLOCS; and the issue of national pride, which drives
Beijing to a rigid policy of strategic primacy in those
61
waters.
Liu Huaqing, when head of the PLAN, noted his service’s
62
mission to secure the “vast resources” of the sea. In
February 1992, mid-way through his tenure as China’s
senior uniformed officer, the National People’s Congress
passed the Law of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zones,
which included essentially all of the SCS as sovereign
Chinese territory, ocean as well as land areas.
The PLAN’s South Sea Fleet, headquartered at
Zhanjiang, would have to enforce this law. It is responsible
for the area from about 23 °-30’N to the Vietnamese border,
corresponding roughly to the Guangzhou Military
Region—and includes the Paracel and Spratly Islands in
the South China Sea. The fleet has bases at Shantou,
Guangzhou, Haikou, Yulin, Beihai, Huangpu, as well as
Zhanjiang—and mans outposts on several SCS islands. Its
forces include two submarine, two escort, one mine warfare,
and one amphibious squadrons, as well as China’s Marine
63
brigade. The SCS has been described as comprising “more
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than two-thirds of China’s territorial waters of more than 3
64
million square kilometers.”
The PLAN has limited resources for projecting sustained
power throughout the SCS and China will likely continue its
present, dual strategic approach in the area. First, it is
65
pursuing discussions to resolve conflicting claims. Second,
however, is Beijing’s policy of establishing a presence on
disputed reefs and islets by building facilities ranging from
navigation markers to structures capable of housing
66
personnel and berthing small ships.
This policy of
“creeping assertiveness” is certainly working in the case of
the Philippines, as China builds military facilities on
Mischief Reef and other islets, while continuing diplomatic
67
talks with Manila.
India. Chinese strategic concerns about India include
the nuclear threat recently evidenced in the successful
testing of nuclear weapons and missiles capable of reaching
targets throughout much of China, the Sino-Indian border
dispute, and India’s location astride the Indian Ocean
SLOCs.
China may be establishing a maritime security presence
in Burma and nearby waters. Rationale for a PLAN
presence in these waters includes two maritime concerns
arising from China’s dependence on trade and imported
petroleum. First, it would position Beijing to influence the
vital SLOCs through the Indonesian straits. Second, an
unfriendly India, with its large, relatively modern navy,
could control the Indian Ocean’s SLOCs on which China
68
depends. China’s activities in Burma indicate a maritime
strategic goal of establishing a presence on the western
approaches to the SCS.
Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) . Continued
development of China’s economy into the 21st century
depends on reliable sources of electrical power—from fossil
fuel now and for the foreseeable future. The nation
currently imports up to 600,000 barrels of petroleum
69
products a day, an amount certain to grow. This imported
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petroleum, mostly from the Middle East, arrives over sea
lanes that pass through the Indian Ocean, and the South
and East China Seas. These routes also pass through
several geographic “choke points,” including the Luzon and
Taiwan Straits, the Strait of Malacca, and the Strait of
Hormuz.
China can project almost no naval control over these
choke points, except for the Taiwan narrows, but the PLAN
may be moving specifically to correct this deficiency, such as
the previously noted steps to emplace PLAN presence in the
western approaches to the SCS. Beijing believes a strong
PLAN is vital to resolving all these (and many other) issues
70
of national security concern.
A Blue-Water Navy?
The PLAN required to carry out Liu Huaqing’s strategy
would include task groups of missile-firing, powerprojection capable ships supported by nuclear-powered
71
submarines and tactical air power, but its strategy would
still assume a philosophical base not far from People’s War.
In other words, Liu and presumably the current generation
of senior PLAN strategists visualize a navy that is both
technologically advanced and politically dedicated, in a
Maoist sense—both “red” and “expert.” This will be difficult
to accomplish.
Liu’s strategy focuses on Taiwan, asserting China’s
claims to offshore territories and natural resources,
defending the homeland against invasion, strategic
72
deterrence, and coast guard-type activities. Strategy,
however, is a starting point of national security, not its
consummation.
The PLAN of the 1990s has grown in size and capability,
but in a haphazard fashion, with its leaders forced by
budgetary scarcity, a weak industrial infrastructure, and a
lack of time, to pursue various paths to modernity, including
building, purchasing, and reverse-engineering platforms
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and systems. Liu Huaqing has launched a modern maritime
strategy, but the PLAN is still far from the modern,
power-projecting force needed to carry it out.
Achieving the third stage of Liu Huaqing’s strategy—
global maritime power—would require China’s leaders to
adopt as a national goal construction of a very large navy
during the next 50 years. This maritime strategic objective,
if distant in accomplishment, or even chimerical, may still
serve the PLAN in domestic budget battles.
The navy is currently following three paths to modernization: buying, reverse engineering, and indigenously
73
producing new ships, aircraft, and weapons systems.
There are several reasons for these different paths. First,
domestic military and political concerns limit resources
available to the PLAN. Second is what history indicates will
74
be a fairly transitory friendship with Russia. Third is the
75
questionable health of the Chinese economy. Fourth,
China’s military-industrial infrastructure has far to go to
reach 21st century capabilities. Finally, naval planners face
China’s lack of maritime tradition: voyages half a millennia
ago do not constitute a useful heritage, when the
intervening centuries have been marked by introspective
nationalism.
Building a navy in this incoherent fashion significantly
increases the complexity of training, manning, and
maintaining the fleet. Just managing an effective parts
supply system for a fleet of many small ship classes is
difficult, as is outfitting and supporting it logistically.
Further, purchasing military equipment abroad is a
questionable option in the long term. First, nations rarely
sell their most capable front-line weapons to others.
Second, not every nation can produce such weapons, no
matter how well-intentioned. For instance, modern tactical
jet aircraft can be designed and produced by only very few
nations: the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France,
Sweden, and perhaps Japan. Modern SSN design and
manufacture lie within the capability of even fewer: the
301

76

United States, Russia, and perhaps France. Third, buying
a modern force takes investment that could otherwise be
devoted to building the indigenous infrastructure to do so,
which inherently limits a nation’s military potential.
PLAN Capabilities. With about 240,000 personnel, the
navy is by far the smallest of the PLA services: the army
numbers about 1.5 million and the air force approximately
470,000. Yet the PLAN commands perhaps one-third of the
military’s total budget. The navy has thus fared well within
the PLA, but has a large appetite. Modern naval systems
are technologically complex and expensive, and require
significant human as well as material resources. The army
will always be dominant in China’s military, but the navy’s
relatively strong status during current PLA-wide modernization efforts attests to Beijing’s concern about maritime
77
issues.
The head of the PLAN, Vice-Admiral Shi Yunsheng, has
attributed several features to China’s 21st century navy: (1)
an “’offshore defense’ strategy;” (2) “making the navy strong
with science and technology, narrowing the gap between it
and other military powers;” (3) “more advanced weapons,”
including “warships, submarines, fighters, missiles,
torpedoes, guns, and electronic equipment;” and, (4) trained
78
personnel and “more qualified people.” Notably absent
from this list is mention of logistics or sustainment—the
79
ability to keep a fleet at sea for an extended period of time;
but these goals illustrate the PLAN leader’s appreciation for
how far his force has to go to “improve its capacity to win a
war at sea.”
Doctrine. Defined in the United States as “fundamental
principles by which the military forces or elements thereof
guide their actions in support of national objectives [and
which] is authoritative but requires judgement in
80
application,” doctrine provides the crucial bridge between
strategic intent and operational effectiveness. Doctrine
presumably is driven by anticipated employment, pictured
in “illustrative scenarios” that in turn furnish military
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planners with schema to frame their planning for future
operations.
The United States figures as the bete noir in PLAN
scenarios, and determination of doctrine, as well as
operational planning, must be based on whether the U.S.
Navy and Air Force are likely to be involved. Chinese naval
strategists appear to understand the vast gulf in
81
capabilities between the PLAN and the U.S. Navy. As a
result, PLAN planners should be expected to try to seize the
initiative in an operational situation where the United
States might be a participant. They will focus on getting in
the first blow.
Did the PLAN “learn” lessons from Operation DESERT
STORM and again from Kosovo, where U.S. superiority in
military technology and operational power was graphically
demonstrated? If it did, the chief lesson may well be that
Chinese forces will for at least the next decade be incapable
of successful direct confrontation with American forces.
Instead, the PLAN will have to rely on speed/mobility,
flexibility, and preemption in a contest with the United
States. These are generalities, however, not operational
doctrine, which is linked directly to capabilities. Maritime
warfare is by nature multidimensional, a characteristic
becoming steadily more complex as information-age
developments are adapted for naval use. The PLAN is
aware of this increasing complexity, but has yet to
demonstrate the capability to operate in that environment.
Beijing is trying to create a modern navy capable of
carrying out a blue-water maritime strategy, but China’s
research and development still suffers from 50 years of
abrupt, violent political changes that rent the educational
and scientific fabric of the country. China currently is
capable of building new ships, but ships built in 1999 on a
1969 technological base are obsolete when their hulls first
hit the water. They are not necessarily ineffective, but must
be employed conservatively and imaginatively.
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Acquiring modern ships is relatively easy, if one’s
checkbook is big enough. But an effective navy requires
sophisticated maintenance, supply, and training capabilities that are expensive to develop, far more difficult to learn
and, even more importantly, to institutionalize as a naval
“way of life.” China has recently purchased naval weapons
and technology, especially from Russia, that demonstrate
Beijing’s determination to speed the pace of naval
82
modernization.
Post-GCPR naval expansion has emphasized moving
toward a blue-water navy to “respond to the needs of the
national strategy and the national defense strategy.” The
ships and systems emerging from that period are credited
with giving “China a significant main naval fighting force”
but inadequate “to have all-around (three-dimensional)
control of blue water.” The PLAN leadership seems to
83
understand what it needs to achieve its strategic goals.
China’s ability to project power is key to its maritime
strategy and is central to Shi’s vision. This capability was
not a national security need before the 1985 strategic shift:
the Korean, Indian, and Vietnam excursions were overland
operations. Projecting power requires the ability to exercise
not just sea denial, but the ability to control or significantly
affect events ashore from sea-based units. A wide range of
activities may qualify, from a demonstration offshore (e.g.,
aircraft carriers deployed to the vicinity of Taiwan) to
launching cruise missiles from submarines against shore
targets (e.g., U.S. attacks on Iraq).
The PLAN must also be able to support forces at sea, over
time, and requires an amphibious assault capability. China
has never possessed a robust capability to transport and
land troops under combat conditions, and the PLAN does
not appear to be making a dramatic effort to correct this
84
deficiency.
The heart of China’s navy is surface combatants,
described as the “vital” or “main” PLAN component. The
Chinese class their warships “on a par with foreign
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warships of the 1980s,” but that is an optimistic estimate.
The PLAN surface forces suffers from ASW, AAW, and
ASUW deficiencies, and especially from a lack of effective
area defense—the ability to defend not just individual
ships, but groups of lightly armed transports.

The PLAN has frequently demonstrated its ability to
deploy and maintain ships in the South China Sea, although
these exercises have not drawn as much attention as those
in the Taiwan Strait area. In mid-October 1996, for
instance, the PLA reportedly conducted a 15-day exercise
86
“seizing islands.” This exercise, as well as those conducted
in the vicinity of Taiwan in 1995 and 1996, is clear evidence
of the PLAN exercising in support of national strategic
objectives. This linkage between training and/or exercising
and maritime strategy is more significant than the
technological complexity of that training. A 21st century
PLAN must possess both the technological sophistication
and personnel expertise required to accomplish its strategic
87
goals.
These shortfalls may be at least partially compensated
for by innovative operational doctrine. This in turn is driven
by the putative revolution in military affairs (RMA), which
was demonstrated in Operation DESERT STORM and
dramatically emphasized during the U.S. campaign in
Kosovo, and appears to offer such an opportunity to some
PLA strategists. One has written, for instance, that “cruise
missiles are the vanguard, aerial strength is the main
power, and the ground, sea, air, space, and electromagnetism are integrated. This will become a basic mode for
the recent and future high-technology regional war,”
the battlefield for which “will be a digitized battlefield”
88
(emphasis added).
Nuclear Deterrence at Sea. The PLAN faces financial,
industrial, and technological limitations integrating the
RMA; nuclear deterrence may be the naval strategic
mission to receive priority. China has built two strategic
missile submarines: a conventionally powered Golf-class (a
305

1950s Soviet design) and a nuclear-propelled Xia-class,
neither of which is apparently operational. These ships are
both capable of launching the CSS-N-3 1,500 nm-range
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM).
China is reportedly building a follow-on class to the Xia,
the Project-094 boat. This effort may be receiving Russian
assistance and has the potential to alter radically the
strategic maritime picture in Asia: a Project-094 armed
with the new JL-2 ICBM (a possibly MIRVed maritime
version of the DF-31 nearing the end of development) would
for the first time enable China to put a strategic deterrent to
sea that would credibly threaten the United States. The new
89
FBM will likely go to sea during the next decade.
Air Power at Sea. Any effective offshore maritime
strategy requires air power, and no aspect of PLAN
modernization attracts more interest and generates more
concern than the possible acquisition of aircraft carriers. A
carrier is seen as providing China with air cover for the
long-range power projection needed to seize and hold
disputed territory such as the Spratly Islands. And a PLAN
carrier force operating east of Taiwan would place that
island’s air defense forces in the middle of an attack from
two fronts, if the PLA were able to coordinate carrier-based
attacks with shore-based attacks from the mainland and
successfully defend the carrier.
Aircraft carrier acquisition is potentially the PLAN’s
most important modernization decision. Will the first
carrier be a small, 12,000- to 16,000-ton vessel with a “ski
jump” bow to facilitate launching its fixed wing aircraft, or
will it be a large conventional-takeoff-and-landing (CTOL)
40,000- to 60,000-ton ship with catapults and arresting
wires? Building and operating a CTOL carrier would be a
very ambitious undertaking that would impact PLA (not
just PLAN) force structure in a basic way.
Thailand’s purchase of a carrier, coming on the heels of
U.S. carriers’ arrival in the Taiwan area in March 1996,
90
must have further frustrated PLAN strategists. Never
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was the effectiveness of aircraft carriers as political
instruments more directly felt by Beijing. Indeed, Chinese
acquisition of a carrier in the near future, in conjunction
with the purchase of anti-carrier Sovremennys, will indicate
that the United States’ 1996 action spurred China’s naval
modernization on a scale similar to that followed by the
Soviet Union after the embarrassment of the 1962 Cuban
Missile Crisis. It will also be an indicator that Deng
Xiaoping’s four national priorities have changed.
In fact, PLAN strategists who favor large carriers may
be forgetting that aircraft carriers are a means, not an end.
The “end” is correcting the PLAN’s most crucial shortcoming—
the lack of air power at sea. Solving this deficiency may
involve carriers, but it almost certainly does not require
large CTOL ships.
Prospects: Beijing’s Maritime Strategy.
China faces five major maritime security situations in
Asia: Japan, Taiwan, the South China Sea, India, and vital
SLOCs. Maritime strategists in Beijing are reminded of
their navy’s shortcomings every day the U.S. Navy deploys
across East Asia—which no doubt helps fuel the current
campaign to modernize the PLAN. The navy seeks greater
support as a key player within the army-dominated PLA
and in the national security policy process. Casting the
United States as the adversary facilitates these efforts,
given the overwhelmingly maritime nature of U.S. presence
in East Asia.
The 14th CCP Congress in October 1992 elected eight
admirals to its Central Committee, including Liu Huaqing.
Liu retired at the September 1997 15th Party Congress as
China’s senior uniformed officer, however, which has likely
not helped the PLAN’s modernization program. Six
admirals were named to the Central Committee at this
congress. Additionally, the current PLAN commander,
Vice-Admiral Shi Yunsheng, is relatively junior.
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Although Shi has claimed that the “CPC leadership”
believes that “building a powerful People’s Navy” is the
“major task of our Army building,” his ability to prevail in
91
budget contests is not likely to match that of Liu Huaqing.
The Chinese Navy remains much smaller than the army,
and it is not clear that its disproportionate share of the
defense budget has resulted in significantly greater clout
within the senior ranks of Chinese strategists.
The PLAN offers China’s leaders a flexible, ready
instrument of power projection, and Beijing has not
hesitated to use the PLAN to achieve strategic goals:
witness the 1974, 1988, 1995, and 1998-99 actions in the
South China Sea. “Offshore Defense” is a maritime strategy
with clear offensive implications. Beijing is moving its
strategic line seaward from the coast, demonstrating that
the navy has a key role in China’s 21st century strategy.
Insofar as the PLAN is concerned, a strategy of “offshore
defense” includes missions to (1) contain and resist foreign
aggression from the seas, (2) defend China’s territory and
sovereignty, and (3) safeguard the motherland’s unification
92
and marine rights.
These strategic objectives translate into complex and
difficult specific missions, including: (1) preparing for
operations against Taiwan; (2) defending Chinese claims in
the East and South China Seas; (3) maintaining a strategic
deterrent force against the United States (and possibly
India and Russia); (4) protecting vital SLOCS—some lying a
93
great distance from China; and, (5) serving as a diplomatic
94
force.
Beijing’s maritime strategy development seeks to
include both modern technology and Maoist doctrine, as in
“the use of strategy can reverse the balance of combat
95
strength.” The ideal maritime strategy will overcome
recognized shortcomings in doctrine, equipment, and
96
training. A strategy cannot, however, overcome the
shortfalls in mobility and power projection that mark the
PLAN.
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The PLAN is a long way from being the dominant naval
power in East Asia, even apart from the U.S. maritime
presence. The JMSDF is certainly superior to the PLAN,
and the ROKN would be a very difficult opponent. Even the
Taiwan navy would not be a pushover for the PLAN.
Clearly, a wise maritime strategist in Beijing would not, in
the event of conflict, position the PLAN “one-on-one”
against any of these modern naval forces.
A more thoughtful strategy would be required for the
PLAN to achieve specific goals in the face of opposition by
the USN, the JMSDF, the ROKN, or the Taiwan Navy. One
aspect of such a strategy would almost certainly be
employment of information warfare methods to counter the
advanced military technological superiority of these
fleets—a capability more discussed than demonstrated in
China.
Another strategic step in such a conflict would be to gain
the initiative through preemption. This does not necessarily
97
require a “bolt from the blue,” but could be achieved by
seizing the initiative at a time of significant naval weakness
on the part of the adversary.
The PLAN’s strategic responsibilities are challenging. It
does not have the resources to defend distant SLOCs, and
the distances involved in securing the South China Sea are
daunting to a navy weak in air power, amphibious lift, and
logistics sustainment. The opposition posed by Taiwan
makes any assault on that island a significant military as
well as political problem. And in the Japanese navy, the
PLAN would face a superior adversary. To be effective,
China’s maritime strategy must compensate for the PLAN’s
material shortcomings and its lack of operational
experience. That said, the PLAN today is a formidable force
within littoral East Asia, and is viewed as a vehicle for
98
aggression.
Some analysts combine thoughts of the RMA with
China’s extensive maritime claims to conclude that China
needs to establish the maritime power necessary to defend
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its interests, including Taiwan and the SCS. One such
view from Beijing describes the sea as the “New High
Ground of Strategic Competition” and focuses PLAN
attention on five areas of international rivalry, those over
ocean islands, sea-space jurisdiction, marine resources,
maritime strategic advantage, and strategic sea-lanes. The
seas are described as both “a protective screen” but also as “a
marine invasion route.” Naval missions are seen as first,
coastal defense; second, control of the “sea space,” which is
“four dimensional,” including air, surface, subsurface, and
the seabed. The Asia-Pacific region is defined as a “priority
region of maritime strategic competition.”
Control of the seas involves many areas, including political,
economic, diplomatic, science and technology, and military.
Military control of the seas means achieving and defending
national unification, defending national maritime territorial
sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, protecting
legitimate maritime economic activities and scientific research,
and ensuring a peaceful and stable climate for national reform,
opening, and coastal economic development, by dealing with
possible maritime incidents, armed conflicts, and local wars. . . .
our Navy has an inescapable mission. . . . The 21st century is
going to be a maritime one. . . . we will have to make our
maritime strategy a key part.100

Today and for the next decade, given the presence of
peaceful borders to the north and west, Beijing’s national
security priorities lie to the maritime east and southeast.
The PLAN must be able to control East Asian seas to
facilitate accomplishment of Beijing’s strategic aims, but
China faces significant hurdles in the technological and
industrial infrastructure and resource availability needed
to deploy a regionally dominant navy.
A strategist in Beijing faces several strategic priorities.
First may be a national imperative to establish an effective
nuclear deterrent force at sea as the core of a 21st century
maritime strategy. Second will be maintenance of a naval
presence throughout East Asia, using port visits to the
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nations of Northeast and Southeast Asia, with an occasional
foray to Southwest Asia and the Western Hemisphere.
Within this general policy of presence, the PLAN will be
focused, as part of a joint force with the PLAAF, on specific
objectives, starting with Taiwan. This in turn requires a
credible power-projection force, with enough amphibious
and logistics capability to take and hold disputed territory
in the East and South China Seas. Fifth, SLOC defense will
be pursued; likely avenues are expanding a presence west of
Malacca and diplomatic efforts in Southwest Asia.
Finally, the question of Taiwan will dominate national
security strategy discussions. PLAN strategists will have to
ensure that their force remains a key player in plans to
coerce Taiwan’s reunification, but do so in a manner that
will not consume all modernization efforts. Given present
and probable future budget resources, it would not be in the
PLAN’s interest, for example, to have to build a massive
amphibious force.
The first stage of Liu Huaqing’s reported strategy—to
control China’s adjacent seas out to the “first island chain,”
is reasonable and attainable within the next 20 years, but
only if Beijing changes the national prioritization of
resource allocation necessary to build a modern maritime
force. There is currently insufficient evidence—acquisition
of technology and a few units of disparate ship classes do not
qualify—to conclude that such a significant shift is being
101
made. Comparison to Germany’s late 19th century naval
building “dash” to catch up to Great Britain’s navy is not a
valid analogy of what China could do. Imperial Germany
already possessed in the late 1890s an industrialtechnological-scientific infrastructure equal and perhaps
superior to Britain’s: China fails completely to match this
status. Also, Germany built the wrong navy; it was unable
to serve as more than a coastal defense force and, in the final
analysis, served little more purpose than to absorb vast
quantities of national resources while needlessly alienating
102
Great Britain and other powers.
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Conclusion.
Earlier, I posed a list of nine factors that affect a nation’s
development of a maritime strategy. How does China
measure up? First, training and education programs are
receiving increasing attention as the professional
specialization of the officer corps increases. Progress
undeniably is being made to adopt modern training and
education systems and methodology, but suffers from time
devoted to political education and resource limitations.
Second, naval systems and platform costs, capabilities,
and sustainability are the focus of PLAN modernization
efforts. As new systems and platforms are bought on the
global market and produced in China, the PLAN suffers
from resource limitations, a relatively weak indigenous
infrastructure, and low starting point for modernization.
Third, the national scientific and industrial
infrastructure for research, development, and production of
naval warfare technology and systems is improving, but
remains inadequate to support rapid design and buildup of
state-of-the-art systems from drawing board to operational
force in a timely manner. Hence the continued reliance on
foreign purchases.
Fourth, the ability to derive doctrine and tactics is
uncertain, but clearly advancing, as evidenced in
publications, military education and training, and
exercises, especially those focused on joint operations, use of
information warfare (IW), and integrated systems
employment.
Fifth, the ability to administer, operate, and command
and control tactical units beyond individual ships is
improving, as demonstrated by current administrative
streamlining and recent long-range deployments of small
flotillas, but is still a question mark on a fleet or theater
level. Sixth, sources of intelligence, and its production,
analysis, and dissemination absorb major resources and
may be a mainstay of PLAN modernization.
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Seventh, service-wide naval strategic planning appears
to be ongoing, with apparent focus on trying to avoid rather
than on matching a potential adversary’s (i.e., the United
States) strengths. Eighth, naval influence at the national
level is probably weaker following Lui Huaqing’s
retirement. The awareness of maritime power is likely
being increased, however, based on China’s increasing
dependence on international trade and commercial
shipping.
Finally, there seems no evidence that naval strategists
hold an enhanced position in the national strategy-making
structure. Their status is likely to rise, however, in
proportion to the degree of crisis in maritime situations,
such as Taiwan or the South China Sea.
China is pursuing a conscious maritime strategy
designed to achieve near-term national security objectives
and longer-term regional maritime dominance through
both combatant and merchant fleets. In the near term,
Beijing is building a navy capable of decisively influencing
the operational aspects of the Taiwan and South China Sea
situations, should diplomacy and other instruments of
statecraft fail. Establishing PLAN or PLAN-AF bases in the
Spratlys (perhaps by artificially enlarging one of the land
forms) and on Burmese territory would provide a starting
point for a major Chinese role in controlling the Malacca
and associated straits, key to the economic life of East Asia.
Power-projection ashore, with its emphasis on littoral
warfare, also tends to lessen the traditional importance
placed on “blue-water operations,” ironically at the very
time when China seems focused on developing a navy
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specifically for that arena.
Furthermore, in addition to
the problem of pursuing multiple paths to modernization,
the PLAN is caught up in a web of ideology and domestic
politics that complicates the inherently expensive and
complex process of building a navy. The shorthand terms
“red versus expert” or “ideology versus technology” serve to
sum up the problem faced by Chinese strategists trying to
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build a large, modern navy—be it in the 15th, 19th, or late
20th centuries. It is a situation to be welcomed by China’s
maritime neighbors.
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